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Introduction: Resident Koreans on Film 
 My interest in the cinematic use and representation of Koreans and Resident 
Koreans in Japanese film began in 2004 when I watched Ōshima Nagisa’s 大島渚 
(1932-2013) 1983 film Senjō no Merī Kurisumasu (戦場のメリークリスマス, Merry 
Christmas, Mr. Lawrence) for the first time. Besides the homoerotic tensions shared 
between David Bowie and Sakamoto Ryūichi, the scene that made the largest 
impression on me was one that depicted the brutalization of a Korean soldier serving in 
the Japanese army by a Japanese sergeant played by Beat Takeshi. After watching this 
film, I began to search for other Japanese films that contained Korean characters and 
came across Yukisada Isao’s 行定勲 (1968- ) seminal film Go! (2001), which acted as 
my introduction to Japan’s Resident Korean community as well as films depicting 
Resident Koreans. With my general interest firmly in place, my academic interest in 
these films was ignited when I had the chance to view Ōshima’s film Kōshikei (絞死刑, 
1968) in 2006 which introduced me both to a critique of institutionalized racism in 
Japan towards Resident Koreans and 1960s avant-garde Japanese film. As I worked on 
other projects, the subject of how Resident Koreans were represented in Japanese films 
remained in the back of my head and later developed through my readings of W.E.B. Du 
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Bois, Frantz Fanon, and Paul Gilroy. However, it was not until I came across Matsuda 
Masao’s 松田政男 (1933- ) and Adachi Masao’s 足立正生 (1939- ) theory Fûkeiron 
(風景論 Landscape Theory), detailed below, that I developed a more critical way of 
understanding how Japanese directors use Resident Korean characters in their films. 
 Consisting of four chapters, this thesis opens with a short introduction to 
pre-colonial and colonial Korean history and prewar and postwar Resident Korean 
history. Chapter two, after giving a brief description of Japanese victim consciousness 
and how it was spread throughout Japan through melodrama films, delves into the 
history of late 1950s and early 1960s films created by leftist humanist Japanese 
directors. These films depict diluted Resident Korean characters whose primary purpose 
is to reflect the positive qualities of the Japanese characters who appear in the films 
while more serious aspects of Resident Korean history remain absent. Concerned with 
the way in which the leftist humanist directors handled their Resident Korean characters, 
the third chapter of this thesis takes a close look at Matsuda and Adachi’s theory of 
landscape and uses it to show how marginalized individuals such as the non-Korean 
serial killer Nagayama Norio, the original subject for the theory of landscape, and the 
white-robed Resident Koreans in an early Ōshima Nagisa documentary film are 
controlled by Japanese political power that manifests itself in homogenous landscape 
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that was an ubiquitous presence throughout late 1960s and early 1970s Japan. The 
fourth and final chapter of this thesis concerns itself with the diagram of the 
microphysics of power which is embedded within Japan’s homogeneous landscape and 
is responsible for both the creation and death of individuals like the previously 
mentioned Nagayama Norio and the Resident Korean Ri Chin’ U and his filmic 
representative R in Ōshima’s Death by Hanging. 
 In writing this thesis I hope to accomplish two primary goals. One is to outline 
a general history of the representation of Resident Koreans in postwar Japanese films 
until 1970 and show how Japanese directors, both postwar humanist leftist directors and 
1960s avant-garde directors used the images of Resident Koreans for their own 
purposes. Also, I hope that this thesis helps to show that the theory of landscape is more 
than an old Japanese film theory that has gained recent academic interest because it is 
quite useful as a critique in understanding how the Japanese state marginalizes 
individuals within its own borders while controlling the general populace. 
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Chapter 1: A Short History of Japan’s Resident Korean Population 
 
1.1.1 Threatened by the West 
In 1881, the politician and historian Takekoshi Yosaburō竹越與三郎 
(1865-1950) wrote that in the Edo Period (1603-1868) the Japanese had no conception 
of the archipelago being a “nation” until the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry 
(1794-1858).
1
 The threat that Perry and his Kurofune 黒船 (Black Ships) represented 
forced the Japanese to engage in a decades-long process of revamping their traditional, 
social, political, and economic structures and, according to Takekoshi, the combined 
threat of the West and the modernization/Westernization of Late Edo and Early Meiji 
Japan resulted in “the 300 or so domains bec[oming] siblings and the many tens of 
thousands of people realiz[ing] that they were one people.”2 
 Responding to the threat from the West, the Meiji government engaged in a 
program of nation-building which closely resembled colonial expansion through the fact 
that local cultural institutions, such as local gods, dialects, costumes, cuisine, holidays, 
                                                   
1
 Mark E. Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945. (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2009), p.50. 
2
 Takekoshi Yosaburō as quoted in Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, p.50; Hong Yung Lee, 
“Introduction: A Critique of ‘Colonial Modernity’” in Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea, 
1910-1945. Hong Yung Lee, Yong-Chool Ha, and Clark W. Sorensen, editors. (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 2013), p.4. 
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were replaced by ones that the Meiji elite considered to be “civilized” and which they 
desired to see recognized at a “national” level.3 In order to spread these newly minted 
national cultural institutions through both interior lands and the peripheries of the 
archipelago, the Meiji government implemented compulsory education and universal 
male conscription as the primary vehicles to reach the Japanese masses.
4
 These 
measures were necessary in order to imbed a “Japanese identity” into the minds of 
Japan’s incredibly diverse population.5 The creation of a nationwide Japanese identity 
was beneficial to the Meiji elite because not only did it create a larger population that 
could be taxed and conscripted, but also helped to ensure that peripheral populations 
would not join with a foreign power and turn against Japan.
6
 Another primary goal of a 
homogenized Japanese identity was that it acted as a sign to the international 
community that the Meiji government was legitimate and that it had advanced to 
civilization.
7
 
 Securing Japan’s peripheries was a major goal of the Japanese state because, 
according to Kume Kunitake 久米邦武 (1839-1931), in order for the Japanese to “be 
                                                   
3
 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, p.54. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid., p.55. 
6
 Ibid., pp.55-56. Although the Meiji government included Okinawans and Ainu within this goal to 
homogenize Japanese identity, it should be noted that these ethnic minorities were still heavily 
discriminated against. “Pure” Japanese still considered Okinawans and Ainu foreign and when these 
groups attempted to identity with the Japanese, they received even more vicious rejections. Caprio, 
Japanese Assimilation Policies, pp.67-70. 
7
 Ibid., p.56. 
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at peace with one another,” it was essential for Japan to be “a country which was 
threatened by no enemies on land or sea on any side.”8 Thus the Meiji government 
continued its pursuit of modernization through looking to the West as a model and 
developed its own plan for imperial expansion.
9
 With the West acting as both catalyst 
and model, one can see that Japan’s quest for empire was not based solely on conquest 
or the inevitable law of monopolistic capitalism, but was conceived as a method for 
self-preservation.
10
 Indeed, with the goal of preventing Japan’s own colonization firmly 
in mind, the Meiji elite adopted the institutions of the West and thereby formed the 
belief that “in order to have a nation a country must also have an empire.”11 Viewed 
either as a “singularly heroic defiance in the face of Euro-American intimidation” or a 
“tragic Faustian compromise,” the Meiji elite’s need for empire reflected its own desire 
to show that it could replicate the best practices of Euro-American imperialism and 
surpass them as well.
12
 
 
1.1.2 Japan’s Desire for Korea 
                                                   
8
 Kume Kunitake as quoted in Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, p.52. 
9
 Oh Seon-hwa, Kankoku heigō e no michi. (Tokyo: Bungeishunjū, 2000), p.39. 
10
 E. Taylor Atkins, Primitive Selves: Koreana in the Japanese Colonial Haze, 1910-1945. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010), pp.25, 93; Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler 
Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011, p.9. 
11
 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, pp.50-51; Uchida, Brokers of Empire, p.8 
12
 Atkins, Primitive Selves, p.37. 
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 Due to its proximity to the Japanese archipelago, the Japanese long had their 
eye on the Korean peninsula and often, at times more intrusive than others, 
implemented strategies to safeguard their interests within Korean affairs.
13
 This 
concern with Korea grew with the inception of the Meiji Period and the Japanese state 
became increasingly aggressive towards the peninsula.
14
 This aggression was the result 
of Japan’s concern that, if Japan were to be attacked by a foreign power such as Qing 
China or Tsarist Russia, the assault would originate from the Korean Peninsula.
15
  
 In 1869, deeply concerned with such a possible invasion, the Meiji government 
sent an ambassador to Pusan. However, the message from the Japanese emperor that the 
ambassador carried was quickly rejected by the Yi Dynasty because it contained the 
words kōjō 皇上 (emperor) and hōchoku 奉勅 (receiving an imperial decree).16 These 
words were problematic for the staunchly Confucian Yi Dynasty because for it “kō (皇)” 
was to only be used by the Chinese emperor and “choku (勅)” was to be used solely for 
Chinese imperial edicts.
17
 For the Yi dynasty, the Japanese use of these Chinese 
characters openly displayed the arrogant attitude of the Japanese state toward Korea.
18
 
                                                   
13
 Ibid., p.25 
14
 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, p.14. 
15
 Atkins, Primitive Selves, p.16; Kum Byondon, Nihonjin no Chōsen kan: so no hikari to kage. (Tokyo: 
Fujiwara Shoten, 2006), p.250. 
16
 Oh, Kankoku heigō e no michi, pp.36-37. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid., pp.41-42. 
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Primarily, according to Oh Seon-hwa, the Yi Dynasty was disgruntled by the fact that 
the Japanese were disrupting the huá-yí 華夷 continuum, a system established by the 
Chinese in which the cultural level of surrounding countries was determined by their 
level of Sinification, by using characters that placed the Japanese Emperor—or Japanese 
king according to the Yi Dynasty—at a higher rank than the Korean king despite the fact 
that the Korean king was officially a “liege subject” of the Chinese Emperor and the 
Japanese king was not.
19
 The Meiji government continued to send ambassadors to 
Pusan, but they were systematically rejected by the Yi dynasty because messages and 
formats were similarly problematic.”20 Since the Japanese had broken the protocol of 
the huá-yí continuum, the highly conservative Yi dynasty labelled the Japanese 
“improvised Western barbarians” and placed them under the nineteenth century Korean 
policy of wijeong cheoksa/eisei sekija 衛正斥邪 (upholding the right and expelling the 
wrong), refusing to hear out the Japanese ambassadors.
21
 
 On its part the Meiji government refused to back down, and sent an expedition 
to seize the guesthouse where the Japanese ambassadors resided.
22
 After this violent 
display, the Yi Dynasty suspended trade and further negotiations with Japan, and the 
                                                   
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid., pp.36-37. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid., pp.37-38. 
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Japanese responded with renewed aggression.
23
 It was at this point that the seikanron 
征韓論 (advocacy of a punitive expedition to Korea) discourse began to rise anew in 
Japan. At this point, the Meiji government was not planning for the colonization of the 
Korean peninsula, but desired to dissolve the huá-yí continuum which acted as part of 
the reason why Korea refused to open to Japan and the rest of the world.
24
 This 
situation was particularly troublesome for the Japanese because, if Korea did not open 
up and modernize at a rapid pace, the peninsula could easily be colonized by a Western 
power and the security of Japan would be jeopardized.
25
 Thus, as long as the Yi 
Dynasty clung to the huá-yí continuum, the Meiji’s government’s decades of efforts for 
modernization would remain insufficient to protect Japan from possible invaders and 
this would hinder Japanese plans to create a new East Asian world order which could 
help protect East Asia from Western powers.
26
 
 As the Meiji government’s sense of crisis continued to grow, it came to the 
conclusion that Korea was not going to abandon the huá-yí continuum and modernize to 
establish its own security and independence.
27
 However, although the Japanese well 
understood that Korea would not modernize through its own efforts and secure its own 
                                                   
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Oh Seon-hwa, Seikatsusha no nihon no tōji jidai: naze a”yoki kankei” no kataranai no ka. (Tokyo: 
Sankōsha, 2000), p.29. 
25
 Oh, Kankoku heigō e no michi, p.39; Oh, Seikatsusha no nihon, p.29. 
26
 Oh, Kankoku heigō e no michi, p.39 
27
 Oh, Seikatsusha no nihon, p.32. 
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independence, they did not engage with the Yi dynasty immediately because they had to 
strengthen their own national power.
28
 China, also, could not involve itself within 
Korean affairs at this time because of its own issues with Westerners that it was 
suffering through.
29
 The regent leader of Korea, the Daewongun 大院君 (1820-1898), 
took advantage of Japan’s situation, and attempted to pull Korea into deep seclusion, 
install a severe autocratic rule within the peninsula, and show loyalty only to China.
30
  
Eventually, The Daewongun was toppled by the Empress Myeongseong 
(1851-1895, hereafter referred to as Queen Min). The Empress was supported by a 
group of yangban兩班, Korea’s traditional ruling class of Confucian scholars, who 
were heavily oppressed by the autocratic rule of the Daewongun.
31
 Having taken 
control, Queen Min reformed the Daewongun’s restoration policy and his severe policy 
of seclusion.
32
 Queen Min herself was not a progressive, but select yangban who had 
been oppressed by the Daewongun were. Following their lead, Queen Min attempted to 
enter diplomatic negotiations with the Meiji government. This move was also supported 
by the Chinese government who thought it best for Korea to avoid conflict with Japan
33
  
The Koreans and the Japanese however were unable to meet each other 
                                                   
28
 Oh, Kankoku heigō e no michi, pp.43-44. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid., pp.45-46. 
32
 Ibid., pp.46-47. 
33
 Ibid. 
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halfway about how the reception would be formed.
34
 Issues such as the Koreans’ desire 
for the Japanese to wear traditional attire rather than Western clothing, and the Japanese 
desire to enter through the gate that normally was only to be used by the Chinese 
ambassador because they considered Japan to lay outside of the huá-yí continuum, 
rankled both sides, and consensus could not be formed between the two parties.
35
 Thus, 
arrogance and lack of understanding and consideration on both sides prevented any type 
of negotiations. According to Oh Seon-hwa, if the Yi Dynasty had been willing to work 
with the Meiji government at this critical point, the Japanese might not have used 
gunboat diplomacy to open the country and subsequently force the Yi Dynasty to sign 
the Treaty of Kanghwa, an unequal treaty that heavily leaned in Japanese favor and that 
was based on similar treaties that Western countries had imposed on Japan after its own 
forced opening.
36
 
 Queen Min and her progressive advisers continued to press reformist policies 
with the Japanese, but they were countered by conservative Confucians and wijeong 
cheoksa supporters who had deep concerns about Korea becoming involved with 
foreign powers. For example, since they believed that trade with foreign powers would 
bring dependence on foreign countries, instead of empowering Korea through Japanese 
                                                   
34
 Ibid., p.47. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid., p.49. 
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intervention, they felt it was better for the peninsula to empower itself.
37
 With such 
dissent spawned by conservative Confucians, Queen Min and her bureaucrats were 
forced to attempt to pass progressive policies without popular support.
38
 Queen Min 
hired Japanese advisors to help reform regulations for the government and the military, 
but, unfortunately, she placed many of her own relatives into positions of power and 
they were thoroughly corrupt.
39
 Hated for their financial waste and embezzlement of 
taxes, Queen Min’ relatives were further demonized by the Korean masses for their 
continuous demands for even more money.
40
 The crisis created by these government 
officials manifested into a strong opposition campaign symbolized by the deposed 
Daewongun.
41
 Queen Min further entrenched herself into the bad graces of the Meiji 
government by seeking the favor of the Qing government.
42
 Therefore, although the 
Japanese had attempted to modernize Korea through both relatively peaceful and more 
forcible means, the peninsula remained mired in corruption, conservatism, and torn by 
factionalism.
43
  
Even if such factionalism and corruption had not been as rampant throughout 
                                                   
37
 Ibid., p.58. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid., pp.59-60. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid.,pp.59-60. 
42
 Ibid., p.60. 
43
 Ibid. 
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the peninsula, however, it is doubtful that the Meiji could have convinced the Yi 
Dynasty to follow it into modernization willingly. For one, even after China was 
defeated in the first Sino-Japanese War, the Yi Dynasty remained staunchly pro-Chinese. 
Secondly, the Koreans approached Russia to safeguard it from the Japanese.
44
 These 
actions displayed the sheer revulsion Koreans felt towards being ruled by a country that 
they viewed to be barbaric and that they despised historically.
45
 
 
1.1.3 The Annexation of Korea 
 With the Korean peninsula being both “strategically critical and tantalizingly 
convenient,” while being a wild and untamed threat, the Meiji state was quick to heed 
the advice of foreign powers about how to handle its Korean problem.
46
 As I wrote 
above, the Meiji state was well aware of the danger that Korea represented being only 
120 miles away and, for nearly two decades after its inception, it attempted to have a 
cooperative relationship with the peninsula. However, after experiencing years of 
trouble and having the Prussian general Klemens Wilhelm Jacob Meckel (1842-1905) 
state that Korea was “a dagger thrust at the heart of Japan” in 1885, the urgency for 
                                                   
44
 Oh, Seikatsusha no nihon, p.29. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, pp.16, 87. 
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homeland security reached its apex.
47
 Another reason why Meckel’s words of warning 
were quite important to the Meiji state was that they represented a Western power’s 
support for Japan’s more aggressive actions in securing, and later annexing, the Korean 
peninsula.
48
 Indeed, international law recognized that intervention was a proper action 
by a given power when the “inept government” of another country put the former in real 
danger.
49
 In part, the Western powers were primarily concerned with protecting their 
own Asian possessions, but they were also well aware of the corruption of the Yi 
Dynasty and thereby saw Japan’s increasingly aggressive moves on Korea as a natural 
current of an international situation.
50
 
 Riding its own wave of aggression to expel and to prevent foreign powers from 
overtaking Korea, Japan engaged in the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) and the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) in order to ward off Qing China and Tsarist Russia. 
Also, violence in peninsular affairs increased; the assassination of Queen Min in 1895 
was arguably the pinnacle of Japanese brutality with Korean affairs. Two months after 
the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Korea signed the Eulsa Treaty of 
1905, which cost Korea its diplomatic sovereignty and thereby made the peninsula a 
                                                   
47
 Atkins, Primitive Selves, pp.19-20; Uchida, Brokers of Empire p.9. 
48
 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, p.16 
49
 Ibid., p.88. 
50
 Oh, Seikatsusha no nihon, p.31. 
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protectorate of Japan. The Japanese reasoned that the protectorate was necessary due to 
the Meiji government’s interests in the political and military affairs of Korea that had a 
direct influence on Japan’s own safety.51 According to the “Declaration of the Japanese 
Government” issued on November 22, 1905, the Japanese government had attempted to 
guide Korea throughout the previous decades as an advisor, but this role had proved 
insufficient and Korea proved time after time to be a “most fruitful source of 
complications” especially in the realm of international concerns.52 Since to let Korea 
continue on its current course would bring even more “fresh difficulties” to Japan, the 
Meiji government decided to take measures to put an end to this “dangerous situation” 
in order to pacify East Asia.
53
  
The Meiji government, however, was not finished. In 1907, the Korean 
government was forced to give up control of all internal affairs and leave them in 
Japanese hands. In 1910, supposedly failing in their attempts to “sweep away evils 
rooted during the course of many years,” “to secure the well-being of the Korean 
Imperial family,” and “to ensure the safety and repose of Japanese foreign residents,” 
amongst other reasons, the Meiji government came to the decision that it was necessary 
to fully annex the Korean peninsula and to place it under the control of the Japanese 
                                                   
51
 “Declaration of the Japanese Government” as quoted in Atkins, Primitive Selves, p.23. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
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Imperial Government.
54
 After the Japanese annexed Korea, they changed the name of 
Korea back to Chosŏn (J: Chōsen) 朝鮮 after it had been renamed Daehan Jeguk 
大韓帝國 (Great Korean Empire) by the penultimate Yi Dynasty ruler King Gojong 高
宗, turned Emperor Gwangmu 光武帝 (1852-1919) in 1897.55 This was significant 
because it erased the attempts by Emperor Gojong to promote the modernization of 
Korea in the face of adversity.
56
 Forcing the country to use the name of a “thoroughly 
discredited past state,” Japan squashed Gojong’s ambitions for a Korean empire.57 
 By annexing the Korean peninsula in 1910, the Japanese finally reached their 
goal of securing its borders and preserving its sovereignty while Western powers 
continued to rip through the rest of Asia.
58
 Korea also represented an important buffer 
against Tsarist Russia who, despite having been defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05, remained a significant threat for the Japanese.
59
 The annexation of the Korean 
peninsula also acted, in Jun Uchida’s words, as a “gate to the world” due its bordering 
China and Manchuria, two other countries that the Japanese eyed for expansion.
60
 
 One major debate about late Chosŏn Korea is whether or not it would have 
                                                   
54
 Annual Report of Reforms and Progress in Korea (1910-1911) as quoted in Atkins, Primitive Selves, 
pp.24-25. 
55
 Atkins, Primitive Selves, p.25; Yamabe Kentarō, Nihon tōjika no Chōsen. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 
1971), p.4. 
56
 Atkins, Primitive Selves, p.25. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid., p.15. 
59
 Uchida, Brokers of Empire p.9. 
60
 Ibid. 
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been able to keep itself from being colonized even if Japan had not been a threat to its 
sovereignty. During its final decades, the Yi Dynasty, already burdened by near 
bankruptcy, a heavily factionalized government, and experiencing domestic unrest from 
disgruntled peasants and disenfranchised yangban, faced the threat of Western powers. 
While Japan and China engaged in rapid Westernization in response to these threats, 
Daewongun’s response was to restore a traditional Confucian monarchy and strengthen 
wijeong cheoksa, which, supposedly, would be effective in countering Western 
battleships.
61
 According to Oh Seon-hwa, the primary reason why the Yi Dynasty had 
been able to maintain itself for so long during its last decades was because the West was 
ensnared with other conflicts at the time and that the Yi Dynasty could be overtaken at 
any time.
62
  
 The annexation/colonization of the Korean peninsula was seen by many as 
natural fate for the country. The diplomat and medical missionary Horace Allen 
(1858-1932) stated that Koreans were a people who “cannot govern themselves” and 
that “[t]hey must have an over-lord as they have had for all time.”63 If the Koreans were 
able to remove themselves from the control of an over-lord like China they generally 
made such a mess of their own affairs that it would “oblige someone else to take charge 
                                                   
61
 Oh, Kankoku heigō e no michi, pp.36. 
62
 Ibid., p.35. 
63
 Horace Allen as quoted in Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies, p.16 
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of them.”64 The Japanese were well aware that Korea had a long history of relying on a 
foreign power and they used this knowledge as a rationalization for increased 
aggressiveness towards the peninsula.
65
 Reflecting on Korea’s tendency to rely on a 
foreign power, the Japanese prime minister Hara Takashi 原敬 (1856-1921) stated that 
an “inborn characteristic” of Koreans was that they had no “concept of independence,” 
and Japanese control of Koreans simply put them into their natural state of being 
controlled.
66
 
 
1.1.4 Colonized Korea and Japanese Status 
 As with its journey in becoming a colonial power, Japan mimicked European 
powers in its attempts to reflect Japanese imperial prestige and grandeur through the 
exoticism of its colonized peoples.
67
 With this scheme in mind, the Japanese held 
acculturation tours for a select few colonized subjects, which not only allowed the 
colonized to see the modernized grandness of Japan, but also gave the Japanese people 
and media a firsthand image of the primitivism of the colonized Other with which they 
could compare their own modernized selves.
68
 For example, The Japan Times, 
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commenting on an acculturation tour by Taiwanese natives in 1897, reaffirmed the 
images of the Taiwanese as a backward people in the minds of the Japanese by 
commenting on their clothing, their language, and their reactions to trains.
69
 As Mark E. 
Caprio notes, The Japan Times and others thoroughly ignored issues such as the 
potential for the two peoples to assimilate while maximizing their differences in order to 
aggrandize the Japanese.
70
 Steeped in their own sense of superiority, the Japanese used 
the polarized differences of the Taiwanese as a reason to colonize and subjugate them.
71
 
 Labelling the Korean population was more problematic because they were too 
bureaucratic, literate, and sophisticated to be dismissed as primitive.
72
 Korea was 
considered by the Japanese to be, at worst, a “semi-civilized” country, thus, the 
Japanese, despite their historical difficulties with the peninsular country, respected 
Korea because of its high status on the huá-yí continuum, its familiarity with the 
Confucian Way, and because it had benefited greatly from centuries of Korean 
knowledge.
73
 To make the matter even more problematic, Japan and Korea, with their 
individual political identities based on Confucian values, and their comparable levels of 
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economic and technological development, were incredibly similar to each other by the 
mid-nineteenth century.
74
 Indeed, despite the fact that modern day Japanese rightists 
state that Japan transformed Korea “from a potentially degenerate kingdom to a 
well-ordered society” and shifted it “from a backward and poverty-stricken country to a 
productive and flourishing land,” Koreans argue that Japan was only able to colonize 
Korea because it had modernized a few decades earlier, and that Korea could have 
reached a similar level of modernization if not for Japan.
75
 With these issues in mind, 
the Japanese had to consider a different manner in which to differentiate the Koreans 
from themselves.
76
  
As E. Taylor Atkins states, the difference between the colonized and the 
colonizer is not based just on “geographical” or “cultural terms,” but on “temporal” 
ones as well.
77
 Koreans, despite their many cultural and historical similarities with the 
Japanese, were considered inferior by the Japanese because they were calcified in a 
“previous phase […] in the social evolutionary past” which the Japanese had surpassed 
years before.
78
 Thus, in order to enhance, once again, the grandeur of the Japanese state, 
the Japanese quickly gripped the supposed “temporal lag” of Koreans and spread 
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derogatory images of Korea throughout the metropole.
79
 For example, the author 
Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸稲造 (1862-1933) found Korea to be a “sedate,” “dignified,” and 
“finely chiseled” land, but it was not one of modern times. Instead, the Korea viewed by 
Nitobe made him feel as if he was “living three thousand years back in the age of our 
Kami.”80 Nitobe also found that the “physiognomy and living of this people are so 
bland, unsophisticated and primitive” that instead of belonging to the twentieth or even 
the tenth century, they belonged to a prehistoric age.
81
 Besides making the Japanese 
Empire appear grander, the presence of a spiritless Korean caught within a temporal lag 
justified the Japanese enlightened government’s encroachment upon Korean 
sovereignty.
82
 
 Japan’s view of Koreans as primitives is problematic, as Atkins notes, because 
it involves an older form of anthropological observation in which the “ethnographic 
other” was described and “critiqued by the cultural standards of the privileged 
observer.”83 The forms of critique and observation used by the ethnographers employed 
by the Japanese state categorized Koreans by comparing and contrasting them to other 
observed peoples and, due to the Japanese state’s desire to aggrandize its modernization 
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versus Korea’s primitiveness.84 Thus, these ethnographers molded their images of 
Koreans in such a manner that they appeared to be “a primordial people inhabiting 
another temporal dimension.”85 With its desire to make Koreans “‘fit’ primitivist 
paradigms,” the Japanese state, despite its decades-long effort to assimilate the Korean 
people, preserved indications of Korean difference through this ethnographic work.
86
 
Also, as we will see later in this chapter, these images negated whatever progress the 
Korean people made in their advancement toward modernization, thus, much of their 
exoticism and primitiveness was falsely created by the Japanese and was able to 
persevere because they “are maintained and exaggerated, and not disavowed or 
suppressed.”87 The images of Koreans being an exotic and primitive people would last 
until the 1930s, when wartime necessitated that new images of the Korean people be 
created.
88
 
 
1.1.5 Korea’s Need for Japan (According to Japan) 
 During the brief period that Korea was a protectorate of Japan, 1905-1910, and 
during the years of its annexation, 1910-1945, the Residency-General turned 
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Governor-General released the Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen.
89
 In 
the early volumes of this publication, the Japanese wrote scathing accounts on their 
viewpoints of the Korean people. In general, Koreans were viewed as a people who 
were prone to superstition, slothful, recalcitrant, and unsanitary.
90
 In an attempt to sum 
up the root cause of all that was wrong with the population, and how it was reflected in 
their clothing, cuisine, social habits, work habits, etc., the Japanese state utilized the 
“lazy native” trope that Caprio states experienced “extensive employment in the 
discourse of colonization at all levels of colonial activity.”91 One of the most highly 
disseminated pictures of the lazy Korean native was that of a slumbering Korean with 
his burden-laden mule waiting patiently for its master to awaken.
92
 Indeed, according to 
the historian and critic Yamaji Aizen 山路愛山 (1865-1917), although the average 
Korean laborer’s stature and strength surpassed that of the average Japanese laborer, his 
deeply seeded laziness made him avoid work until his hunger made it absolutely vital. 
However, after consuming his fill, his desire to work would quickly ebb.
93
 To make the 
status of the lazy Korean native even worse, Yamaji stated that the average Korean 
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laborer lacked the will to change his situation as well.
94
 The laziness of the Koreans 
was viewed as an “innate personality defect” that justified Japanese intervention into the 
peninsula and the subjugation of the Korean people.
95
 Also, as we will see later in this 
thesis, the lazy native trope implemented by the Japanese state, as with the Western 
nations it mimicked, justified the compulsion and coercion used to make the colonized 
into laborers for state projects.
96
 
 Who was responsible for Korean listlessness and temporal lag that resulted 
from it? As with the lag in securing its own borders, the Japanese blamed the “inept 
government” of Korea for the stagnation of the country’s cultural development and the 
crippling torpor that its people were experiencing.
97
 Supposedly, the decay of the 
Korean nation began, as I will detail later, with the Japanese and the Koreans being split 
apart from each other by the Chinese.
98
 Due to this artificial separation, the culture and 
society of the Korean peninsula developed under the thumb of the Chinese and the 
scholar-gentry of Korea, the yangban, displayed little individual development and 
slavishly modelled themselves on their Chinese superiors.
99
 This form of servitude 
implemented by the Koreans, sadae 事大 or serving the great, resulted, in the eyes of 
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the Japanese, in Korean culture being nothing more than a “substandard derivative of 
Chinese culture.”100 The Korean gentry’s slavish worship of its Chinese models earned 
even further contempt from the Japanese because it represented the Koreans’ 
willingness to make a “humiliating, voluntary surrender of sovereignty” to China.101 
The Japanese were further aggravated by the yangban because of their inexplicably 
arrogant and self-satisfied nature, which was readily displayed during Japan’s attempts 
to open Korea and lead it to modernization.
102
 Due to Japan’s difficult history with the 
yangban and the scholar-gentry’s slavish worship of the Chinese, which supposedly 
created the cultural variances and developmental gap between the Japanese and Koreans, 
the Japanese, as well as Korean nationalists, blamed the Korean nobility and the 
monarchy that ruled it for the stagnation of the Korean people.
103
 
 According to Japanese officials in Korea, the yangban were a group of 
individuals who were “accustomed to despise labour and indulge in idleness, whether 
they have property or not.”104 To make matters worse, as noted by the missionary 
Claude-Charles Dallet (1829-1878), the yangban were a highly factionalized group of 
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individuals who continuously vented their hatred upon each other.
105
 As Dallet noted, 
the yangban, who had, in the missionary’s words, rendered the last three centuries of 
Korean history into boring pap because it was made up of nothing more than 
“unproductive, bloody conflicts among the aristocracy,” did not have differences in 
policy or administrative principles, so they fought over their own dignity or the 
influence of their duty.
106
 Within this self-centered and bloody political society, 
common Koreans, who supposedly were the bearers of true Koreanness due to their lack 
of Sinification, were rendered completely voiceless and their opinions were simply not 
allowed within the political sphere.
107
 As Dallet wrote, the only times in which the 
yangban took notice of common Koreans was either to suppress them or to exploit them 
as much as possible.
108
 Living in such an environment in which the yangban enriched 
themselves through “long-standing official extortion and abuses,” it is not surprising 
that ordinary Koreans, due to the insecurity of their lives and property, were 
lackadaisical in the development of their occupations and improving their lives in 
general.
109
 Indeed, the general Ugaki Kazushige 宇垣一成 (1868-1956), who acted as 
the Governor-General of Korea twice, stated that the apathetic nature of the Koreans 
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ranked among the world’s worst and that their very existence held back the world’s 
development.
110
 According to the Japanese, the torpid nature of Koreans was engrained 
so deeply into their personhoods that it even affected their physical features. Despite the 
fact that their muscles for basic survival were supposedly superior to the Japanese, 
muscles that were used for “expressive movement” (hyōjō undo 表情運動) remained 
underdeveloped.
111
 Of course, if the physical characteristics of the Korean populace 
were affected by the general torpor that had come over the nation, its mental 
characteristics were affected as well. The journalist and educator Arakawa Gorō 荒川
五郎 (1865-1944) stated that, although Koreans “look just like the Japanese” their 
minds “appear[ed] to be a bit vacant” with “their mouths open and their eyes dull, 
somewhat lacking.”112 With the stagnation of the Korean populace’s minds and desire 
to work and prosper, the Japanese believed that the yangban had “fluttered away its 
[Korea’s] glory.”113 Thus the Japanese took it upon themselves to intervene in Korean 
affairs and instill in the Korean populace a “will to work for the betterment of the 
collective whole.”114  
 Steadfast in their belief that “leisure was a luxury not afforded people of a 
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civilized land,” the Japanese desire to pull Koreans out of the distant past and free them 
from their old ways was bolstered by the racial kinship that the two countries shared.
115
 
Many Japanese thinkers, such as the politician and bureaucrat Shimada Saburō 島田三
郎 (1852-1923) and the teacher and journalist Oyama Tōsuke小山東助 (1879-1919), 
believed that saving the Korean people from their inept government was absolutely 
necessary and that it needed to be done through “good governance.”116 However, as I 
stated above, the Japanese believed that the Koreans were unable to maintain 
self-government and that they lacked the desire for independence. Thus, as Oyama 
stated, it was necessary for Japan to colonize Korea and install an enlightening 
administration so that the peninsula could receive the “good governance that it 
desperately needed.”117 
 By establishing itself in Korea, the Japanese state hoped that through its good 
governance Koreans would be inspired to do things which they had failed at doing 
before, such as “complete a full day’s work” and strive for self-improvement.118 The 
Japanese also focused heavily on Korean women because they were the ones who 
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would instill such critical attributes desired by the Japanese state in their children 
through home education.
119
 Thus, through uprooting Korea’s inept government and 
attempting to install these desired attributes into the beings of the Korean public, the 
Japanese hoped to create a “new Korea” (shin Chōsen新朝鮮) that freed the Korean 
people from their “half-Chinese” (han-Shinajin 半支那人) existence created by the 
Korean monarchy and yangban.
120
 
 As for Japan’s leadership role, the first Governor-General of Korea, Terauchi 
Masatake 寺内正毅 (1852-1919), stated that “there naturally exists a relationship in 
which one is the leader and guide and the other, the follower and pupil.” While Korea 
had fallen into a long period of stagnation due to the wedge driven between it and Japan 
by China, Japan had continued to progress to modernization and civilization thanks to 
the “wise and beneficent reigns of her successive Emperors,” thus, due to this historical 
situation, Japan was indeed the leader and Korea the follower.
121
 This was Japan’s 
destined role because of the rapid road to modernization it took during the 
mid-nineteenth century. Indeed, as the liberal politician Ozaki Yukio 尾崎行雄 
(1858-1954) stated, around the time of the Gaspin Coup 甲申政變 in 1884, although 
China and Korea had led Japanese civilization in the past, “now Japan is the leading 
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country and China and Korea follow far behind.”122 By taking on the mission to rescue 
Korea from being caught within its archaic past and civilizing it, Japan effectively 
dismissed native Korean efforts to modernize.
123
 Indeed, Japan’s civilizing mission of 
Korea, in the words of Andre Schmid, stole the rhetoric of Korean intellectuals who 
were “rethinking…the [Korean] nation” and thereby “hijack[ed]” Korea’s own goals for 
modernization as reasoning for colonizing and subjugating the Korean people.
124
 
 
1.1.6: Same-Blooded Japanese and Koreans 
 As I have touched upon earlier in this chapter, Japan’s colonization of Korea 
was rather unique because it involved a nation colonizing another with a population of 
racially and culturally similar people.
125
 Indeed, up until the mid-nineteenth century, 
Japan and Korea were quite similar with their shared Confucian values and similar 
levels of economic and technological development.
126
 Thus, with the possible 
exceptions of British Ireland and French Algeria, no other imperial power could or did 
claim such a “racial bond” with the people it colonized as did the Japanese with 
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Koreans.
127
 Also, Japan’s encroachment upon Korea differed from more traditional 
colonized lands due to the fact that the peninsula possessed some “two thousand years 
of distinctive cultural, historical, political, and ethnic identity,” however, as Mark 
Peattie notes, the colonization of Korea fit the pattern of Japanese imperialism due to 
the fact that Japan tended to colonize “well populated lands whose inhabitants were 
racially akin” to it.128 Indeed, Japan and Korea shared similarities in being influenced 
by the Chinese, Buddhist heritage, linguistic likenesses, the seemingly shared heritage 
of Korean shamanism (musok) and traditional Shintō, etc.129 Combining their 
knowledge of the shared heritage of Korea and Japan with their view that Korea was 
caught within its primitive past, some Japanese looked at Koreans as if they were 
mirrors that reflected back their own primitive selves.
130
 Thus, for the Japanese, the 
same-bloodedness of the Koreans “made gazing on the ‘other’ as much an act of 
introspection as [of] surveillance.”131 
 Japan’s focus on Korea’s and its own shared heritage throughout the 
colonization of the Korean peninsula, 1910-1945, was markedly different than how it 
had viewed Korea during the Edo era. As Caprio writes, in pre-Meiji days, the Japanese 
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viewed Korea as foreign power with which they engaged in a fairly equal diplomatic 
relationship.
132
 However, despite this equal diplomatic relationship, Japan and Korea 
were engaged in a game of one-upmanship in which one claimed cultural superiority 
over the other.
133
 For example, the Japanese believed they were superior because 
Korean tours of Japan supposedly acted as “tours of tributary” and Koreans maintained 
that they were superior because of their “refusal to allow Japanese visits to the Korean 
capital.”134 As during the colonial period, negative images of Korea were abundant. In 
an early account, Ugaki Kazushige wrote: 
‘In Korea, hills are bald, fields are infertile, [and] tigers are walking around 
everywhere. A portion of the aristocrat scholars practice conspiracy, and most 
of the people wear white robes, hold long pipes in their mouths, indulge in 
napping in places like a pigsty, and they eat millet.’135 
Although these portrayals of Koreans remained firm throughout most of the colonial 
period, they changed from originally being used to solely paint Koreans as a filthy and 
archaic other to presenting them as kinsmen who desperately needed the civilizing 
mission of the Japanese. Thus, Japan’s interest in its shared cultural roots with Korea 
should be taken with a large grain of salt because this interest reflects the “flexibility 
and malleability of images to fit situation and purpose.”136 
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1.1.7: Expansion and the Historical Japanese Self 
 As mentioned earlier, Japan, like other colonial powers, used ethnography and 
anthropology as tools to differentiate itself from those it colonized. However, unlike 
Western colonial powers, Japan also used anthropology as a tool to discover the roots of 
the Japanese in Korea.
137
 Indeed, through “anthropological diligence” the Japanese 
believed that they could rediscover or salvage a “primordial Japan” located within the 
Korean peninsula.
138
 Although the Japanese had been interested in locating their own 
origins throughout the colonial period, the need for security and the escalating conflict 
with China added intensity to Japan’s search for its origins in Korea and, as we shall see, 
the rest of Northeast Asia.
139
 
 In attempting to establish a historical precedent for Japan’s colonization of 
Korea, the politician Nakano Seigō中野正剛 (1886-1943) wrote that Japan’s deep 
relationship with Korea did not begin with the archipelago’s supervision of the 
peninsula, but went back to the supposed conquest of the three Korean Kingdoms 三韓
征伐 (Sankan seibatsu) at the hands of the legendary Jingū-kōgō 神功皇后, Empress 
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Consort Jingū, (reign 201-269).140 By establishing its historical presence in Korea, 
Japan, in the words of Prasenjit Duara, was attempting to establish an “anthropogenic 
claim” to Korea which gave logic to Japanese maneuverers in Korea because they were 
turned into “corrective actions to restore proper sovereignty” to Japan.141 Indeed, to 
prove Japan’s “anthropogenic claim” to Korea, Japanese would engage in curatorial 
projects that would cement a “prior claim” to the peninsula through created evidence of 
a “prior Japanese political presence in antiquity.”142 By establishing its prior claim to 
the country, Japan’s colonization became a matter of “sutur[ing]” the wound” created by 
China artificially wedging itself between Korea and Japan.
143
 Thus, Japan’s 
colonization of Korea was not the act of forcing “historically groundless impositions of 
an alien identity on hapless Koreans,” but a “racially and historically valid crusade […] 
to reunify an estranged family.”144 
 With their prior claim to Korea established in history and anthropology, the 
Japanese reasoned that their colonizing Korea and their relationship with Koreans were 
“entirely different” and more “morally legitimate” than Western countries colonizing 
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lands in Africa or Asia and white colonial relationships with darker skinned natives.
145
 
This morally legitimate colonization of Korea would later be extended to the 
assimilation of the Korean people because the similarities of the two people made 
assimilation “more appropriate” than a European power toward one of its colonies.146 
Since its colonization was supposedly more morally legitimate and its assimilation more 
appropriate due to its shared blood with Korea, Japan viewed its encroachment upon the 
peninsula as integration rather than colonization.
147
 The attempt to make the 
colonization of Korea seem more like “a smooth integration of backward cousins into 
the Japanese family-state,” was done, in part, to promote national cultural identity 
within the metropole as well.
148
 
 Japan’s goal of finding anthropological evidence of its former sovereignty was 
not above the use of pure fabrication. For instance, the Japanese planted a stone 
monument in Koryŏng, the capital of the ancient Korean state of Kaya, to mark the 
existence of Mimana Nihon-fu任那日本府, a Japanese colony created by the 
aforementioned Empress Consort Jingū in order subjugate Korean Kings under the rule 
of Japanese imperial authority.
149
 Although at one point the existence of Mimana 
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Nihon-fu was supported by Japanese, Korean, and Western historians, Koreans later 
came to see that Japan’s creation of Mimana Nihon-fu was a ploy to distort Korean 
history in order to claim that the Koreans were inferior to the Japanese and create a 
precedent for Japanese imperial presence.
150
 
 Having validated their kinship with an historical presence in Korea through 
anthropology, the Japanese continued their anthropogenic claim deeper into Northeast 
Asia. For example, the scholar Akiba Takashi 秋葉隆 (1888-1954) stated that the 
Korean word mudang 巫堂 (female spirit medium) originated in Mongolia which 
strengthened the case for “regional shamanic heritage” and aided Japanese expansionist 
aspirations in Northeast Asia.
151
 With this work, Akiba thereby contributed to a field of 
study called Mansenshi 満鮮史, a term created through the combined Chinese 
characters of Man 満, the first character of Manshū 満州 (Manchuria), sen 鮮, the 
second character from Chōsen 朝鮮 (Korea), and shi 史 (history) tagged at the end, 
which theoretically validated Japanese expansion into the Northeast Asian hinterlands 
due to the area’s shared heritage.152 Indeed, the Japanese continued to justify future 
expansions into Asia through the belief that primordial ties to an area was much 
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stronger than any modern empire’s claim.153  
Japan was unique among colonial powers in that, even in its official 
propaganda, it claimed a “long-standing kinship” with its colonized subjects. Such a 
claim was impossible for white Western colonial powers to make because of the 
scientific racism it used as reasoning to colonize its darker-skinned subjects.
154
 Of 
course, one of the major reasons why the Japanese claimed such a long-standing kinship 
with Koreans was that the two countries were legitimately tied to each other with their 
similar cultural backgrounds. However, more importantly, Korea’s geographical 
proximity made the Japanese embrace the cultural proximity of the Koreans in order to 
justify their more intrusive state rule to ensure state security.
155
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Part 2: Koreans in Prewar and Wartime Japan 
 
1.2.1: The First Koreans in Japan 
In September 1875, the Japanese sent the gunboat Un'yō 雲揚 to the Korean 
island of Kanghwa and occupied it. Known as the Kōkatō jiken (江華島事件 Kanghwa 
Incident) in Japanese, this invasion subsequently led to the signing of the 
Nitchō-shūkōjōki (日朝修好条規 The Treaty of Kangwha) which allowed for 
individuals to travel between Korea and Japan and allowed for the transportation of 
goods between the peninsula and archipelago. At a glance, this treaty seems to have 
loosened the restrictions placed on Korea by the Yi dynasty, but it was an unequal treaty 
similar to those Western powers forced Japan to sign. With this treaty in place, the 
Japanese, among other things, were able to establish concessions within Korea where 
Japanese citizens gained extraterritoriality and were able to use Japanese currency in 
these locations
156
 Thus, many of the benefits offered by the Treaty of Kanghwa were 
only available to the Japanese which made it “one-sided.”157 
Not too long after the signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa, Japanese nationals 
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began to flood into Korea. As Kim Chan-jung writes, Japanese, “who dreamt to get rich 
quick through having a share in rights and interests in Korea,” quickly moved to the 
peninsula in order to escape their situations back in Japan.
158
 However, Koreans were 
slower making their way to Japan. As the sociologist Fukuoka Yasunori writes, the total 
population of Koreans in Japan before the annexation of Korea in 1910 is commonly 
thought to have been around 790, mostly foreign exchange students.
159
 However, 
Fukuoka, drawing on the scholarship of Kim Yŏng-dal and Yamawaki Keizō, states that 
the number of Koreans in Japan was greater and that they engaged in a number of 
occupations including that of coal miners, railway construction workers, or peddlers of 
candies by the 1890s.
160
  
These laborers, as Kim Chan-jung states, filled the “industries which supported 
Japanese modernization.” During the early decades of Koreans working in Japan, these 
industrial jobs were often considered to be part of “punitive labor,” so many of the first 
Korean laborers in Japan were prisoners in their home country.
161
 Koreans who came to 
Japan to work on the railways were experienced workers who had worked the rails in 
their home country. The first Korean railroad workers in Japan were hired to work in 
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Kyushu on the Hisatsu Line 肥薩線 and their numbers continued to grow as Japan 
modernized and entered into the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
162
 Korean railroad 
labor played an important role in this war as it helped insure, both in Korea and Japan, 
that the rails were in good condition to supply the Japanese military in Manchuria.
163
  
Thus, because of Japan’s modernization efforts and war efforts, the Korean 
population in Japan by the end of the Russo-Japanese War was over one thousand.
164
 
Besides these exchange students and laborers, the rest of the pre-annexation Korean 
population in Japan tended to be made up of government officials of Yi Dynasty Korea 
and political refugees.
165
 Overall, although many official records state that the number 
of Koreans residing in Japan was relatively low, this number seems to have been higher 
before the annexation than originally thought, and this is not even counting 
undocumented individuals who entered Japan’s borders unofficially.166 
 
1.2.2: Forced Out of Korea 
Although the number of Koreans in Japan before the annexation of Korea in 
1910 might have been greater than originally thought, it is true that Koreans went to 
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Japan in much greater numbers after the annexation was officially established. With 
their numbers growing each year after annexation, Koreans flooded continuously into 
Japan through “direct and indirect pressure” during the decades of the Japanese 
colonization of Korea, which extended from 1910 until 1945.
167
 
One of the primary reasons why Koreans left their home country was the state 
of economic destitution that the Japanese colonists left them in.
168
 After the annexation 
of Korea, the Japanese immediately began to implement a number of harsh policies. In 
relation to Japan’s Resident Korean population, the tochi chōsa jigyō (土地調査事業 
(Land Survey Project, 1910-18) and the sanmai zōshoku keikaku (産米増殖計画 (Plan 
for Increasing Rice Production, 1920-34), were the most important Japanese colonial 
policies that forced Koreans to go to Japan.
169
 Under the Land Survey Project, most of 
the land that had once belonged to the Yi dynasty was confiscated by the Korean 
Resident-General and sold to the Oriental Development Company(東洋拓殖株式會社 
(Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha) which resulted in a large number of Korean farmers 
losing their land.
170
 In general, the purpose of the Land Survey Project was to 
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determine which farmers controlled what land for taxing purposes.
171
 However, since 
most of the ordinary farmers were unable to understand how to fill out the proper forms 
due to their illiteracy and because they declared ownership of land they worked on but 
did not actually own, they lost most of their land.
172
 When the Land Survey project 
came to an end in 1918, the Japanese, who did not make up three percent of colonial 
Korea’s population, and wealthy Korean landlords possessed 50% of Korea’s arable 
land.
173
 Much of this land, 64% of the rice paddies and 43% of the cultivated land, 
would become land worked by tenant farmers.
174
 Of course, these tenant farms were 
managed by the once independent farmers who had lost their land to the Land Survey 
Project.
175
 Securing these tenant farms was very costly because the farmers sometimes 
had to give up 70% of their total harvest. This situation led to the already destitute 
farmers becoming even poorer and eventually being forced out of Korea.  
Already devastated by the results of the Land Survey Project, poor Korean 
farmers were struck again by the Plan for Increasing Rice Production. Beginning in 
1920, the Plan for Increasing Rice Production was implemented as method to provide 
“cheap rice for laborers and poor people” of Japan in order to avoid a recurrence of the 
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Rice Riots (米騒動 kome sōdō) of 1918, which erupted due to the scarcity and high 
consumer price of rice.
176
 Thus, a better fed Japanese population was supported by the 
hard work and sacrifice of destitute Korean farmers who reaped no benefits from the 
enforced escalation of rice production.
177
  
Instead of helping the poor Korean farmer, the Plan for Increasing Rice 
Production led to “landholder-led commercialization and exportation of the rice product” 
which resulted in the “permeation of a twisted commodity economy” into Korean 
villages and “promoted class differentiation.” 178 Japanese and Korean landholders 
benefited greatly from this plan because the Japanese Imperial government was willing 
to make major capital investments into Korean agriculture and land was leveled 
properly and advanced irrigation systems were installed. As a result, “Japanese [and 
Korean] landlords’ profit became secured.”179 However, as landlords became richer the 
number of destitute farmers increased as well. Average farmers were unable to compete 
with the rapidly modernizing farms, and rapidly increasing taxes, such as the water tax, 
and they were forced to give up their land.
180
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For Koreans who had lost their land or means to earn a living, going to Japan 
represented a method of survival. Koreans from the southern provinces of Gyeongsang, 
Jeolla and Jeju-do made their way to Japan while those who lived in the northern half of 
the peninsula headed to Manchuria/Manchukuo.
181
 
Even after losing their land and being forced to move to Japan, Koreans were 
unable to escape the Plan for Increasing Rice Production. For instance Jeong Gyeong-jo 
鄭景朝, who came to Japan because “(w)e could not eat no matter how much we 
worked (in Korea) at that time,” states that he came across a bag of Korean Jinsen rice 
when he went to a marketplace in Shimonoseki.
182
 This was a bad experience for Jeong 
because his poor countrymen back in the peninsula “could not eat it, especially in the 
summer.” Thus, Jeong came face-to-face with how he and his countrymen were 
considered to be second or even third class citizens within the Japanese empire. 
Reflecting on his condition at this time, Jeong writes that he was “completely miserable” 
and that “the situation for our race [in Japan] was absolutely miserable.”183 
 
1.2.3: Korean Labor in Japan 
Coming to Japan and having to begin life in the country of their colonizers 
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represented only the first problems that Koreans had to face. As Kim Tae-young states, 
Koreans immediately suffered “various discriminative treatments” upon their arrival in 
Japan, including “exclusion from opportunities in employment.”184 If Koreans were 
“lucky” enough to find employment in Japan, their jobs, normally at restaurants and 
construction sites, tended to be ones where they found themselves laboring under severe 
working conditions which the Japanese refused to tolerate.
185
 To make matters worse, 
these jobs were also unsecured and the Resident Koreans only received around one third 
of the wages that the Japanese received for the same work. Thus, the lives of early 
Resident Koreans in Japan “were in an utterly wretched state.”186 
The availability of jobs for Korean workers would change as Japan prospered 
during the chaos of World War I.
187
 Indeed, in their search for “good and cheap labor,” 
Japanese companies, mainly in the spinning thread, coal, and construction industries, 
made strong efforts to recruit Koreans.
188
 Japan would experience an economic 
depression after the conclusion of World War I, but continued to need extra labor due to 
America’s prosperity and its demands for such things as silk.189 Indeed, Koreans 
became a much needed “resource” for Japanese industries because they created a secure 
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source of labor. Japan’s national railways even offered discount fares to Koreans in 
order to insure that they were available to supply manpower to Japanese industries.
190
 
In order to gain the much needed “resource” of Korean labor, recruiters (both 
Korean and Japanese) used underhanded methods to cajole destitute individuals to leave 
their homes and move to the Japanese archipelago. However, these underhanded 
methods would often backfire because the fooled Korean laborers would rebel when 
they discovered that the working conditions in Japan were much worse than what they 
were told by the recruiters.
191
 Also, the harsh working conditions that the Koreans 
labored under were exacerbated by the fact that most of the Japanese workers held 
contempt and hostility towards them.
192
 However, Resident Koreans continued to come 
to Japan and their communities grew within the industrial centers of the country.
193
 
This was not so much the result of the methods of the horrid recruiters who lied and 
tricked these individuals to come to the country of their oppressors, but an effect of the 
continuous poverty and unemployment issues that weighed on the backs of the 
peninsula’s poorest residents.194 
The flow of Korean laborers into Japan continued steadily for the first ten or so 
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years after annexation; however, beginning in May of 1920, Japan was sunk into a deep 
economic depression which affected both the Koreans living in the peninsula who 
wanted to go to Japan and those who were already settled in Japan. Due to this 
depression, it became necessary for a number of industries to cut pay, dismiss workers, 
or to even close their entire factories.
195
 Of course, being a disdained minority whose 
jobs were already in a precarious position during the times of high prosperity, Resident 
Koreans felt the brunt of the depression.
196
 Thus Resident Koreans were the first to be 
let go with only a small amount of money, which was to be used as travel expenses as 
compensation.
197
  
Many Koreans, especially those who had family members back home, returned 
to Korea, however, there was an increasing number of Koreans in Japan who had no 
connections back in the peninsula, so they were fixed within Japan.
198
 Caught within 
Japan, these Resident Koreans had to fight tooth and nail in order to survive life with 
their colonizers. This situation led to many labor disputes between 1920 and 1922, but, 
because Resident Korean labor leaders were unorganized and there was a lack of 
solidarity with Japanese laborers, these disputes tended to peter out without any 
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significant goals being reached.
199
 Japanese companies created rivalries between the 
Japanese and the Korean laborers and oftentimes it was groups of Japanese laborers 
(that of course outnumbered the Resident Koreans) who suppressed the labor 
disputes.
200
  
Despite these early setbacks, Korean laborers eventually organized their 
disputes more evenly and some began to delve into Marxism and/or Leninism. This led 
to a number of Resident Koreans forming links with Japanese socialists.
201
 As a result, 
Resident Koreans were able to establish their own labor unions in 1922 in Tokyo and 
Osaka. After their establishment, Japanese and Koreans in the labor movement began to 
collaborate with one another.
202
 
After 1920, although Japan was hit by economic depression, the number of 
Korean workers coming to Japan continued to increase thanks in part to the enactment 
of a road reformation plan that was written in 1919.
203
 Also of note, during this time 
period administration policies within the Korean peninsula were undergoing a shift from 
a “military rule” to a “civilian rule” after the 3.1 Independence Movement in which 
Korean protestors demanded to be released from Japanese colonialism.  
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Shocked by the protest, which it violently put down, the Japanese government 
attempted to “soften dissatisfaction, anger, and resistance of Korean people” by 
removing some restrictions that it had placed on them. One restriction removed was the 
necessity of Koreans needing a travel pass to enter Japan. As a result, the number of 
Koreans coming to Japan grew from 30,000 in 1921 to 97,000 in 1923.
204
 The 
elimination of the travel pass was supposedly Japan’s way of showing Koreans isshi 
dōjin (一視同仁 Imperial benevolence) and eliminating “institutional discrimination” 
towards Koreans.
205
 Yet the true situation of Resident Koreans did not improve, but 
rather steadily grew worse.  
For example, the July 29,
 
1922 issue of the Yomiuri Shinbun reported that the 
working conditions and treatment of Resident Koreans working in Japan as construction 
workers were “utterly miserable.” This same issue also reported that a number of 
Resident Koreans were outright abused and slaughtered by the Japanese at the Number 
One Nakatsugawa Power Plant in Niigata.
206
 Instead of attempting to right the wrongs 
that had been committed in order to create a better relationship with colonized Koreans 
and Resident Koreans, the Governor-General of Korea and the Ministry of Home 
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Affairs attempted to deny the article and the ones that followed it.
207
 Resident Korean 
reporters, however, did travel to Niigata and verified that the atrocities had taken 
place.
208
  
This incident in some ways helped create awareness of the issues that Resident 
Koreans faced among some groups of concerned Japanese. Indeed, due to Ra 
Gyon-sok’s 羅景錫 and Yi Sang-hyob’s 李相協 investigation of the incidents at the 
power plant and their speech given at the Korean YMCA Hall in Kanda in September 
1922 where the prominent Japanese anarchists and Marxists, Urata Takeo 浦田武雄 
(1893-1973), Takatsu Masamichi 高津正道 (1893-1974), Ōsugi Sakae 大杉栄 
(1885-1923), and Sakai Toshihiko 堺利彦 (1871-1933) were present.209 The Japanese 
Communist Party, which was established the same year Ra Gyon-sok and Yi Sang-hyob 
did their reportage of the Nakatsugawa power plant, argued in favour of the “solidarity 
of Japan and Korean laborers” in its bulletin Zen’ei (前衛 Vanguard).210  
The slaughter of Korean workers in Niigata was a clarion call for leftist 
Japanese and Koreans to form a “common front” to oppose the imperialistic Japanese 
state.
211
 While the organizers succeeded in bringing together nearly 500 Koreans and 
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500 Japanese, the event also drew more attention by Japanese forces who were not only 
concerned about the solidarity between Korean and Japanese laborers, but also wary of 
the rise of another independence movement in Korea.
212
 
 
1.2.4: The Great Kanto Earthquake, The Massacre of Resident Koreans, and 
Resident Korean Collaborators 
Japanese hostility and suspicion towards Resident Koreans came to a head after 
the Great Kanto Earthquake (関東大震災 Kantō daishinsai) occurred on September 1, 
1923.
213
 With urban districts such as Yokohama and Tokyo reduced to rubble, many 
Japanese, who became increasingly agitated by strong and devastating aftershocks, 
became enraged as rumors spread that Resident Koreans were committing arson and 
poisoning wells.
214
 On the day after the earthquake, the rumors continued to spread and 
were supported and spread nationwide by the police through military facilities. Incensed 
by the supposed “arsons, poisonings, and pillages committed by Koreans in 
metropolitan areas,” Japanese “vigilante groups,” which were organized by town 
administrators, systematically rounded up and slaughtered Koreans.
215
 Also, since the 
Kanto region was put under martial law after the earthquake, the military played a 
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strong role in the rounding up and systematic slaughter of Koreans—as well as key 
Japanese communists and anarchists—who they recognized as threats.216 
The number of Resident Koreans murdered by Japanese citizens, police, and 
soldiers remains unknown because it has not been investigated by the Japanese 
government. According to the Japanese Department of Justice, the number of murdered 
Koreans amounted to 232 individuals, while the Governor-General of Korea states that 
the number was 832.
217
 Of course, these numbers are relatively suspect both because of 
their low totals and because of their sources. A more reliable source is Kim Sun-hak 金
承学, the president of a bulletin called Dokuritsu Shinbun 独立新聞 (Independence 
News), a bulletin for Koreans who supported Korean independence, who, along with a 
number of Korean exchange students, surveyed the area secretly after the massacre took 
place. Kim estimates the number to be around 6,415 individuals.
218
 
When the chaos of the massacre and mass arrests finally ebbed, the Kanto 
region had become relatively depopulated of Resident Koreans.
219
 Furthermore, public 
security authorities issued on September 3
rd
, the same day of the massacre, issued an 
order that prohibited Koreans entrance into Japan. Individuals that arrived after this 
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order were refused entry and sent back to Pusan.
220
 This prohibition of entry into Japan 
was not done out of fear or malice, but to keep things from getting even more chaotic. 
Resident Koreans located in Shimonoseki were caught in a wave of fear because they 
were terrified of being massacred by the Japanese. Many fled home immediately.
221
 
After the massacre occurred, a pro-Japanese Resident Korean organization 
called Sōaikai (相愛会) offered its services to help remove the bodies of dead Resident 
Koreans and watch those who had been imprisoned.
222
 This organization would also 
play a key role in the kōminka (皇民化 imperialization) of Resident Koreans into loyal 
subjects of the Japanese empire, and acted as a watchdog over the minority’s 
activities.
223
 Originally established in 1920 by Park Choon-Geum 朴春琴 and Yi 
Ki-Dong 李起東 in Tokyo as an institution that was supposed to spread “harmony” 
between the people of Japan and Korea, Sōaikai became a social work organization that 
established branches throughout Japan.  
With its goals outlined in its constitution as the “annulment of racial 
discrimination,” “making harmony between Koreans and Japanese exhaustive,” and 
“seeking mental enlightenment and economic aid for Korean laborers,” Sōaikai 
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supposedly aimed to build accommodations, find jobs, and give “vocational guidance” 
to struggling Resident Koreans. However, instead, the institution “observed and 
supervised Korean laborers” and “suppressed laborers who cried for better wages with 
violence.”224 Indeed, it was this group that suppressed the activities of both the Korean 
labor and nationalists movements and, even more sickening to Resident Koreans and 
Koreans back in the homeland, actively aided Japanese public security authorities to 
suppress Korean movements.
225
 For their “pro-Japanese” spirit and their willingness to 
aid the Japanese authorities, including providing 300 men to clean up the corpses of 
dead Resident Koreans killed by the Japanese and imprisoning and guarding their own 
countrymen, they were made an official institution in 1928 by the oppressors of their 
own people.
226
 
After gaining official support from the Japanese government, Sōaikai followed 
the “government line” closely and, after Japanese war efforts increased, the Sōaikai 
would be “absorbed” into the Kyōwakai (協和会 Concord Association) which was a 
more powerful association which aimed to prepare Resident Koreans for the Japanese 
war effort.
227
 Kyōwakai would eventually establish a number of yūwa dankai (融和団
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体 harmony organizations) throughout Japan which were ostensibly created to aid 
Resident Koreans throughout the country. However, the Kyōwakai was instead used as a 
tool by the Japanese government, especially the Governor-General of Korea, to cover up 
the massacre of Resident Koreans within the Kanto region.  
Also, and more importantly, the Japanese government and the 
Governor-General of Korea wanted to enlist the help of the Kyōwakai to “promote 
reconciliation between Japan and Korea” because they were concerned that the Koreans 
would rise in an anti-Japanese rebellion due to the massacres.
228
 The process of 
promoting reconciliation between the Japanese and the Koreans was initiated the 
Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto 斉藤実 (1858-1936) who travelled to Osaka 
and placed the order to establish the Ōsaka Naisen kyōkai (大阪内鮮協会 Osaka 
Japanese-Korean Association) which was established in 1924 and later created further 
branches in Kanagawa and Hyogo. These new Japanese-Korean organizations used the 
already established yūwa dankai in order to further their goals and they would have a 
lasting effect on the lives of Resident Koreans until the end of the war.
229
  
 
1.2.5: Too Many Koreans Entering Japan 
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Despite the massacre and the general mistreatment that the Japanese showed 
toward Resident Koreans, Koreans continued to come to Japan due to the poverty in 
their homeland.
230
 As stated above, Japan went into a deep economic depression when 
World War I ended, and as a result many companies were forced to close and the 
Resident Korean population felt the brunt of the pay cuts and layoffs. Aware of the 
economic state of both Japan and Korea, the Japanese government reinforced measures 
to hinder the immigration of Korean labor into the country.
231
 In 1924, the Japanese 
government ended the “unrestricted passage policy” that had been implemented after 
the March 1
st
 Independence Movement and thereby allowed only Koreans who 
possessed a travel pass issued by the government to enter the country.
232
 Also, to 
reinforce the end of the unrestricted passage policy, the Governor-General of Korea 
made it increasingly difficult for Koreans to receive travel passes by upping the amount 
of money needed to pay for travel expenses.
233
 This plan was effective and more than 
140,000 Koreans were refused voyage from Pusan to Japan over the next three years, 
1924-26.
234
 
This number must be taken with a grain of salt because of the illegal entry of 
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Koreans into Japan. During the years that the Japanese strictly patrolled the legal entry 
of Koreans into Japan, the number of destitute Korean farmers was also increasing. This 
led to many Koreans coming to Japan through a “secret passage.”235 Because of these 
illegal entries into Japan, the Ministry of Home Affairs increased the amount of required 
travel money to sixty yen and a Korean had to possess an “employment certificate 
issued by the receiving company.”236 Although the Japanese government was trying to 
make entry into Japan more difficult for Koreans, the Governor-General of Korea did 
not actively discourage destitute farmers from making the trip to Japan because they 
represented an acute security issue if their numbers continued to grow.
237
 Thus, if a 
Korean possessed the necessary sixty yen for travel money and an employment 
certificate, he or she was allowed to leave with no questions asked. Of course, destitute 
Koreans and the Japanese companies worked around these new regulations as well. A 
common practice used was the hiring company giving a Korean the needed sixty yen 
which was promptly returned to the company after the immigrant worker’s arrival in 
Japan.
238
 As a result, the number of Koreans entering Japan continued with 67,417 
more immigrants from Korea entering in 1928 than in 1927.
239
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1.2.6: The Great Depression and The Japanese-Resident Korean Labor Movement  
As stated above, Japan entered into an economic depression after World War I, 
but the country’s economy was able to remain relatively stable because of the prosperity 
America was experiencing during the early postwar years. However, when America was 
drawn into the Great Depression in 1929, Japan’s economy followed suit.240 Thus, the 
jobs of the Japanese and the Resident Koreans were rendered unstable due to the 
bankruptcy of companies, closure of factories, reduction of operations, and wage 
cuts.
241
 Those who were most deeply affected were individuals who worked in cottage 
industries and those who had no organizational or social protection. Resident Koreans, 
of course, possessed no safeguards for their jobs and were, again, hit the hardest.
242
 
As with the earlier depression, Resident Koreans had to endure unpaid wages 
and be dismissed on racial grounds because Japanese employers were attempting 
preserve Japanese jobs. For example, 18% of the Resident Korean population in Osaka 
was unemployed in 1930. This percentage was three times greater than the percentage 
of unemployed Japanese in the same city.
243
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Although many Koreans did return to the peninsula when they lost their jobs, 
many remained in Japan because they had nothing to return to. Korean labor groups, of 
course, opposed these discriminatory actions. However, unlike earlier Korean labor 
movements, those that supported Resident Koreans during the Great Depression era 
were “more systematic and combative because labor unions, which led the disputes, had 
been established and they also had solidified their ideological foundation.”244 Indeed, 
much of the solidarity of Korean laborers was established by the Zainichi Chōsenjin 
rōdō sōdōmei (在日朝鮮人労働総同盟 The Federation of Resident Korean Labor 
Unions in Japan) which was created in 1925 and by 1927 possessed more than 30,000 
members.
245
 At first the organization was primarily concerned with issues such as 
unpaid wages, low wages, and unfair dismissals, but it soon had to deal with 
discrimination in the workplace as well.
246
 The federation became increasingly 
influenced by peninsular leftist and nationalist independence groups which resulted in a 
focus upon the “liberation” and “independence of Korea.”247 Due to these ethnic 
interests, the federation never sought to join with Japanese labor unions, however, it did 
seek solidarity with Japanese laborers.
248
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In 1929 The Federation of Resident Korean Labor Unions in Japan was 
absorbed into the Nihon rōdō kumiai zenkoku kyōgikai 日本労働組合全国協議会 (the 
National Council of Trade Unions of Japan, abbreviated 全協 zenkyō) as directed by the 
Communist International.
249
 Many Korean laborers disliked the idea of being under the 
power of an international communist movement, so many of them dropped out of the 
Federation. Primarily, Resident Korean laborers, who were welcomed with open arms 
by the Council, were concerned with the fact that international communist-led group 
placed little interest in issues that were dear to them, such as Koreans’ rights to a certain 
standard of living or Korea’s independence.250 As a result of this distrust, membership 
in the Federation of Resident Korean Labor Unions in Japan, which had some 30,000 
members in February of 1929, dropped to 2,700 after the Federation joined the National 
Council.
251
 
The Resident Korean who remained with the National Council were drawn 
deeply into some of the group’s illegal activities and became more and more involved 
with increasingly violent labor demonstrations which, instead of helping things, only 
made the labor disputes more intense.
252
 Indeed, from September of 1929 until 
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September of 1930, Resident Korean laborers engaged in 486 labor disputes with brute 
force.
253
 As a result of this escalation in violent tactics, companies and public security 
authorities would hire labor racketeers, primarily made up of policemen and military 
police, to attack the Korean laborers.
254
 As the violence between Resident Koreans and 
the Japanese grew worse, prejudice against Korea and Koreans also grew. As a result, 
Japanese employers increasingly fired Resident Korean workers because of their 
tendency towards violence.
255
 
The Resident Koreans who remained loyal to the National Council also created 
a rift between them and their fellow countrymen residing in Japan who were more 
concerned with the independence of Koreans than with life and labor in Japan. This rift 
would remain until the end of the war and weaken the Resident Korean community as a 
whole.
256
 
The escalation of violence used by Korean laborers proved to the Japanese 
authorities that it was necessary for the yūwa organizations to increase their assimilation 
efforts because unassimilated Koreans would remain hostile towards Japan.
257
 By 
embracing violence, Resident Koreans lost whatever measure of resistance against 
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Japanese assimilation policies they once had because many of their leaders were 
arrested and kept in confinement due to the fear they caused the Japanese.
258
 Once 
these Resident Korean leaders were in Japanese custody, and thereby out of the public 
eye, the authorities did not hesitate the torture them to death.
259
  
 
1.2.7: Forced Labor 
Although the Japanese government attempted to block the entry of Koreans 
into Japan because there was already a glut of both Japanese and Korean laborers, the 
circumstances quickly changed with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 
which drained the country of private citizens. Hardest hit were private companies which 
suffered from an acute shortage of young laborers. This shortage would prove to be the 
Achilles’ heel of the Japanese wartime economy.260 In order to fight the lack of 
able-bodied workers, the Japanese government implemented the Kokka sōdōin hō (国家
総動員法 National Mobilization Law) which allowed the government to draft citizens, 
including Koreans and Taiwanese, in order to fill vital industries for the war effort.
261
 
Coalmining, one of the most important industries for the war effort and one hardest hit 
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when workers were forced to become soldiers to support the war effort, directly 
contacted the Ministry of Commerce to gain Resident Korean workers and the Ministry 
supported their needs by actively searching for individuals to work in the mines.
262
 
However, the number of Resident Koreans who could work in such industries as 
coalmining and construction work was insufficient, so the companies asked the 
Japanese government if they could recruit workers directly from the peninsula.
263
 In 
order to fill the companies’ desire for Korean laborers, the Cabinet Planning Board 
created the rōmu dōin keikaku (労務動員計画 Labor Mobilization Plan), based on the 
National Mobilization Law, which was used to promote Korean immigration to Japan. 
In all, 85,000 spots were opened for Koreans to come work in Japan.
 264 
When Japanese companies, mainly those involved in coalmining, metal ore 
mining, and construction, offered to recruit Koreans to come work in Japan, they were 
flooded with applicants who had once been forbidden to go to the archipelago. However, 
after half a year or so, the number of applicants dried up completely.
265
 The reason why 
Koreans quit voluntarily coming to Japan at this time was because the “wretched 
working conditions” and “severe labor conditions” in Japan became common 
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knowledge in Korea.
266
 
Because it became too difficult for Japanese wartime industries to receive 
sufficient numbers of Korean laborers through normal recruitment methods, the Cabinet 
Planning Board in 1942 created an “administratively enforceable” Plan for the 
Recruitment of Labor that was supposed to bring 130,000 Korean laborers to Japan.
267
 
In February of the same year, the Cabinet Planning Board decided on the “measures on 
the use of Korean laborers” which incorporated the immigration of Koreans laborers 
and how they were to be handled by administrative and police authorities.
268
 Within 
these measures, the Governor-General of Korea established the senjin naichi inyū assen 
yōkō (鮮人内地移入斡旋要綱 guidelines for placement of Korean immigration to 
Japan), the so-called kan assen (官斡旋 public procurement for businesses) which 
officially began kyōsei renkō (強制連行 forced labor) in Japan and Korea.269  
Despite this increase in workers, Japanese industries were stilled strained to 
keep up with the production of needed goods as Japan was sucked deeper into the war. 
As a result of these struggles, the Japanese government invoked the National Service 
Draft Ordinance on Resident Koreans which forced them to work in industries that were 
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necessary to fuel Japanese war efforts.
270
  The government had already enlisted its own 
native citizens into the ordinance in 1939, but hesitated to bring Resident Koreans under 
it out of fear that they would riot.
271
 Predictably, Resident Koreans greeted their draft 
with heated protests. Many Resident Koreans simply did not show up when they were 
required to work. Out of 4,600 Resident Koreans drafted in Tokyo, 2,126 did not report 
and out of 1891 individuals drafted in Hyogo, 1030 did not appear.
272
 Originally this 
plan only applied to Resident Koreans, but, by April 1944, the Japanese government put 
peninsular Koreans under the ordinance as well. As could be expected, the Koreans 
protested being included in this ordinance. Many well-armed Koreans even hid in the 
mountains and would fight off those who tried to make them honor this ordinance.
273
  
However, in the end the Japanese were able to overwhelm Korean resistance 
forces and between 1 million and 1.5 million Resident Koreans were forced to relocate 
to Japan to work with the wartime industries.
274
 Enforced Korean laborers oftentimes 
faced working conditions worse than Koreans and Resident Koreans who had 
voluntarily labored in the wartime industries. As Norma Field states, enforced Korean 
laborers worked in a type of “nazi economy wherein laborers were maintained at the 
                                                   
270
 Ibid. 
271
 Ibid, pp.117-18. 
272
 Ibid. 
273
 Ibid. 
274
 Ibid, p.118. 
70 
 
threshold of death because they were easily replaced.”275  
As Hong Yung Lee writes, the Japanese annexation of Korea, which ultimately 
lasted for thirty-six years, marks the shortest example of modern colonialism.
276
 
However, despite its brevity, Japan’s colonization of Korea would leave a lasting impact 
on diasporic Koreans in Japan that stretches for generations. On that note, I will now 
outline a brief history of Japan’s Resident Korean population over its first two decades. 
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Part 3: Resident Koreans in Postwar Japan 
 
1.3.1: Why did Koreans Stay in Japan in the Early Postwar Period? 
After Japan was defeated by the Allied Forces on August 15, 1945, thirty-six 
years of Japanese colonial rule in Korea came to an end. As a result of Japan’s defeat, 
over two million Koreans in Japan were “free” to return to their home country.277 
Indeed, after the Korean people were freed “from the yoke of Japanese colonial rule,” 
the majority of them hurriedly returned to the Korean peninsula one after the other.
278
 
Wanting little to do with the island nation that had devastated their lives and their home 
country, some 1,400,000 Koreans returned to the Korean peninsula from August 31, 
1945 until February 1946.
279
 As the Resident Korean Kim Yeong-sik 金永植 states, 
the Koreans who were the quickest to return to their homeland were those who had 
surviving parents or brothers and those who had “prospects for life there.”280 
Koreans who had been in Japan for a short time, primarily those who had been 
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moved to Japan as enforced labor, returned to Korea in droves.
281
 Indeed, during his 
interviews with some 150 later generation Resident Koreans, Fukuoka Yasunori did not 
encounter a single individual whose parents or grandparents had been forcibly brought 
to Japan as enforced labor.
282
 Fukuoka notes that his interviews were not done through 
random sampling, he would have needed the original copies of the Resident Koreans’ 
alien registration forms for that, and that it would be foolish to state that there were no 
Resident Koreans or descendants of first generation Resident Koreans who came to 
Japan as enforced labor, but the “general tendency” is that Koreans who were brought to 
Japan as forced labor returned to Korea after the war, while individuals who sought 
employment in Japan “voluntarily” were more willing to remain in the country.283 
Indeed, as Fukuoka states, it is not surprising that those who were forced to come to 
Japan left as soon as possible since it represented nothing more than a location of 
“oppression and isolation.”284  
Unfortunately, for many of the Koreans who desired to return to their homeland, 
the trip back to the Korean peninsula could be quite perilous. The Resident Korean 
Jeong Gyeong-jo, who was living in Shimonoseki at the time the war ended, states that 
                                                   
281
 Fukuoka, Zainichi Kankoku/Chōsenjin, p.31. 
282
 Ibid, p.32. 
283
 Ibid. 
284
 Ibid, p.33. 
73 
 
the Korean residents of his location, and elsewhere, were quite anxious to return to their 
homeland and were willing to jump upon any boat that was bound for there. However, 
being uneducated in nautical ways and misjudging how easily the waves of the Genkai 
Sea could capsize a boat, many Koreans and their entire families went to their watery 
graves as they dreamed of their homecoming.
285
 
After most of the forced laborers and those who had family and good prospects 
back in Korea had returned there by February 1946, between 500,000 and 600,000 
Koreans remained in Japan.
286
 As Fukuoka states, most of these Koreans likely desired 
to return to Korea and planned to do so in the near future, but there were a number of 
key elements that prevented them from doing so.
287
 
One of the primary reasons why a number of Resident Koreans decided to 
remain in Japan was purely financial. As I noted earlier, the Koreans who came to Japan 
before the implementation of forced labor did so in order to survive. Although the 
working conditions and living conditions were horrid in many ways, at least the 
Koreans were able to eke out a living in Japan that they were unable to do in their 
homeland. When faced with the decision to return to Korea after the war, many Koreans 
decided to remain in Japan because the American Occupation Forces, which controlled 
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Japan from the end of the war until 1952, severely limited the amount of money and 
possessions that they were allowed to return with to their homeland. Thus, unless they 
were one of the individuals who either had family or prospects back in Korea, these 
individuals would lose the few gains they received in Japan and have to start from 
scratch again.
288
 
Besides having to give up their money and possessions before leaving Japan, 
Korean residents would be greeted only with wartime devastation if they chose to return 
to Korea. Many Koreans who remained in Japan after the war, including those who 
were planning and preparing, albeit slowly, to return to their homeland, received news 
from family members and those who had returned to Korea immediately after the war, 
that the country was in complete disorder and that it was better for them to remain in 
Japan.
289
 In fact, Korea was in such a state that a number of Resident Koreans who had 
made the trip back to their homeland snuck back to Japan to seek a steadier life.
290
 
Furthermore, tens of thousands of Koreans who had not lived in Japan during the 
prewar or wartime periods made their way to Japan and hid in cities such as Osaka 
where there were large populations of Resident Koreans.
291
 If they had been caught, 
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they would have been labeled as “smugglers” and deported back home.292 Many of 
these Koreans would reside illegally in Japan until their children were old enough to 
start school. At that time, they went to their regional legal affairs bureau and were able 
to gain a special stay permit that allowed them to become part of the Resident Korean 
community.
293
 Thus, due to the financial and physical difficulty of leaving Japan and 
due to the instability with the Korean peninsula, the flow of Koreans returning to Japan 
became a trickle and the true Resident Korean community in Japan began to form.
294
  
 
1.3.2: The Rise and Fall of Resident Korean Ethnic Schools 
After being liberated from Japanese colonialism by the Allied forces, many 
Resident Koreans believed that they would finally be released from the “oppression of 
the race” which had dominated their lives for thirty-six years.295 Instead, Resident 
Koreans found themselves “trapped” within the enemy country in which they had to 
face Japanese—as well as American—laws and policies that “linger[ed] and hinder[ed] 
the[ir] ability to progress personally or socially” as liberated Korean nationals in 
Japan.
296
 For example, Jeong Gyeong-jo, who worked as an adviser in an ethnic 
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organization after the war, states that “the treatment of zainichi Koreans was still severe 
even after the war ended” and that the Japanese government’s desire to “usurp their 
basic rights was only getting stronger.” 297 Indeed, as I will show below, the Japanese 
were quick to attack Resident Korean ethnic schools and the organization Zai-Nihon 
Chōsenjin renmei (在日本朝鮮人連盟 The League of Koreans in Japan, abbreviated as 
Chōren 朝連), which was originally established to aid with the repatriation and 
unemployment of Resident Koreans.
298
 
One method that the Japanese government and the American Occupation forces 
implemented to control the Resident Korean population was by stripping them of any 
national status. As Fukuoka writes, Resident Koreans were denied the rights of being 
either “foreigners” in Japan or “‘Japanese’ with Japanese nationality.”299 However, 
despite being denied the rights of both foreigners and Japanese, the Japanese 
government and the American Occupation forces were quick to identify Resident 
Koreans as either foreigners or Japanese when one label or the other proved to be the 
more effective method of controlling the minority group through law.
300
  
One of the most reviled examples in which Resident Koreans were labeled as 
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“Japanese” involved ethnic schools. As Kim Tae-young notes, immediately after Japan’s 
defeat, a number “Korean language training schools” mushroomed across the country in 
order to help children prepare for returning to Korea. However, because of the unease 
within the peninsula and the limits placed on money and belongings that Resident 
Koreans could take to their homeland, Resident Korean leaders thought it was best to 
improve ethnic schools, primarily through better organization and through the use of 
Resident Korean created textbooks, in order to not only prepare their children for life 
back in Korea but also for life in Japan.
301
 Also, these improved ethnic schools were 
established because Resident Koreans loathed the idea of their children being absorbed 
into Japanese society through the education system after they had been freed from 
colonial rule.
302
 Indeed, Koreans thought that it was natural for them to have their own 
schools that were separate from those that Japanese children attended.
303
 
Jeong Gyeong-jo, who worked at a Korean ethnic school in Fuse during the 
early postwar period, states that the mission of Resident Korean teachers, for the most 
part individuals who were not trained to be teachers, was the “‘recovery of ethnicity’” 
through the study of the Korean language, history, and culture that the Japanese 
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government had attempted to eliminate.
304
 Thus, the Resident Korean teachers desired 
to infuse their students with Korean ethnicity so they would remember “that wherever 
we live, we must live as Koreans.”305 After having their Korean ethnicity suppressed 
for so long, it is not surprising that the education that the Resident Korean children 
received was highly nationalistic. As Jeong Gyeong-jo states, subjects such as history 
and geography were highly Korea-centric and reflected how Koreans were “the superior 
race with more than 4,000 years of history.”306 These studies also focused on how 
Korean society was respected in the ancient world and how Japanese society developed 
from Korea. Thus, in many ways, Korean ethnic education focused on how Koreans 
were supposedly superior to their colonizers.
307
 
By 1948 the number of Resident Korean schools in Japan had grown to 504 
and they contained around 60,000 students. Most of these schools, of course, were 
established by Chōren whose leaders tended to be socialists and Korean nationalists, 
two groups made the Japanese government and the American Occupation forces 
uneasy.
308
 As Kim Tae-young writes, at first GHQ, General Headquarters, took a stance 
of “noninterfering” in its relationship with Resident Korean schools, but, as the Cold 
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War became more severe, GHQ could no longer ignore the spread of these schools 
because they were linked to Chōren’s socialists who posed a supposed threat to the 
burgeoning democracy of Japan.
309
 Thus, GHQ’s stance towards ethnic schools 
changed from “noninterference” to “control” and finally to outright “oppression.”310 On 
January 24, 1948 the Japanese Ministry of education, through the enforcement of GHQ, 
sent a circular notice to the governors of each prefecture that states that “Korean 
children should be put to Japanese schools” and that the “establishment of private 
schools should be done in accordance with the School Education Law” while the 
“education given is in Japanese language with the textbooks approved by the Ministry 
of Education.”311 In June of the same year, an administrative order was given for the 
ethnic schools to be closed down in each prefecture.
312
 Resident Koreans opposed the 
closure of their schools and emphasized to the Japanese government and GHQ that the 
“goal and mission of ethnic education” was to make Korean children ready for life back 
on the Korean peninsula and they needed “education in Korean schools” where the 
“Korean language is used” in order to obtain such goals.313 
As Resident Korean ethnic schools were closed across the country, Resident 
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Koreans rose up in protest. The core of their rage and dismay was displayed in the 
Hanshin kyōiku jiken (阪神教育事件 Hanshin Education Incident) that took place in 
April 1948.
314
 On April 13, an administrative order was given for nineteen out of 
seventy Resident Korean ethnic schools to be closed in Osaka. In protest, the parents of 
the students who attended these schools asked the Japanese government to withdraw the 
order.
315
 A few days later the principals of the ethnic schools gathered and they 
produced a list of eight demands that they wanted addressed to the Japanese government 
such as the “immediate withdrawal of the order of closure” and the “acceptance of the 
independence of ethnic education for Korean people.”316 In order to gain support for 
these demands, a signature gathering campaign was launched as well. With their list of 
demands written and a large number of Resident Korean signatures gathered, the Osaka 
branch of Chōren sent a request to Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi 芦田均 (1887-1959) 
to “withdraw the order for the closure of the schools.”317  
On April 23
rd, an assembly of around 30,000 individuals gathered in Ōtemae 
Park in Osaka to protest the closure of the schools. This protest allowed Resident 
Korean representatives to speak with the Vice Governor of Osaka, but the results of the 
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meeting were less than optimal.
318
 In order to break up the assembly of Resident 
Koreans, the Osaka prefectural police conducted a roundup where hundreds were 
injured and around 300 individuals were arrested.
319
 On April 26
th
, Osaka policemen 
began spraying an assembled group of Resident Koreans with water cannons while 
Chōren leaders were meeting with the governor of Osaka about the closure of the ethnic 
schools.
320
 Eventually, policemen armed with rifles would surround the building where 
the protestors were located and, after shots were fired, one Resident Korean teenaged 
boy was killed and eight other individuals were severely injured.
321
 
As these protests were raging in Osaka, a similar situation was brewing in 
Kobe when the administrative order for the schools to close was made by Hyogo 
prefecture on April 10
th
 and the closure of the ethnic schools occurred on April 11
th
. The 
Resident Korean community asked the Japanese government to “respect the 
independence of ethnic education and the use of school buildings.”322 However, their 
requests were ignored and, in revenge, Resident Koreans surrounded the prefectural 
office in Kobe City, “enforced collective bargaining,” and “confirmed” that their 
schools would not be shut down. Yet, as a result of this “enforced collective bargaining,” 
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GHQ established martial law and voided the new “agreement” between the Resident 
Koreans and the Kobe government while placing hundreds of Resident Koreans under 
arrest and later sentencing six of them, and one Japanese, to ten years of hard labor for 
their actions.
323
  
Although some of the methods used by Chōren to preserve their ethnic schools 
were rather heavy handed and thereby had little chance to succeed, members of the 
group supported the “enforced collective bargaining” because they were fighting against 
the enemy that had, during the prewar and wartime periods, “deprived [them of] 
freedom of speech, publication, and association,” attempted to “eliminate [their] history 
and traditions, and “banned Korean education.” Therefore, the Japanese had attempted 
to destroy the supposed “Korean spirit” through their “assimilation policies.324 It was a 
fight to preserve the culture of Korea for Korean Residents in Japan because “culture is 
something which expresses the existence of a race and a race without culture only has 
the road to ruin.”325 
Ignoring the demands of the Resident Korean community, the Ministry of 
Education made it clear that if ethnic subjects such as the Korean language, history, and 
culture were to be taught to Resident Korean children they “shall be taught as optional 
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subjects or in extracurricular lessons” and not as the primary education that the children 
received.
326
 In order to gain further control over Resident Koreans, and especially 
socialist and nationalist Chōren members, and other groups that it considered to 
represent a threat to the security of the country, the Japanese government established the 
Dantai tō seiki rei (団体等正規令 Organization Control Law) in April of 1949 which 
forcibly separated Chōren from Koreans in Japan Democratic Youth League.327 Chōren 
itself would eventually be shut down when the Japanese government, with full support 
from GHQ, declared that it was a “terrorist organization.”328 After its closure, even 
more Resident Korean schools were closed because they were directly run by the 
organization.
329
 
After the closure of Chōren and all of the public ethnic schools, Resident 
Koreans had three options for the further education of their children: independent 
schools ran by the Resident Koreans themselves, a branch of a Japanese public school, 
or Japanese public schools where ethnic classes were taught.
330
 By April 1952, the 
number of Resident Korean schools, including the branch and schools that offered 
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ethnic classes, dropped to 172.
331
 Although the three examples listed above were the 
primary ways for Resident Korean students to gain an ethnic education, students in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area had another option. As Kim Tae-young writes, on December 
20, 1949 the Tokyo Board of Education officially established “Tokyo Metropolitan 
Korean Schools” which were an exceptional item because schools exclusively for 
foreigners were rarely “public schools.” However, these would prove to be short-lived 
due to their association with the pro-North Korea organization Minsen.
332
 
Although Chōren closed its doors in 1949, Japanese governmental concern 
about the actions taking place within Resident Korean schools would reignite with the 
beginning of the Korean War on June 25, 1950.
333
 The primary reason for this concern 
was that the Zainichi Chōsen tōitsu minshu sensen(在日朝鮮統一民主戦線 the United 
Democratic Front of Koreans in Japan, abbreviated as Minsen 民戦), which was 
established not long after the fall of Chōren and attracted many of the followers of the 
previous institution, supported North Korea, and was instructed by the Japanese 
Communist Party, was deeply involved with the education of Resident Korean 
children.
334
 Devoted to the “unification of their homeland,” which they believed would 
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be reached through “overthrowing the reactionary cabinet of Japan with mutual 
cooperation with Japanese people,” Minsen, like Chōren before it, aimed to secure the 
independence for Korean ethnic education in order to pursue such goals as “bringing up 
100,000 Resident Korean children faithful to the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea.”335 Fully aware of how the Japanese government eliminated previous 
incarnations of Korean ethnic education, Minsen, in their inaugural speech, stated that 
“They are trying to destroy the independent education of our race again. We must 
overcome every difficulty and oppression and defend our ethnic education to the 
end.”336 
The Japanese Government believed that Minsen’s activities with the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Korean Schools were those “of a revolutionary movement” and they 
supplied an “anti-Japanese communist education” to the students.337 Of course, 
Japanese officials believed that Minsen’s teachings and demonstrations were “opposed 
to the intentions of Japanese government” and thereby posed a real threat to the “public 
order of Japanese society.”338 As a result of the tensions between the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Korean Schools and the Japanese government, the activities of Minsen 
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were put under heavy surveillance as a “public security measure” and the Japanese 
government sought the closure of these schools with the signing of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty in 1952.
339
 Three years after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 
the Tokyo Board of Education declared that the public Korean schools would be closed 
on March 31, 1955. After this announcement, parents of Resident Korean students, 
Resident Korean teachers, and a number of Japanese teachers protested the closure of 
the schools.
340
 
One of the primary protestors of the closure of the schools was an illegal 
organization called Sokoku bōei i’in kai (祖国防衛全国委員会 the National 
Committee of the Defense of the Motherland). In its bulletin Shin Chōsen (新朝鮮 New 
Korean), the organization states that 50% of Resident Koreans were unable to attend 
school after Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s 吉田茂 (1878-1967) cabinet “banned 
the voluntary, democratic ethnic education of Resident Koreans.”341 The committee 
also complained that the Yoshida government took away their freedom to/of organize, 
speech, publication, assembly, and demonstration as well as blocking Resident Koreans 
from being able to “absorb new culture” because they could not contact Korea, China, 
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and the Soviet Union.
342
 Thus, protesting the closure of ethnic schools was the way for 
Resident Koreans to fight against the “American and Japanese policies to erase ethnic 
peoples.”343 
 
1.2.3: Resident Koreans and Japanese “Homogeneity” 
Despite the presence of 500,000-600,000 Resident Koreans, as well as other 
minorities, on national territory, the Japanese government and the Japanese populace 
tended to insist that Japan was made up of a people with one “homogeneous national 
identity” that consisted of and will continue to consist of common culture and lineage 
whose origin is solitary and pure.
344
 Thus, Japanesemess was “invariable and 
inflexible.”345 With a stronger understanding of how the Japanese conceptualized 
themselves as being homogeneous, one can better grasp why Resident Koreans, even 
those of later generations, who are acclimated to Japanese society due to their fluency in 
Japanese and familiarity with Japanese customs and culture, were/are still considered 
total outsiders in Japan. Besides wanting to preserve purity, the Japanese government 
wanted to preserve the idea of a homogeneous nation in order to let the black mark of 
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the colonial years fade away.  
In order to accomplish this goal, the Japanese policy towards Resident Koreans 
who did not repatriate during the early years after the end of the war and those who did 
not return through North Korean-Japanese repatriation movement was “to make them 
die a natural death by forcing assimilation” upon them, which, in the end, “decolorized” 
their ethnic differences.
346
 Thus, Resident Koreans were expected “to become Japanese 
as much as possible” as they eliminated their “Koreanness.”347 
Accompanied by a desire to live a peaceful life within a country that was 
hostile to their existence, many Resident Koreans chose to assimilate totally to Japanese 
society or to become naturalized Japanese citizens.
348
 By almost submitting to 
(assimilation) or totally submitting to (naturalization) this “highest form of national 
belonging” available to a non-Japanese citizen, Resident Koreans were able to acquire 
Japanese identities.
349
 However, after doing so, it became necessary for a Resident 
Korean to “reject his or her racial and ethnic difference to align” solely with the 
Japanese.
350
 As a result, the Resident Koreans had to avoid associating with Korean 
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ethnic organizations and acquaintances that were openly Korean.
351
 
After giving up their Koreanness, the lives of Resident Koreans were still 
unsettled because they were burdened by the secret of their origins. Indeed, as Freda 
Scott Giles states, in reference to African Americans passing as whites, they become the 
“despised other lurking within” the mainstream society that they were forced to conform 
to.
352
 Thus, while passing as Japanese offers Resident Koreans some ease in daily life, 
it can also seriously damage their being because, as they “renounce a socially 
subordinate…identity to retain their tenuous place in the dominant culture,” it 
strengthens the dominant culture even more while weakening the culture and self-worth 
of minorities.
353
  
While closely guarding the secrets of their own origins, secrets that are hidden 
but “guide” their very lives, Resident Koreans are prone to self-reflection. However, 
instead of being the path to better self-understanding, such self-reflection often led 
Resident Koreans to “realize that they have no place in the all-inclusive structures that 
give them [the Japanese] meaning,” such as the beliefs in Japanese homogeneity.354 
Also, Resident Koreans who decided to pass as Japanese were met with “fierce scorn 
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and dismissal” by their fellows who, at times, were “ethnically militant.”355 Particularly, 
Resident Koreans who decide to pass as Japanese are disdained by their fellows because 
they bear “the mark of the oppressor.”356 
Although the burden of concealing their identities was very difficult, revealing 
their ethnicity was potentially even more damaging. If a Resident Korean reveals his or 
her ethnicity, it can have “immediate consequences” because the ones who learn of this 
Koreanness might apply it to all aspects of the individual and use it to explain, albeit 
oftentimes falsely, certain traits of the confessors.
357
 Thus, revealing oneself as Korean, 
although it might be seen as empowering by many well-meaning individuals, can be 
damaging because it can give the “false impression that the confessor is the proprietor 
of his own voice.”358 If an individual is truly the “proprietor of his [or her] own voice, 
it means that he or she is “empowered in other spheres of life as well.”359 However, 
with Resident Koreans, especially during the early postwar years, this was not the case 
because the Japanese government, and a large section of the Japanese populace, saw the 
Resident Korean community as a “bothersome existence” that did not deserve even 
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basic human rights.
360
 Thereby, in many ways, it was more effective to hide one’s 
Korean origins than to display them openly because doing so was “antagonistic” to 
one’s life in Japan.361 
Resident Koreans who have either naturalized or totally assimilated to life in 
Japan even kept their Korean origins secret from their own children in order to protect 
them. As a result, many Resident Korean children were devastated after eventually 
learning of their true origins, “because their comfortably assimilated lives are 
ruptured.”362  
 
1.2.4: Resident Koreans Divided by Generations 
For the most part, the Resident Koreans who decided to naturalize or assimilate 
totally were members of the second, or more likely, third generation and beyond.
363
 The 
“impassioned Korean identity of the first generation” weakened as the years became 
decades and younger generations of Resident Koreans deeply engrained themselves in 
Japan by marrying Japanese and reaching some level of prosperity.
364
 Thus, a divide 
was established between older Resident Koreans whose thoughts and emotions were 
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tied solely to the Korean peninsula and younger members of the minority group who 
“share the same destiny with Japanese people in Japanese society.”365 
While a large portion of first generation Resident Koreans, whose political 
leanings bent heavily towards North Korea, were more concerned with the 
“reunification of the homeland” than with life and rights for minority groups in Japan, 
younger generations, individuals that could be referred to as “true Resident Korean folk,” 
knew that the island nation was not a “temporary stopping place,” but the one where 
they were born and whose language and culture they were primarily familiar with. The 
return to Korea, either North or South, was nothing more than a fantasy to them.
366
 
However, despite their knowledge that they would likely never return to North 
or South Korea, many among these younger generations of Resident Koreans also had 
no desire to fully naturalize because they would lose their ethnicity.
367
 This was a new 
idea that broke many taboos because both older generation Resident Koreans and the 
Japanese government found it abhorrent to link “permanent residence in Japan with 
eternal fidelity to Korean folkhood.”368 This idea, which took some thirty-five years to 
develop after the war, was excruciatingly slow in its manifestation due to, in relatively 
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equal parts, “the myth of a homogeneous Japanese folk, and the tragedy of a divided 
homeland still occupied by American troops.”369 Indeed, due to the brutalities 
committed by the Japanese and Americans within the Korean peninsula, the unending 
vitriolic racism of the Japanese, and having older relatives who had been brutalized by 
the Japanese and Americans and dreamed of reunifying the peninsula, it is not 
surprising that a desire to live in Japan as Resident Koreans took so long to develop.  
However, these younger generations found it difficult to understand the 
sentiments that the first generation and their more militant fellows felt towards the 
“rhetoric of folk and homeland.”370 Indeed, for these younger generation Resident 
Koreans who were unable to embrace the “rhetoric of folk and homeland,” Korea and 
things Korean had the effect of making them understand how Japanese they really 
were.
371
 Thereby, although many became ashamed by how Japanese they were, it was 
an acceptance of their true selves as Resident Koreans and not Koreans.
372
 
 
1.2.5: The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea 
Although the Japanese government was quick to deny responsibility for the 
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suffering it caused the Korean people during the colonial period, it was very interested 
in starting relations with South Korea during the postwar years. As Norma Field writes, 
Japan, with help of the United States, was able to gain a strong economic position by 
the mid-1960s when the island country was ready to begin relations with the southern 
half of the Korean peninsula.
373
 Because of its powerful economic standing, the 
Japanese government was able to “shape” the Nikkan kihon jōyaku (日韓基本条約 The 
Treaty on Basic Relations) in a manner that would allow it to accomplish two desired 
goals: “representation of Japanese capital” within South Korea and an end to South 
Korean citizen demands for reparations for wartime losses.
374
 As a result of this treaty, 
the South Korean government, headed by President Park Chung-hee朴正煕 
(1917-1979) who desired Japanese money to be pumped into South Korea, established a 
list of South Korean citizens who could not demand repatriations from the Japanese 
government. This list included “systematically current Resident Koreans, Koreans who 
died after 1945 from the effects of brutal prewar and wartime labor, Korean victims of 
the atomic bombs, and ‘comfort women,’ among others.”375 
One of the major effects of The Treaty on Basic Relations was that it offered 
Resident Koreans who sided with South Korea the opportunity to apply for legal 
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permanent residence in Japan after January 1, 1966.
376
 The number of Resident 
Koreans who desired to be part of this kyōtei eijū (協定永住 permanent residence 
agreement) grew quite rapidly with the number reaching 100,000 in 1969, 342,000 in 
1974, and 350,000 in 1985.
377
 As a result of this permanent residence agreement, which 
made Resident Koreans eligible for such things as passports, the Resident Korean 
community in Japan was permanently split into two political halves with those who 
were willing to accept the agreement being placed on the side of South Korea and those 
who did not sign being placed on the side of North Korea
378
 This powerful separation 
led to a number of confrontations between those who supported the North and those 
who supported the South.
379
 As for the Japanese government, Fukuoka Yasunori states 
that there was little real concern for the welfare of Resident Koreans in Japan. The 
Japanese government was solely preoccupied with securing the alignment with the 
South Korean government, and the permanent residence agreement was established to 
cement the deal.
380
 
Many Resident Koreans, especially those who were placed on the side of North 
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Korea, had a number of issues with the Japanese government attempting to solidify its 
relationship with the South Korean government. One of the primary reasons why North 
Korea-leaning Resident Koreans were displeased with the stance that the Japanese 
government was taking with South Korea was because it was evident that it was 
following the American policy toward Korea with its antagonistic attitude towards the 
North and ease of support with the oftentimes brutal leaders of the South.
381
 This 
attitude of the Japanese government would play an important role, especially during the 
1960s and the 1970s, in influencing how “Resident Koreans extended their struggle 
against oppression in Japan to democratization efforts in Korea.”382 
Also, to many Resident Koreans and left-leaning Japanese, Japan’s economic 
presence in South Korea represented a type of neo-colonialism. As the noted Korean 
poet and playwright Kim Chi-ha金芝河 (1941- ) wrote about the dealings between the 
Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曽根康弘 (1918- ) and dictatorial 
South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan全斗煥 (1931- ), when “the political and 
economic dependence is already there all that remains is the cultural dominance in tune 
with military rule.”383 There was also fear that, with the aid of Japanese money, the 
South Korean government would continue to prioritize industry and transport 
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infrastructure over the wellbeing of its own citizens and workers.
384
 
As a despised minority within a hostile host country, the words of the Resident 
Koreans, especially those who sided with North Korea, were ignored by the Japanese 
populace and government and the South Korean government as well. Thus, it is not 
surprising that after the Japanese government paid President Park Chung-hee eight 
hundred million dollars in reparations and loans, “further claims on Japan related to its 
colonial rule” were essentially dropped while Resident Koreans and the citizens of 
South Korea continued to suffer due to the Japanese and South Korean governments 
that turned a blind eye to them.
385
 
Now, with this history established, let’s take a closer look at the representation 
of Koreans in Japanese film. 
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Chapter 2: Resident Koreans in Japanese Film 
 
2.1: Introduction 
According to the film historian Yomota Inuhiko 四万田犬彦, film scholars in 
Japan, unlike their counterparts in the United States of America, have cast a blind eye 
on the images of minorities within film. While the images of African Americans, Jews, 
Native Americans, and others have been written about for years and have enriched the 
reader’s knowledge of how minorities are constructed, depicted, and used in American 
film, Yomota believes that Japanese film scholars instead turned inward and examined 
what truly made Japanese film Japanese.
386
 Thus, for example, instead of analyzing the 
importance of the appearance of Korean laborers in Shimizu Hiroshi’s 清水宏 
(1903-1966) prewar film Arigatō-san (有りがとうさん Mr. Thank You, 1936), they 
geared their research to such subjects as the “Japaneseness” of Ozu Yasujirō’s 小津安
二郎 (1903-1963) films, a subject which was bolstered by the fact that Western critics 
were interested in how Japanese films differed from Western—primarily 
                                                   
386
Yomota Inuhiko, “Nihon eiga to mainoritei no hyōshō: Zainichi Kankokujin no hyōshō” in Ajia no 
naka no Nihon eiga. (Tokyo; Iwanami Shoten, 2001), pp.52, 53. 
99 
 
Hollywood—films.387 A more blatant disregard for minorities in Japanese film can be 
seen in how these critics receive films from other Asian countries. Film critics 
sympathized with the “ethnic anguish” experienced by the characters, but were hesitant 
to mention the presence of Resident Koreans in yakuza—Japanese gangster—films. 
This absence of critical study concerning the presence of minorities, especially Resident 
Korean minorities, in Japanese film is odd to Yomota because studies of how Koreans 
and Resident Koreans are depicted in Japanese literature are quite prolific.
388
 In an 
attempt to redress this imbalance, this chapter I will trace a brief history of the 
representation of Koreans and Resident Koreans in Japanese film. 
 
2.2: Victim Consciousness and US censorship 
Although this chapter will primarily deal with the images of Resident Koreans 
in Japanese narrative and documentary film from 1955 to 1970, it is important to 
premise this with an outline of Japanese victim consciousness and how it was depicted 
in early postwar film, in order to understand the reasons behind the absence of Resident 
Koreans in early postwar films, and the reasons why their early incarnations in the late 
1950s and early 1960s were nothing but idealized stereotypes.  
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As the film historian Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto states, victim consciousness was 
developed as “a psychic means of disavowing the history of the Japanese victimizing 
Asia” while at the same time making themselves the victims of their own militaristic 
government and the American atomic bombings.
389
 Because this mentality is so 
engrained within the peoples of the Japanese archipelago, it is impossible—although it 
has been attempted numerous times—to dislodge this mentality by simply stating that 
the Japanese were the victimizers and not the victims. Thus, instead of trying to 
understand victim consciousness as the “simplistic binarism of victimizers and victims,” 
Yoshimoto states that Japanese victim consciousness should be viewed as a “fantasy 
formation” of the Japanese which can only be dissolved by discovering and dissecting 
the “utmost ‘pathological’ kernel” within it that forms the victimized mentality of the 
Japanese.
390
  
Miryam Sas writes that the possible origin of Japanese victim consciousness 
might be found in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 
1945.
391
 One would expect that such an experience would make the Japanese resent the 
United States even more than they had throughout the war, but, as Sas writes, “Japan’s 
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vengeful gaze toward the United States was transformed into an adoring look.”392 The 
Japanese leadership saw the atomic bombings as a “drama of rescue” in which Emperor 
Hirohito could be saved by the United States from “corrupt militarists.” Such a 
viewpoint helped the Japanese leadership rationalize Japan’s inevitable defeat and made 
the Occupation by the United States easier to withstand.
393
 Furthermore, the 
Occupation leaders agreed with the Japanese leadership that Emperor Hirohito was a 
victim of circumstance and not a war criminal himself. This belief would eventually be 
embraced by the nation as a whole, and the Japanese were quick to forget the atrocities 
committed by the common Japanese soldiery in the colonies and inhuman treatment of 
minorities in the Japanese archipelago and a collective amnesia of the wartime and 
prewar periods overtook the Japanese populace.
394
 As a result, Japan became a victim 
which was pardoned of its past but forced into a subservient role under the rule of the 
United States.
395
 
The United States had other motivating factors in its willingness to blame the 
war and wartime atrocities solely on the militarists instead of the emperor: it hoped to 
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make Japan into a “peaceful nation” that staunchly supported its occupier in the Cold 
War against the looming communist threats of China and the Soviet Union.
396
 Thus, 
even though Japan had supposedly been forgiven for its past deeds, the Occupiers were 
determined to make the island country fit the mold that they desired. This mold, of 
course, was based on the United States themselves. 
Thus the Occupation authorities created the Civil Information and Education 
(CIE) which initiated a number of reforms in education, religion, and public information. 
Some of the basic goals on the CIE were to dissolve the militaristic mindset of the 
Japanese, endorse “liberal freedoms” such as freedom of expression, religion, and 
assembly, and to preserve Japan’s newfound peace.397 The CIE aimed to do this by 
“reeducating” and “reorienting” Japan into a pro-democratic and pro-American 
nation.
398
 
The American Occupation Forces turned to film as a method to help make 
Japan a pro-democratic and pro-American nation. Originally believed to be nothing 
more than a form of entertainment, Hollywood film became a “chosen instrument” of 
the Occupation forces to improve Japanese “collective behavior” and to help Japan gain 
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a prominent place in the global arena.
399
 Film was viewed as an effective means of 
spreading these ideals because of its ability to draw large audiences. Thus, the 
Occupation forces hoped that Hollywood film would fulfil the dual purposes of 
“entertainment and intellectual cultivation” (goraku to kyōyō 娯楽と教養) in order to 
offer both offer “release and fulfilment to a population crushed by the war.”400  
The Occupation forces initiated a “controlled reconstruction” of Japanese 
movie culture which was very similar to how Japan used film to spread its own 
ideologies in its colonies.
401
 Also, as I will show in more detail later, Hollywood film 
was an effective means of showing the abundance of consumer goods in America and 
spreading American capitalist ideologies.
402
 Thereby Hollywood film allowed the 
devastated Japanese populace to enter a filmic fantasy zone where they could indulge in 
the “vicarious experience of conspicuous consumption” which would not only show 
them the wealth and power of the U.S., but also help give the Japanese aspirations to 
rebuild their country as quickly as possible so that they too could enjoy such material 
comfort.
403
 
At the same time, concerned with the content of the films being produced in 
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Japan and imported from abroad, the Japanese government enacted the Regulation for 
Motion Picture Censorship (Katsudō shashin firumu ken’etsu kisoku 活動写真フィル
ム検閲規則) which gave the Home Ministry power to “pass, edit, or ban completed 
film products based on ‘common decency’ (fūzoku 風俗), which was applied against 
representations of cruelty, lust, adultery, nudity, profanity, and blasphemy.”404 
Censorship was further enforced by the Control Committee for the Motion Picture Code 
of Ethics, which evaluated films according to the categories of “Nation and Society,” 
“Law,” “Religion,” “Education,” “Custom,” “Sex,” and “Distasteful Subjects.”405 
One of the most intrusive censorship organizations was the U.S. Army 
managed Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). A subdivision of McArthur’s Civil 
Intelligence Section, the CCD’s purpose was to enforce SCAP’s goals through “cultural 
regulation and control” with a particular focus on “censorship of civilian 
communications in Japan in both the private (telephone calls, personal letters, and 
telegrams) and public (newspapers, magazines, etc.) spheres of daily life.
406
 The section 
that concerned itself with film was the Press, Pictorial, and Broadcast Division which 
was responsible for “censorship of all newsreels and movies made by the Japanese.”407 
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Routinely, this division was a stickler for the guidelines written in the Motion Picture 
Code and was quick to oust films that did not make the Code’s standards. Even if the 
films did meet these standards, the CCD would often ask for edits in order to strengthen 
SCAP’s agenda.408 
Although these other divisions, both local and foreign, hindered the Japanese 
film industry, SCAP itself probably represented the greatest impediment to a true revival 
of Japanese film because they censored directors in their desire to “reeducate” and 
“reorient” the Japanese populace.409 Similar to its own division the CCD, which would 
be dissolved after only a few years, SCAP ran a fine-toothed comb through screenplays, 
scenarios, and film prints and made the Japanese filmmakers eliminate or alter sections 
that they found to be objectionable. As the film historian Hiroshi Kitamura states, 
SCAP’s actions made them a “regulator of [Japan’s] cultural output.”410 Similar to the 
CCD, SCAP used “pressure and suasion” to force the Japanese directors to change their 
filmmaking processes in order to nip in the bud questionable content and to include 
content desired by SCAP that reflected its own values.
411
 On the surface, these 
“suggestions” were supposed to aid Japan recover from the devastation of war and 
                                                   
408 Ibid, p.46. 
409 Ibid, pp.42-43. 
410
 Ibid. p.43. 
411
 Ibid. 
106 
 
instill in them an appreciation for American-styled democracy, but the primary result 
was that it revealed the “hegemonic structure of cultural and political power” that the 
United States possessed over Japan.
412
  
The main topic that the censors wanted removed was war: 236 films which 
expounded upon “conformity to a feudal code,” the “creation of the Warrior Spirit,” and 
the “superiority of the ‘Yamato,’” all themes that could go against SCAP’s mission to 
reeducate and reorient the Japanese populace, were confiscated and incinerated near the 
Tama River.
413
 Furthermore, they eliminated from other movies scenes in which 
“military songs, symbols, and men in uniform” were included.414 
Another issue that concerned SCAP’s censors was the depiction of both explicit 
and implied racism. Primarily, the censors were critical of foreign films in which white 
people interacted with peoples of color. If discrimination appeared in these films, the 
scenes in which it appeared were quickly excised before the film was released to the 
Japanese audience.
415
 For example, Sidney Salkow’s (1909-2000) prewar film Storm 
Over Bengal (1938) featured an Indian insurrection against the British in which a 
military leader barely escapes a group of Indian rebels before their capture, and made 
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whites seem to be both “imperialistic” and “racially intolerant.”416 This concern about 
the negative depiction of white people and their relationship with darker skinned 
“natives” can also be seen in the censors’ critique of Edward A. Kull’s (1885-1946) 
Tarzan and the Green Goddess (1938). In this film white archaeologists are depicted as 
nothing more than avaricious thieves who steal from natives who are “powerless, 
faceless, and submissive” while being unable to defend themselves against white greed. 
For this and other reasons, the censors found this film to depict “imperialism at its 
worst.” Instead, the censors supported films such as John Cromwell’s (1887-1979) Anna 
and the King of Siam (1946), because it depicted a striving for “‘scientific” thinking,’ 
‘modernization,’ ‘progress,’ and English-language education.’”417  
Although the United States limited the contents and types of films that 
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Japanese audiences could watch, Hollywood film would have a major effect on the 
Japanese and help shift their cultural, political, and social beliefs.
418
 As Kitamura states, 
after the Japanese were defeated, they developed a fascination with all things American 
and had a great desire to learn about the nation that decimated their country.
419
 At the 
same time, the Japanese “imagined and reinvented” the United States in the way that it 
best fit their needs. Therefore, even if the culture of United States seemed to be 
“superior” to Japanese culture, this heightened rank was built upon Japanese perception 
and not a perception instilled by the Occupation.
420
 
As in their appreciation for European film, a number of Japanese, especially 
critics and other intellectuals, looked to Hollywood film for inspiration on how to live a 
different life than they had during the prewar and the wartime periods.
421
 Indeed, 
because the ideologies that had governed prewar and wartime Japan had supposedly 
been wiped out by the Occupation, Japan had entered an “era of disintegration” which 
was a fruitful time for “theories of individual autonomy” (shutaiseiron 主体性論).422 
These theories were primarily concerned with how the Japanese could maintain 
                                                   
418
 Ibid, p.xi. 
419
 Ibid, p.89. 
420 Ibid. p.176. 
421 Ibid, p.136. 
422 Isolde Standish, Politics, Porn, and Protest: Japanese Avant-Garde Cinema in the 1960s and 1970s. 
(New York and London: Continuum, 2011), p.16 
109 
 
“personal integrity in opposition to social forces” and institutions.423 Thus, Hollywood 
films, and Japanese films that contained similar issues, as I will show later in this 
chapter, functioned as guidelines to show the power of the individual and how an 
individual can still preserve morality by following his or her own decisions rather than 
being coerced by social forces.
424
  
Although Hollywood film was rapidly becoming popular in Japan, SCAP was 
disappointed that Japanese audiences did not seem to fully comprehend the films that 
they were watching. In order to bridge the gap between film and audience, SCAP, 
through the Central Motion Picture Exchange, invited rich and well-known Japanese to 
view films at special screenings in order to develop “advance publicity.”425 These 
individuals, instead of simply discussing the films with media outlets, were supposed to 
make the films’ “high level of culturalism” easier for the Japanese masses to 
understand.
426
 Thus these prominent Japanese became engaged in an “enlightenment 
campaign” that aimed to increase the consumption of Hollywood film by “systematizing 
the instruction of [filmic] appreciation.”427 
On the surface, this enlightenment campaign might seem to be nothing more 
                                                   
423
 Ibid. 
424
 Ibid. 
425
 Kitamura, Screening Enlightenment, p.138. 
426
 Ibid. 
427
 Ibid. 
110 
 
than a scheme created by Hollywood to increase profits. At the same time, the American 
occupiers, similar to the Japanese during the prewar and wartime periods, were well 
aware of the importance of critics and how effective they were in spreading new 
ideologies. Thus, SCAP took it upon itself in “instructing” and “educating” these 
prominent Japanese in the best methods in how to spread the American values present in 
these films for the purpose of inspiring the Japanese populace to reconstruct a 
pro-democratic and pro-American Japan.
428
 
As stated above, one of the primary subjects that the Occupation forces wanted 
the Japanese public to learn about was democracy. Critics were also eager for their 
people to latch onto a democratic mindset because this would help fill the void of 
ideology created by wartime devastation and defeat and because democratic feelings 
would supposedly fill the Japanese with an “energy” that would help them “recover for 
tomorrow.”429 
One of the primary lessons that the Japanese critics hoped that Japanese film 
audiences would pay particular interest to was the subject of humanism (hyūmanizumu 
ヒューマンイズム). Of course, humanism was a concept that the Japanese were 
familiar with before the Occupation, but, as Kitamura points out, the humanism that 
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appeared in prewar and wartime Japanese cinema, such as Tasaka Tomotaka’s 田坂具
隆 (1902-1974) popular film Gonin sekkohei (五人斥候兵 The Five Scouts, 1938), 
dealt with “human bonding and emotional affection in relation to Japan’s imperial 
polity.”430 With this “imperial polity” supposedly wiped out by the Occupation, 
humanism, as it was displayed in Hollywood films, came to mean a “mind-set to respect 
human beings.”431  
According to the critic Honda Akira 本多顕彰(1898-1978), a “candid 
exposure of one’s inner emotional qualities” was of major significance to the humanism 
that appears in Hollywood films, but, of even more importance in the context of early 
postwar Japan, these films displayed “a universal drive for compassion.”432 Honda, as 
well as a number of his fellow critics, believed that this type of humanism was 
completely absent in Japan during the war years, but that Americans had possessed it 
since the time the pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock. Thus, Hollywood cinema was the 
perfect avenue for the Japanese to learn “personal kindness and compassion.”433 
 
2.3 Victim Consciousness and Melodrama: The War-retro Genre 
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Although the existence of American film and the ideals that Americans tried to 
instill into the Japanese were dominating early postwar film culture, Japanese film was 
still significant in the lives of the Japanese. Japanese turned to the film culture of their 
own country in order to try and come to terms with the collapse of the world that they 
had known and the absence of the ideologies that had once controlled their everyday 
lives.
434
 However, as Yoshimoto points out, Japanese film did not only concern itself 
with helping the Japanese understand how Japan’s prewar and wartime quest for 
modernity ended in complete disaster, but also with tackling the new modernity brought 
to Japan by the American Occupation forces.
435
 
The most popular form of film during the first decade of the postwar period 
was the melodrama. Yoshimoto states that, in general, melodramas are considered to be 
“too formulaic, too exaggerated, and above all, too emotional” and their entertainment 
value derives from how they play on people’s emotions.436 According to Peter Brody, 
melodrama is an “expressionist drama” in which the true emotions of the characters are 
not on the surface, but are embedded deeper in the characters. This normally means that 
the characters rarely express themselves in words alone, and rely instead on overblown 
“human body and facial expression[s]” in order to try and get their messages across to 
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others.
437
 Thus, in these melodramas “emotion and human feelings the only genuine 
discourse” and both the audience and the characters in the film must understand the 
unvoiced purity and innocence of the protagonist in order to experience the full impact 
of the films.
438
 
One of the most interesting aspects of melodrama is its use of the specter of the 
past within the present. In her study, Christine Gledhill states that while realism engaged 
itself with a continued search for “renewed truth and authentication” and thus always 
looked to the future, melodrama, on the other, was stuck in an “atavistic past” where 
one is always looking for something that has been “lost,” “inadmissible” or 
“repressed.”439 Instead of dealing with issues of the present, such as the “rise of market 
capitalism and the emergence of [an American-inspired] modernity,” melodrama 
focused on the antagonistic relationship shared between prewar and postwar cultures.
440
 
Overall, this clinging to the past is the melodrama’s way of rejecting change.441 
As I stated earlier in this chapter, the Japanese attempted to rationalize the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their subsequent defeat as a “drama of 
rescue” in which the Emperor—and the Japanese people as a whole—was saved by the 
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Allies from the militarists who had led the country to destruction. This belief led to the 
creation of Japanese “victim consciousness” which effectively created a national 
amnesia that let the Japanese “forget” the atrocities they during the war. Because of this 
desire to equate victimization with an unavoidable fate, melodramatic films could be 
seen as the perfect “cinematic actualization” of victim consciousness.442 Indeed, as 
Yoshimoto points out, for a decade after the war, melodramatic Japanese films were one 
of the primary avenues through which Japanese victim consciousness was able to spread 
throughout the nation and be able to install a collective amnesia that covered up Japan’s 
past traumas and atrocities.
443
 
For victim consciousness to come into existence, a “conversion narrative” must 
occur. The conversion narrative takes place when an individual casts aside all forms of 
responsibility and follows the belief that his or her actions are not decided by him or 
herself, but by the “determining forces of a situation.”444 In Japan, this can be seen in 
how the country, with the help of the American Occupation forces, made itself a victim 
of militarism and cast a blind eye to those it had victimized. Where film is involved, 
conversion narratives and their offshoot victim consciousness can best be seen in 
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“war-retro genres.”445 
Although relatively simple in their presentation and content, films in the 
war-retro genre are more important in how they act as a meeting ground where the 
director and the audience can share a similar vision with the characters within a given 
film than their actual content. According to Yoshimoto, the director of melodramatic 
films does not want his or her viewers to simply feel sympathy for the characters, but to 
identify with them and thus acknowledge their experiences as the viewers’ own. Victim 
consciousness is therefore “a particular form of narcissism [that] transform[s] the 
difference of the other into the sameness of the self.”446 The directors of melodramas 
were supposedly able to make their viewers identify with their characters with relative 
ease because they, their audience, and the characters on the screen all shared the same 
feelings about the fate that had changed almost every aspect of their lives “in the 
expressive performance of a tender sorrow.”447 
In this respect, films like Imai Tadashi’s 今井正 (1912-1991) Mata au hi 
made (また逢う日まで Until the Day We Meet Again, 1950) and Matsubayashi Shūe’s 
松林宗恵 (1920-2009) Ningen gyorai kaiten (人間魚雷回天 The Sacrifice of the 
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Human Torpedoes, 1955) which embraced man’s powerlessness when confronted by 
fate and the weight of history, were basically a slap in the face to thinkers who 
encouraged their fellow Japanese to embrace American and European film in order to 
establish the “autonomy of the individual.”448 
The purpose of the melodramatic retro-war films was the creation of an 
exchange in which the directors and their audiences could share an “emotional catharsis” 
and try to come to terms with Japan’s recent past. Indeed, by identifying with the films’ 
characters, the audience could overlap their own personal experiences with that of the 
characters and a “collective understanding of the trauma of the past” could be created 
and shared by the country as a whole.
449
 
Although the Japanese might have been able to gain some sense of contentment 
through this collective sense of victimization, their methods of dealing with the 
combined traumas of war, defeat, and the Occupation did not deal with the issues at 
hand but only allowed them to create a fantasy which, to quote Jean-Paul Sartre, 
“secures people within their own walls.”450 
An interesting aspect of early postwar Japanese cinema is that, although it can 
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be called a “cinema of war,” the enemy is virtually absent.451 Instead, the films 
primarily focus on how the war affects the ordinary citizens of Japan. Normally setting 
their films within the confines of a city or town that has been completely decimated by 
an air raid or another type of military violence, the directors of war-retro films 
implemented the absence of the enemy as a method to make the audience completely 
identify with the victims without seeing other perspectives.
452
 In this way, the audience 
members are able to develop an “intersubjective relationship” between themselves and 
the characters within the films and thus identify the characters’ experiences as their 
own.
453
 
Furthermore, the victimized Japanese characters and their enemies are always 
painted as absolutely good or absolutely evil, with no nuances.
454
 Similar to the way the 
Japanese see themselves in the fantasy zone of victim consciousness, “tragic heroes” 
within war-retro films were the victims of uncontrollable fates created by 
“environmental and political factors” that were much more powerful than them.455 
Their actions were not of their own doing because there was no option of individual 
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choice during this time period.
456
  
With the American and Japanese government, filmmakers, etc. creating 
memories and obfuscating the traumas of war and defeat, the Japanese populace was 
able to develop a “collective memory” of how they were victimized in the war by the 
militarists.
457
 Furthermore, Japanese filmmakers helped the Japanese better understand 
the traumas they experienced because it took the “unassimilated scrape of images, 
disjointed temporalities of overwhelming experiences” of trauma and put them into 
“teleological sequences of time” and “an all-knowing omniscient narration style,” which 
helped cement how the Japanese had no control against the fate the militarists led them 
to.
458
 
However, even though the collective memories of Japan’s populace are 
supposedly being depicted in these films, due to the director’s desire for the audience to 
identify with the protagonist, history is depicted through the “immediate memories” of 
those who had experienced the war. Thus, as Standish points out, “history, in the sense 
of ‘historiography’, is expunged from the narrative” and personal experience comes to 
be viewed as reality.
459
 Because history is viewed from personal experience, the 
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suffering of others is looked upon with a narcissistic gaze and Japanese imperialism in 
Asia and the Pacific War are the cause of “domestic suffering” and, thus, they determine 
the “contemporary situation” of Japan.460 
Thus colonized individuals who had suffered at the hands of the Japanese both 
in the colonies and in Japan were expunged from Japanese collective memory.
461
 
Although it in no fashion or form excuses the Japanese for their wartime atrocities, one, 
in some ways, can understand why the formerly colonized and Japanese minority 
groups were expunged from Japanese collective memory at that time: they were 
constant reminders of Japan’s failed imperialism and brought back painful memories.462 
 
2.4: From Victim Consciousness to Consumer Culture  
Although films detailing victim consciousness were very popular during the 
first decade of the postwar period, their popularity began to fade roughly around 
1955.
463
 One major reason was the spread of television, which began to take the place 
of cinema as the main form of entertainment, giving rise to a new form of “communal 
subjectivity.”464 
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As I stated earlier, a number of Japanese intellectuals looked to the devastation 
caused by the war with hope because it was an opportunity to recreate Japanese 
subjectivity after the old fascist ideologies were wiped out by defeat and the Occupation. 
Desiring to install a new “political subjectivity for a new social democracy,” the 
intellectuals’ hopes were soon dissolved when prewar political figures and bureaucratic 
personnel regained their positions of power and were determined for Japan to reach 
“economic supremacy” no matter what the cost. Thus, instead of a new Japan being 
reconstructed, one could say that prewar Japan was being put in a new mold.
465
 
With the prewar leadership returned to power and with economic recovery 
becoming Japan’s primary goal, victim consciousness was soon supplanted by a “new 
economy of consumerism” which television helped fuel.466 Indeed, as Yoshimoto writes, 
television helped create a “new type of image” in Japan of an emerging urban middle 
class whose lifestyle, culture of consumerism, and importance of commodities as status 
symbols replaced the images of war and suffering.
467
 
Drawing on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Yoshimoto states that this 
change from victim consciousness to consumer culture can be attributed in part to 
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American-styled capitalism that was sweeping across the country during the early 
postwar years. Indeed, even before televisions began to spread within Japanese living 
rooms across the country, Hollywood films, as “myths of the twentieth century” 
“articulat[ed] and propagat[ed] ideologies of American capitalism” on the silver screen, 
so the Japanese had already experienced vicariously American-styled consumption.
468
 
Thus, when the opportunity to participate in a similar culture of “conspicuous 
consumption” presented itself to the Japanese, many embraced it eagerly.469    
Although this American-styled consumer culture did help boost the Japanese 
economy, many left-leaning intellectuals were uneasy with it because the policies that 
the Japanese government was implementing were influenced by U.S. demands.
470
 Thus, 
they believed that Japan was slinking back to a prewar militaristic government and that 
the newfound democracy that had implemented in Japan was nothing more than “the 
flip side of wartime militarism.”471 Therefore the hope that many Japanese had felt with 
the dawn of a new democracy in Japan quickly turned into “despair and disgust” as they 
felt completely betrayed by their own government.
472
 
One of the most obvious cases that Japan was bending to the will of the United 
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States was its opposition to worker and union activities. As Hiroshi Kitamura writes, 
McArthur and the Occupation forces seemed to be supportive of the rank-and-file 
workers at first because they ordered the massive conglomerates to be dismantled so 
that there would be more competition between medium and small-sized businesses and 
thereby empower the average worker. Although this movement brought communist and 
left wing movements to positions of power within the industry, McArthur supported 
them during the first two years of the occupation.
473
  
However, because the conditions in the film industry remained rather chaotic 
during these two years, the Occupation forces decided that “stability” was more 
important than competition and the old monolithic conglomerates were revived at the 
expense of workers and unions.
474
 Thus, after having supported workers and unions, 
SCAP began a “reverse course” and a very large portion of left-leaning individuals was 
purged from the Japanese film industry in 1948 and 1949.
475
 Tensions between SCAP 
and the Japanese film industry reached its height at Tōhō studios when SCAP sent in 
troops and tanks from the First Cavalry Division of the occupation’s Eighth Army to put 
down a strike.
476
 Eventually, some 20,000 individuals in the film industry would lose 
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their jobs in 1950 due to the red purges.
477
  
Having thus established the historical, social, and political background of the 
film and television industry of Japan and its relationship with notions of national 
identity and consciousness, let me turn to the history of the representation of Resident 
Koreans in Japanese film. 
     
2.5: Early Postwar Films Depicting Resident Koreans 
Besides the political and social methods used to obfuscate the presence of 
Resident Koreans in Japan, Japanese filmmakers were also quite hesitant to make films 
that were concerned with Korean or Resident Korean issues for practical reasons. One 
of the primary reasons why filmmakers were hesitant to make these films was because 
the figures of Koreans and Resident Koreans were quite “taboo” in Japan.478 As the 
noted film scholar Satō Tadao 佐藤忠男 states, it was a risk to create films concerning 
Korean or Resident Korean issues, because if the Korean or Resident Korean characters 
in the film were not handled very carefully, the very real matter of discrimination could 
be raised by the offended party which could lead to trouble not only for the director but 
also for the company that produced the film. Thus, in order to avoid any such 
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repercussions, the issues involving Koreans and Resident Koreans were simply 
avoided.
479
 Also, besides being concerned with tackling controversial issues, film 
production companies were worried with how well films depicting Korean and Resident 
Korean issues would perform at theaters. As Yomota points out, film production 
companies during the early and mid 1950s viewed films not as works of artistic merit, 
but as items of mass consumption for entertainment purposes.
480
 Therefore, because 
production companies did not believe that films concerning Korean and Resident 
Korean issues would draw large audiences and thereby be profitable, they were further 
avoided.
481
 
However, by the mid-1950s, as Satō, Yomota, and Takayanagi Toshio 高柳俊
男 point out, films concerning Resident Korean and Korean issues began to surface 
with the earliest films being Kobayashi Masaki’s 小林正樹 (1916-1996) Kabe atsuki 
heya (壁あつき部屋 The Room with Thick Walls, 1956) and Uchida Tomu’s 内田吐夢 
(1898-1970) Dotanba (どたんば The Eleventh Hour, 1957).482 For the most part, the 
directors who took it upon themselves to create films concerning Korean and Resident 
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Korean issues were humanist leftists who looked at Resident Koreans with feelings 
mixed with compassion, empathy and encouragement.
483
 By creating films that were 
contemporaneous with the lived life of the Resident Koreans, these directors supposedly 
hoped to build a solid foundation of trust with Resident Koreans that went beyond 
issues of race.
484
 
However, although films concerning Korean and Resident Korean issues were 
now being produced, directors still had to contend with Resident Koreans being a taboo 
subject and being concerned with making a profit. Thus, in order to deal with both of 
these issues, directors would in some ways “de-Koreanize” their films in order to make 
them more palatable for a Japanese audience.  
One of the most famous films that from the 1950s that deals with Resident 
Korean issues is Imamura Shōhei’s 今村昌平 (1926-2006) filmic adaptation of 
Yasumoto Sueko’s 安本末子 (1943- ) Nianchan: Jussai shōjo no nikki (にあんちゃ
ん：十歳の少女の日記 My Second Brother: Diary of a Ten Year Old Girl) which was 
released under the same name in 1959. Satō Tadao describes the film as being about a 
destitute Resident Korean family, which consists of two brothers and two sisters, 
bravely trying to survive in a poor Resident Korean coalmining town located in 
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Kita-kyūshū after the dual tragedies of their father passing away and the older brother 
losing his job.
485
 As Satō writes, an awareness of the family’s background is essential 
to truly understand the film because it explains several nuances of the work such as the 
reason why it was so easy for the older brother to be fired from the mine when the 
industry became depressed and why the family’s neighbors were so willing to offer 
aid.
486
  
However, while the film does give hints that the people depicted are Korean, i.e. 
an old woman who is kind to the family wears traditional Korean clothing ch’ima 
chogori and the older brother’s friend speaks with an accent, Satō notes the fact that the 
characters are Korean is never fully disclosed to the audience. Therefore, Japanese 
viewers who have some knowledge of Koreans or Resident Koreans should be able to 
recognize that the characters are Korean, but those who have no such knowledge might 
remain unaware of it.
487
 Interestingly, this information is not just missing in the film, 
but in the original diary written by Yasumoto as well. Indeed, Yasumoto herself has 
stated that one of the main reasons why her diary became a bestseller in the 1950s was 
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because of its “lack of ethnic consciousness.”488  
Despite its de-Koreanized nature, Satō believes that some aspects of the diary 
were still too Korean for Japanese audiences. One major issue in which the film differs 
from the diary is the nature of the older brother. In the film, the older brother is a 
“strong, cheerful, and active young man” who never loses courage and hope despite his 
family’s poverty.489 Remaining cheerful despite living in abject poverty is a common 
theme found in films concerning Resident Koreans produced during the 1950s and 
1960s, and the older brother in My Second Brother might be considered the progenitor 
of this theme. Yet, the filmic older brother is markedly different from the older brother 
in the diary, described as a “considerate and intelligent person” whose primary goal is to 
see that his younger siblings become well educated.
490
 Satō believes that the older 
brother’s deep concern to see that his younger siblings are well educated is a strong sign 
of his Confucian nature that also marks his Koreanness. As Satō writes, “Korea is a 
country of Confucianism” where “elders hold a strong responsibility for the instruction 
of younger people;” thus the brother’s seriousness in regards to his younger siblings’ 
education truly makes him Korean.
491
 
                                                   
488
 Ibid. 
489
 Satō, “Nihon eiga ni kakareta Kankoku/Chōsenjin,” p.183; Yang In-sil, “Sengo nihon eiga ni okeru 
“Zainichi”zō wo meguru gensetsu kūkan.” Zainichi Chōsenjin-shi Kenkyū 33 (October, 2003), p.80 
490
 Satō, “Nihon eiga ni kakareta Kankoku/Chōsenjin,” p.183 
491 Satō, “Nihon eiga ni kakareta Kankoku/Chōsenjin,” p.184; Yang, “Sengo Nihon eiga ni okeru 
128 
 
At the time the film was released, Japanese believed that Resident Koreans 
lived similarly to the poorest of the poor in Japanese society. Thus, because Japanese 
audiences could not equate Confucian morals with the poorest of the poor Japanese, 
they also believed that Koreans were void of these traits. If a film attempted to display 
Korean characters steeped in Confucian values, the characters would be “too 
wonderfully praiseworthy for Japanese sensibilities.”492 Satō also writes that the image 
of a character honed by Confucian values might have also appeared to be distasteful to 
Imamura because the director preferred to depict the “image of a human living as wildly 
as he desires.”493 However, although the filmic depiction of Resident Koreans might 
have been more palatable to Japanese audiences, Satō belives that Imamura did a 
disservice to Resident Koreans because he failed to depict them faithfully. Thus, 
Imamura’s sympathy displayed in this film is flawed because it reflects his sympathy for 
poor people as a whole, not his sympathy for Resident Koreans.
494
  
Although quite observant in his analysis of Yasumoto’s diary, there are some 
other aspects of Resident Korean life in the work that Satō does not mention. According 
to Sung Mija 成美子, herself a second generation Resident Korean, the diary resonated 
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with her own life in three primary ways: poverty, abusive language hurled toward 
Koreans by racist Japanese, and how “Korea” remains in the lives of the family despite 
their having been Japanized. For example, Korean-styled religious services, fortune 
telling, and celebration of the Lunar New Year are all portrayed.
495
 Besides these 
cultural observations, Sung also observes that the diary is very “Korean” despite being 
written in Japanese because of the prevalence of honorifics used by the ten-year-old 
Yasumoto in her writing even when speaking of her father and elder brothers.
496
 Thus, 
Imamura also eliminated these aspects of Korean culture in his adaptation of the work. 
It is also worthy of note that Japanese directors hid the Korean backgrounds of 
characters in yakuza (Japanese gangster) films consistently throughout the 1950s, the 
1960s, and even the 1970s. As the scholar of Resident Korean studies Takayanagi 
Toshio writes, yakuza films such as Katō Tai’s 加藤泰 (1916-1985) Otoko no kao o 
rikekisho (男の顔を履歴書 By a Man’s Face You Shall Know Him, 1966) and Izutsu 
Kazuyuki’s 井筒和幸 (1952- ) Gaki teikoku (ガキ帝国 Empire of Brats/Kids, 1981) 
are valuable films in the study of Resident Koreans in Japanese cinema because they 
presented “tougher and more realistic images of Koreans” than earlier films such as My 
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Second Brother.
497
 However, Takayanagi shows that yakuza films were also used as 
conservative tool to show the Japanese population’s mistrust of Resident Koreans and 
other third nation peoples (三国人 sangokujin), such as Resident Taiwanese and 
Chinese. In these incredibly one-sided films, Resident Koreans and others were shown 
to take advantage of the chaos and lawlessness of postwar Japan, but were wiped out by 
the yakuza. Thus, while left leaning directors such as Imamura and Urayama Kirio 浦
山桐郎 (1930-1985) attempted to show a more humanistic side to Resident Koreans, 
more mainstream conservative film presented Japan’s largest minority group as a 
possible threat to the well being of Japanese citizens.
498
  
 
2.6: Yakuza and Resident Koreans 
With this background in mind, I will now turn my attention to a seminal yakuza 
film that, according to Yomota, was particularly well received by Resident Korean film 
viewers: Yamashita Kōsaku’s 山下耕作 (1930-1998) Nihon bōryoku rettō: Keihanshin 
koroshi no gundan (日本暴力列島：京阪神殺し軍団 Gangland Japan, 1975).499 
Although it is a fictional film, the gangsters in Gangland Japan are modeled after the 
Yanagawa-gumi 柳川組, a real yakuza gang based in Osaka and originally led by the 
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Resident Korean “Don” Yanagawa Jirō 柳川次郎 (Korean name Yang Uyon Sok 梁元
鍚) (1923-1991) who acted as the model for the film’s protagonist played by the popular 
actor Kobayashi Akira 小林旭 (1938- ).500 Set in the year 1952 and located in 
Tsuruhashi 鶴橋, the locale of a major Resident Korean community in Osaka, the film 
opens with a petty turf war between two gangs which results in Kobayashi’s character 
inflicting a serious wound on a rival gang member. 
In the context of Resident Korean film studies, the thing that is most valuable 
about this film is how the Koreanness of the characters is concealed yet fully displayed 
at the same time. As I mentioned above, both Satō and Yomota write that films directly 
concerning Resident Korean affairs or films with Resident Korean characters were rare 
because Resident Korean issues were taboo and because this subject matter, within films 
that were intended just for entertainment, would probably attract a very small 
audience.
501
 Also, Yomota writes that Japanese film audiences, similar to the early 
postwar film critics that I mentioned above, simply did not want to see Resident Korean 
characters in film because their presence would disrupt the belief that Japan was a 
homogeneous country. Therefore, similar to the way the Japanese government desired 
both to ignore and reduce the presence of Resident Koreans in Japan, the Japanese 
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populace supposedly wanted to ignore this presence as well.
502
 Thus no words which 
refer to “Kankoku” (韓国 South Korea) or “Chōsen” (朝鮮 North Korea) appear in 
films such as Gangland Japan.
503
 
Thus, the questions remains: how does a major film studio like Tōei, the major 
producer of yakuza films, create movies that center around characters who belong to a 
despised minority? According to Yomota, Tōei adopted a “dual structure” in handling 
Resident Korean characters which means that while overt references to the Korean 
backgrounds of the characters are never given, there are “symbols” sent to certain 
audience members, i.e. those who are familiar with Korean and Resident Korean society, 
who would be able to recognize the Korean backgrounds of the characters while those 
who were unfamiliar might simply detect a general foreignness hovering about them.
504
 
While Imamura at Nikkatsu “de-Koreanized” Yasumoto’s diary in order to 
make it more palatable to Japanese audiences, in Gangland Japan, the references to 
Korean culture are much stronger and, if Yomota’s presumption is correct, discovering 
these bits of Koreanness can help the viewer to better understand the deeper meanings 
of the film.
505
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Although there are of course Japanese living in the location as well, Tsuruhashi 
is widely known to be the home of an enormous Resident Korean community.
506
 As the 
sociologist Fukuoka Yasunori writes, Osaka contained the largest Korean population in 
prewar and wartime Japan and, at the end of the war, the largest portion of the Resident 
Korean community remained there and were soon joined by thousands of other Koreans 
who sought refuge from their ravaged homeland.
507
 The characters from Tsuruhashi are 
yakuza, which makes their Koreanness more and more evident due to the fact that, 
because they were kept both from finding gainful employment and economic help from 
the Japanese government, Resident Koreans often were reduced to having to pursue 
unlawful activities in order to survive.
508
 
The clues mentioned above are some of the more obvious nods to the Resident 
Korean origins of the characters, however, there are several subtler hints of their 
Koreanness as well. As mentioned above, the film opens with a skirmish between two 
rival gangs, in which Kobayashi Akira’s character Hanaki Isao seriously wounds a rival 
gang member, Kanemitsu Kōji. When the wounded man needs a blood transfusion and 
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it is discovered that Hanaki’s is a match, the protagonist offers his, but Kanemitsu states, 
“Pig’s blood is much better than yours!”509 According to Yomota, this scene is 
significant because Kanemitsu’s use of the term “pig’s blood” hints at his Korean origin. 
As Yomota writes, “choppari” チョッパリ, pig’s foot, was an insult used by Koreans 
against Japanese, so Kanemitsu does not want his Korean blood sullied by that of a 
Japanese.
510
 Yet, Hanaki reveals his own Korean origins when he states, “Don’t worry. 
You and I have same blood.”511 
There are other instances in this film that act as symbols of some of the 
characters’ Korean origins such as when Hanaki discovers and drinks from “a beer 
bottle containing white liquid” which, according to Yomota, is most likely makgeolli, a 
Korean rice wine and when a gang member complains that his rivals “eat different food” 
which the film historian Monma Takashi 門間高志 takes to mean the abundance of 
garlic and hot pepper in Korean cuisine which Japanese avoided almost completely a 
few decades ago.
512
 
While paying so much attention to the “hidden” Korean aspects within 
Gangland Japan might appear excessive, they are significant to display how Resident 
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Koreans appeared in some Japanese films that utilized a “dual structure.” Thus, for 
Japanese who knew little about the presence of Resident Koreans in Japan, Gangland 
Japan would be nothing more than yet another yakuza film.
513
 However, for Resident 
Korean viewers who were able to pick upon the hidden symbols and recognize the 
Koreanness of the characters depicted in the film, the film is irreplaceable and made all 
the more special because of its hidden meanings.
514
 
 
2.7: Creating Stereotypes: Moral Koreans and Moral Japanese 
When filmmakers of the majority deal with issues pertaining to minority 
populations, the issue of stereotypes cannot be avoided. Therefore, as with the skewed 
images of African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, etc. in American 
film, the images of minorities in Japanese films are quite distorted by native 
filmmakers. 
As I have stated above, in order to create films that contain Korean or Resident 
Korean characters, Japanese filmmakers have to concern themselves with the taboo of 
simply presenting Resident Korean characters, how well the films will profit, and how a 
“homogeneous” Japanese audience would react to the presence of Resident Korean 
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characters. Japanese filmmakers also had to be concerned with how the characters 
reacted to certain issues such as discrimination. If they attempted to show films that 
depicted “happy” Resident Korean characters, such as those in My Second Brother, in 
conjunction with discrimination, the film would seem to be taking the very serious issue 
of discrimination too lightly and the film would seem “unnatural.”515 Caught in this 
ordeal, one might think that Japanese directors would take advantage of this situation 
and try to create serious Resident Korean films that deal with the real lives of Resident 
Koreans. However, as Yomota writes, film directors locked the images of Resident 
Koreans in rigid stereotypes where they were presented as always being “upright and 
clean, morally noble, and broad-minded,” albeit being weak in power.516 This type of 
false image making is a problem. 
At a conference organized by Yomota, the third generation Resident Korean 
actress Kim Ku-mi-ja 金久美子 (1958-2004) referenced a scene in Ōshima Nagisa’s 
Nihon shunka-kō (日本春歌考 Sing a Song of Sex, 1967) and critiqued how the images 
of Resident Koreans were handled by Japanese directors. In this scene, a high school 
girl of possible Resident Korean origins sings a song that was once sung by Korean 
comfort women (慰安婦 ianfu). After the completion of the song, the girl is applauded 
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and made to wear a sparkling dress that did not fit her. Kim believes that this scene 
reflects how humanist leftist film directors avoided dealing with the real issues faced by 
Resident Koreans in Japan by creating their own ideal Resident Korean characters who 
were paragons of morality. With this issue in mind, let’s delve deeper into these 
constructed images of Resident Koreans.
517
 
Yomota likens the Japanese directors’ willingness to create these idealized 
images of Resident Korean characters to the Freudian concept of “screen memories” in 
which the consciousness screens important memories and buries them deeply in the 
unconscious while unimportant memories come to surface and are focused on in minute 
detail.
518
 Therefore, because Japanese directors have to be concerned about taboo issues 
concerning Resident Koreans, about the profitability of their films, about the supposed 
homogeneous nature of their audience, and about how to portray Resident Koreans, 
important issues such as discrimination and traumatic events from the prewar and 
wartime periods are deeply buried and lesser issues and attributes surface. Thus, it is 
due to industry restraints that directors “forget” important issues and focus on not so 
important issues. With this system of “screened memories” in mind, the viewer of today 
is more able to understand the “strange tendencies” of how Koreans were represented in 
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late 1950s and early 1960s Japanese film.
519
  
The “strange tendency” to show that Resident Koreans possessed a “moralistic 
spiritual supremacy” appeared in the first postwar films that depicted Resident Korean 
characters such as Uchida Tomu’s Dotanba and Kobayashi Masaki’s The Room with 
Thick Walls. Dotanba is set within a mining town where, one day, a cave-in occurs. 
Miners outside the mine attempt to derive a plan to rescue the trapped men, but they are 
unsuccessful. Among their ranks is a group of Resident Koreans who also wanted to 
help the trapped men, but one of the Japanese miners takes issue with their presence and 
states, “They came here because they can drink for free.”520 This comment angers the 
group and they abandon the idea of helping the trapped miners and leave. Eventually, 
the rescue operation requires more manpower and the Resident Koreans are asked to 
come back. They refuse to do so at first, but their leader states “I am really angry at the 
Japanese who says that we help them because we can get free drink. But if we are 
locked up in the mine, we will wait hoping other miners come and help us.” The group 
of Resident Koreans then goes to the mine to help with the rescue and the trapped 
miners are saved.
521
 Thus, the Resident Koreans were able to get over the harsh 
remarks uttered by the Japanese, were able to put themselves in the shoes of their 
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former (current?) enemies, and saved those who might have killed them mercilessly just 
a few years before. Therefore, although if they were living in a situation even worse 
than poor Japanese miners in a small mining town, the group allowed their “spiritual 
supremacy” rise to the surface and they were able to beat Japanese discrimination by 
helping the very Japanese who had discriminated against them. 
Besides being able to maintain their moral uprightness in the face of 
discrimination, filmic Resident Koreans were also able bastions of calmness at moments 
when their Japanese counterparts were totally ensnared by militaristic ideologies. Thus, 
the Koreans in Kobayashi’s The Room with Thick Walls, who have been imprisoned in 
Sugamo prison as class B and class C war criminals, can criticize Japanese militarism 
and can make sense historically of how they came to be imprisoned in Japan.
522
 In this 
context, the words of Koreans or Resident Koreans were considered to be wise and 
correct despite their oftentimes powerless, albeit morally superior, position. This can be 
seen in Suzuki Seijun’s 鈴木清順 (1923- ) film Shunpuden (春婦伝 Story of a 
Prostitute) in which the white-clad Korean prostitute criticizes the foolish death of a 
Japanese comfort woman because one has to “live on at all costs.”523 Thus, many 
postwar directors, including such major names as Imamura, Kobayashi, Suzuki, and 
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Urayama, presented Koreans and Resident as morally strong, albeit weak in power, 
individuals who are in many ways superior to the Japanese. However, the question that 
must be asked is why Koreans and Resident Koreans are presented this way? In what 
way are these morally superior Korean and Resident Korean characters important for 
Japanese audiences? 
Although it is true that these early postwar films that depict Resident Koreans 
can in some ways be seen as creative works that try to move beyond nationality and 
show compassion, empathy, and encouragement for the downtrodden minority group, 
the main focus of these of these films is actually the Japanese characters who appear 
alongside the Resident Koreans. Indeed, as Yomota points out, the presence of ideal 
morally sound Resident Koreans in these films is to support the presence of likewise 
ideal moralistic Japanese. These idealized images of Resident Koreans and their 
Japanese counterparts go beyond these films to show how Korea and Japan’s 
relationship’s was based on moralistic terms as well.524 The presence of these 
moralistic Japanese is problematic because, as I will show later in this section of the 
thesis, they are used to cover up issues that truly need to be addressed. 
As Yomota writes, films concerning Resident Koreans normally present the 
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viewer with two types of Japanese characters: those who are prejudiced and view 
Koreans as inferior and those who are “conscientious and humanistic” and “protect 
Koreans as their brothers.”525 Probably the best known film for Japanese audiences that 
presents the viewer with prejudiced Japanese along with their morally superior 
counterparts is Urayama Kirio’s Kyūpora no aru machi (キューポラのある街 
Foundry Town, 1962) which was based on a novel by Hayafune Chiyo 早船ちよ 
(1914-2005) and scripted by Urayama and Imamura Shōhei.526 
Set in the city of Kawaguchi in Saitama prefecture, Foundry Town’s plot is 
centered on the struggles of laborers in the postwar period, whose jobs are put in danger 
by the rapid mechanization that is sweeping through the country. Despite these 
circumstances, which have both soured the being of her proud laborer father and forced 
her to quit high school so that she could seek employment, Jun and her brother Takayuki 
remain cheerful despite such desperate times.
527
 Also, Jun and Takayuki do not allow 
nationality to get in the way of their friendships. Jun is friends with Kaneyama Yoshie, a 
young Resident Korean woman who works at a pachinko parlor, and Takayuki is a 
                                                   
525
 Ibid, p.71. 
526
 Indeed, Takayanagi Toshio states that this film would also be the first film that Japanese over a certain 
age would remember when they think of films that have Resident Korean characters. Takayanagi also lists 
this film as one of the masterworks of Japanese cinema. Takayanagi, “Nihon eiga no naka Zainichi 
Korian zō,” p.234. 
527
 Satō, “Nihon eiga ni kakareta Kankoku/Chōsenjin,” p.186; Takayanagi, “Nihon eiga no naka Zainichi 
Korian zō,” p.234. 
142 
 
friend and classmate of Sankichi who is Yoshie’s younger brother.  
Jun, a young girl on the brink of womanhood, is often at odds with her 
old-fashioned father. When Jun’s mother and father learn that the girl is friends with the 
Resident Korean Yoshie, they both grow concerned and angry. Jun’s mother tells Jun 
that Yoshie is “dangerous” while her father, who is drunk, yells, “You idiot! Do you 
hang out with that Korean?” However, instead of allowing her parents to destroy her 
relationship with Yoshie, Jun retorts, “Yes, I’m her friend. What’s wrong with that?”528 
Takayuki’s moralistic outrage is more complex. Knowing that his friend 
Sankichi will soon “repatriate” to North Korea, Takayuki, who is directing a skit for his 
school’s performance day, allows the Korean boy to play a lead role after he asks to do 
so.
529
 Wanting to act in the skit—Jules Renard’s Poil de carotte—because the girl he 
likes, Kaori, is doing so as well, everything is going well for Sankichi until he utters the 
line, “I am Carrot. Because my hair is red, the madam named me so.”530 In response to 
this, a young heckler shouts, “San-chan, a Korean carrot!”531 This heckling devastates 
Sankichi so much that he forgets his next line and begins to cry. Takayuki himself had 
made discriminatory remarks to Sankichi in the past by stating such things as “guys like 
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you should quickly go back to Korea,” but these taunts were seen as nothing more than 
general rudeness among two young male friends. However, seeing his friend devastated, 
Takayuki runs after the heckler and makes him cry.
532
 Thus, Takayuki affirms his own 
powerful moral code by defeating the bad Japanese boy. Thus, in these conflicts, in 
which the downtrodden Resident Koreans do not fight for themselves, one can easily 
see the presence of both good and bad Japanese and how the good Japanese can 
supposedly eliminate discrimination through their morality. I will return to this issue 
later in this section of the chapter. 
Another film that features moralistic Japanese who are able to eliminate 
discrimination rapidly is Morizono Tadashi’s 森園忠 educational film Omoni to shōnen 
(オモニと少年 Omoni and the Boy, 1958). Created with the theatrical trope Gekidan 
mingei 劇団民藝, Omoni and the Boy centers on the figure of a Resident Korean 
woman who adopts a young Japanese boy after he loses his parents at the Jōban 
coalfield in the city of Iwaki.
533
 After the boy’s teachers and neighbors are unable to 
locate additional members of the boy’s family, the Resident Korean adopts the boy. The 
woman is told not to adopt the boy by her Resident Korean neighbors because of his 
Japanese origins and because there are many orphaned Resident Korean children, but 
                                                   
532
 Satō, “Nihon eiga ni kakareta Kankoku/Chōsenjin,” p.186. 
533
 Yomota Inuhiko, “Kyōka kara shisen: Zainichi eiga shosō.” Sekai. 747 (January, 2006): 255. 
144 
 
the woman wants to do so because the boy reminds her of her own deceased son.
534
 
The woman and boy live happily despite their poverty; however, the boy is soon teased 
at school by the other Japanese children who say such nasty things as “You smell of 
garlic” and “You will become Korean although you are Japanese.”535 Instead of asking 
the boy to endure the discriminatory words, the Resident Korean woman visits the 
parents of the bullies and, because of her purity and sincerity, the Japanese parents 
quickly discover their own morality and change their views toward Resident Koreans 
and make their children change theirs as well. Thus, the Resident Korean woman’s 
morality was able to draw out the moral goodness of her Japanese neighbors who 
quickly were able to snuff out their children’s burgeoning racism. Eventually the boy’s 
uncle is located and the man intends to take the boy back to Tokyo with him, but the boy 
decides to remain with the Korean woman. Therefore, as with most of the films that 
concerned Resident Koreans at this time, the superior morality of the Resident Korean 
mother was able to gain strength through likeminded Japanese and together they were 
able to defeat discrimination. This means that, although Resident Koreans might always 
be considered morally superior to a certain portion of the Japanese population, they 
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must have the aid of the Japanese to truly change attitudes toward discrimination.
536
 
As Monma Takashi states, midway through the first decade of the postwar era, 
Japanese directors, who, at that time, were free from the restraints imposed on them by 
the American Occupation forces, began to create films as an “act of atonement” for the 
atrocities committed against Koreans and Resident Koreans. However, even if they did 
not completely eradicate it, as can be seen in Foundry Town and My Second Brother, 
Japanese directors greatly attenuated the very real issue of discrimination that Resident 
Koreans faced by showing that it was a relatively easy force to defeat through the 
combined forces of moralistic Resident Koreans and Japanese.
537
 Yomota, likening 
these films to Stephen Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993), states that these leftist 
humanist films focus on the “humanitarian salvation” of the Japanese from their past 
misdeeds. Thus, the morally superior Resident Korean characters serve one major 
purpose: they act as the catalyst for good Japanese to show their moral superiority that 
cleanses or completely obfuscates Japan’s bitter history with Korea.  
 
2.8: Persisting Stereotypes: Resident Koreans and Poverty 
                                                   
536
 Satō, “Nihon eiga ni kakareta Kankoku/Chōsenjin,” p.185; Takayanagi, “Nihon eiga no naka Zainichi 
korian zō,” p.234. Although I was harsh on these films in my critique, they are both quite important 
because they were a couple of the first films to address Japanese discrimination toward Resident Koreans, 
albeit in a manner that aggrandizes good Japanese. 
537
 Monma, “Nihon eiga no naka no Zainichi zō,”p.215. 
146 
 
Poverty, more often than not, shapes the plots of these humanist leftist directors’ 
films. Indeed, as Yomota points out, it was the poverty that Resident Koreans had to 
struggle through that encouraged the directors to create films that were filled “with 
compassion, empathy or encouragement toward their peninsular neighbors.”538 Of 
course, the two major films that I have covered in detail in this chapter, Imamura’s My 
Second Brother and Urayama’s Foundry Town are the best-known films that not only 
deal with the issue of Resident Korean poverty during the early postwar years, but also 
show how Resident Koreans dealt with this poverty by “living purely, rightly and 
positively.”539 Let’s take a closer look at how poverty is displayed in My Second 
Brother. 
As stated above, My Second Brother is set in the city of Kitakyūshu where the 
mining industry is caught in a major economic slump due the closure of the Korean 
War.
540
 The Yasumoto family, which has suffered the loss of its patriarch, receives 
another major blow when the elder brother is fired due to the economic strain put on his 
mine. Thus, the family, which was already poor, is reduced to “rock bottom subsistence 
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level living.”541 
However, despite their poverty, the four siblings are “wonderfully cheerful, 
sunny, and easy going” as they live “bravely” through their day to day lives in which 
they endure hunger and separation from each other.
542
 Indeed, even the film’s theatrical 
poster states “Four siblings who lived cheerfully and strongly as they were trodden and 
kicked!”543 Moved by both their endurance and their ability to stay positive no matter 
what hardships life throws at them, Satō, in his initial viewing of the film, believes that 
the four siblings offered a valuable model for Japanese audiences who, despite vast 
improvements, were still recovering from the deprivation and destruction of the wartime 
period.
544
 However, this depiction of Resident Koreans as cheerful despite their poverty, 
similar to depicting their moral superiority despite discrimination, is damaging because 
it not only trivializes their suffering in Japan but also obscures the root causes of their 
poverty and why they more deeply ensnared by their poverty than their Japanese 
counterparts. 
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that one of the “hidden” clues that the 
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Yasumoto family was Korean was how easily the mine fired the elder brother.
545
 This 
obfuscation of the reason why the character was fired, although it might make the film 
more palatable for a Japanese audience, does a great disservice to Resident Koreans 
because it removes a key reason of why they remained entrenched in poverty while the 
Japanese around them were able to prosper: their own Koreanness kept them poor.
546
 
As I wrote earlier in this chapter, Satō Tadao believes the Confucian ethics that 
are supposedly present in Yasumoto Sueko’s diary were removed from the filmic 
version of the work in order to make it more appealing for Japanese audiences. Satō 
believes that Japanese filmgoers would find it very difficult to believe that Resident 
Koreans could live under a strict moral code when this morality was completely absent 
within the beings of the poorest of the poor Japanese.
547
 Although Satō wrote this 
section of the essay in order to criticize Imamura for “Japanizing” the Yasumoto family 
by removing a key element of their Koreanness, it also reveals the rise of classism in 
late 1950s and early 1960s Japan in which destitute Japanese and Resident Koreans 
were scorned heavily by Japan’s middle class. 
Another issue that Satō focuses on is the strong system of mutual support that 
is present within the Resident Korean presented in My Second Brother. Although poor 
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and the victim of Japanese discrimination, the Resident Korean mining community in 
My Second Brother is still full of pride and attempt to cheer up the parentless Yasumoto 
family through their mutual support.
548
 Satō believes that both poverty and national 
affinity played a mutual role in creating a strong community of Resident Koreans who 
were quick to reach out to each other in times of need.
549
 It is this strength found 
through poverty and national affinity that Satō believes is the primary lesson that can be 
learned watching this film.
550
 However, although mutual aid is commendable, Satō 
does not mention the true origins of this mutual aid: because Resident Koreans were 
barred from receiving social security and welfare, the only method that they could 
employ to survive was mutual aid. 
Although I was highly critical of this film, I do respect Imamura’s supposed 
goal, as theorized by Satō, of trying to create a film that presented solidarity through 
poverty. However, this theme began to disappear from films by the early 1960s due to 
the high economic growth.
551
 Thus, it became difficult to form a foundation between 
Japanese who were growing richer and their downtrodden countrymen and women and 
Resident Koreans and Taiwanese. Instead, as I mentioned above, the richer Japanese 
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began to hold a deeper disdain for the poor, both Korean and Japanese.    
Yang In-sil states that the humanist leftist directors, although they create 
positive portrayals of Resident Koreans, such as their being paragons of morality, 
cheerful despite their poverty, and possessing strong communal bonds with their 
countrymen, depict only images that are already present in their minds.
552
 As Jane Chi 
Hyun Park writes, false images, even positive ones, are damaging because they are a 
“‘fiction that becomes real’ through its acceptance and reiteration by members of both 
dominant and marginal groups.”553 Thus, because films, then and now, are a major 
method by which Japanese audiences come in contact with Resident Koreans, their 
impact is substantial. If these idealistic images of Resident Koreans appeared in only a 
handful of films, they might not pose such a problem, but, due to their prevalence, they 
can crystallize their images of Resident Koreans in the minds of Japanese viewers. 
According to Homi Bhabha, a stereotype is “a form of knowledge and identification that 
vacillates between what is always ‘in place,’ already known and something that must be 
anxiously repeated.”554 Therefore, one could say that the stereotypes of Resident 
Koreans present in these late 1950s and early 1960s films were “anxiously repeated” 
and became so well “known” that their images were “affixed and arrested” and these 
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images became the scope through which Japanese audiences saw Resident Koreans. 
Resident Koreans thereby lost their individual beings while their traits portrayed in 
popular film became the “common sense” of the Japanese.555 However, the “common 
sense” presented in these films is skewed by the Japanese directors and issues that truly 
create the beings of—primarily first and second generation—Resident Koreans, such as 
“South-North division,” “division of race,” and “the sorrow of history,” are completely 
absent from their films.
556
 Thereby, instead of focusing on issues that could have helped 
explain the positions of Resident Koreans and helped Japanese truly understand the 
complex nature of being Resident Korean in Japan, these directors, and film critics as 
well, focused on the “differences and distinctions” of Resident Koreans that made them 
distinct from the Japanese, such as “Confucianism, ethnicity, and traditional culture.”557 
Therefore, as Yomota writes, these Resident Korean characters should be looked upon 
as “intellectual works” created under the Japanese directors’ “idealized notion called 
‘Korean’ and far apart from real [Koreans] themselves.”558 Now, let’s take a look at 
some of these “intellectual works” and how they locked Resident Koreans into Japanese 
condoned stereotypes. 
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Satō pays a great deal of attention to the bearing of the elder Yasumoto brother 
whose personality is shifted from a quiet young man deeply concerned with the 
education of his younger siblings in the diary to a bright and cheerful young man who 
does not let his poverty destroy him in the film. Satō believes that this shift was done in 
order to make the character more acceptable to Japanese audiences who would have a 
hard time believing that such a dirt poor Resident Korean could possess such a high 
level of Confucian morality. This disbelief is premised on the assumption that very poor 
Japanese could not possess such morality.
559
 Besides revealing Japanese classism, 
Satō’s critique of the brother’s shift from serious, Confucianist Resident Korean to 
carefree Resident Korean also reveals the film historian’s desire to find something 
purely “Korean” within the Resident Korean featured in the diary and the film.560 This 
desire to locate something “purely Korean” acts as a method to not only better 
understand the “daily customs” of Resident Koreans displayed in the films but as a 
method to show how Resident Koreans differ from the Japanese.
561
 Indeed, as Yang 
points out, Nakata Tōichi’s 中田統一 Ōsaka sutōrī (大阪ストーリー Osaka Story, 
1995) also received a similar treatment due to the ways Confucian patriarchy, a major 
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issue in the Resident Korean community, was handled in the film.
562
 The primary issue 
here is not the fact that these issues are critiqued, but that they are handled in such a 
way that only marks Resident Koreans as the other instead of showing how some issues 
are imbedded in Japanese, Korean, and Resident Korean societies. 
Another issue that Satō’s focus on Confucianism in My Second Brother reveals 
is that Japanese critics might be searching for signs of “Korea” when they do not really 
exist. As I wrote earlier, Yasumoto Sueko believed that the success of her diary could be 
linked to its “lack of ethnic consciousness.”563 However, this lack did not keep critics 
from searching for something “Korean” about the work. Indeed, it gave critics “much 
room for interpretation,” so Satō, Sung, and the like attempted to fill the void of this 
“lack of ethnic consciousness” with Confucianism, i.e. the substance that made the 
Japanized characters truly Resident Korean.
564
 
 
2.9: The Repatriation Movement to North Korea in Japanese Film 
If Confucianism was a rather tenuous connection to make between Resident 
Koreans and the Korean peninsula, Japanese critics and directors found a stronger issue 
that tied Resident Koreans to their ethnic “homeland” with the repatriation movement 
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which would see some 90,000 Resident Koreans—many with Japanese spouses in 
tow—leave Japan to go to North Korea from 1959 until 1984.565 Indeed, as Takayanagi 
writes, after the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross organizations established the 
repatriation route between the two countries elements of “anticipating return” and the 
“recognition of North Korea” were added to a number of leftist humanist directors’ 
films with Urayama Kirio’s Foundry Town being probably the most renowned.566 In 
fact, the film is centered on Jun and Takayuki’s friends Yoshie and Sankichi’s pending 
“repatriation” to North Korea.567 At the end of the film, Jun and Takayuki see Yoshie 
and Sankichi off at Kawaguchi station which is adorned with North Korean flags while 
a chorus of “The Song of General Kim Il-sung” can be heard in the background. The 
scene is sad, but it is also full of hope as Takayuki gives Sankichi a bag of marbles and 
Yoshie gives Jun her old bicycle as keepsakes.
568
 
Another film with a similar theme is the actress Mochizuki Yūko’s 望月優子 
(1917-1977) Umi o wataru yūjō (海を渡る友情 Friendship Across the Sea, 1960). In 
this film, the decision to repatriate to North Korea acts as a type of panacea for the 
rocky marriage between a Resident Korean man and a Japanese woman. It is as if 
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entrusting their future to North Korea and Kim Il-sung smoothes over the tension they 
experienced in Japan.
569
 
As can be seen in these very brief descriptions of these two films, the Japanese 
directors handled the repatriation movement rather lightly and the scenes were full of 
good cheer. Takayanagi believes that these depictions of the repatriation movement are 
highly problematic, despite the “progressive” and “conscientious” intentions of the 
directors, because they lack a “historical viewpoint” that would connect the presence of 
Resident Koreans in Japan to prewar institutions.
570
 I would also add that these films 
noticeably lack historical understanding in why Resident Koreans felt the need to 
“return” to North Korea when the majority of the population was from the southern half 
of the peninsula and how many Resident Koreans were “forced” out by the Japanese 
state due to how they were treated as an unwanted population in Japan. 
As I stated above, Urayama’s Foundry Town was considered to be a 
masterpiece not only in the limited realm of films that deal with Resident Korean issues 
but also in the realm of postwar Japanese film as a whole.
571
 However, it is also one of 
the films most disliked by older generation Resident Koreans. A Resident Korean 
acquaintance of the film historian Yomota Inuhiko, who had actually repatriated to 
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North Korea before making his way back to Japan, states that Foundry Town was the 
most distasteful film concerning Resident Koreans ever made, and the scene of Yoshie 
and Sankichi the most difficult to bear because of its fawning nature towards North 
Korea.
572
 For South Korean viewers of the film, the film is ludicrous because of its 
adoration of North Korea. Thus, instead of filling them with respect for the Japanese 
directors who tried to cement Japanese/Resident Korean friendships through their films, 
they could only see the North Korea affiliated organization Sōren, which was “evil” and 
“scary” to South Koreans, and how it ruined the lives of its own people by repatriating 
them to the hated North.
573
 Satō Tadao was also greatly moved by the film for many 
years because it displayed how a young Japanese boy reached out to a Korean boy, but 
his rosy glasses were shattered when he chatted with South Korean producer about the 
film. The producer was infuriated by the fact that the Japanese seemed to be impressed 
with the repatriation movement and that they thought it was good for the Resident 
Koreans to return to North Korea. This attitude showed that the Japanese were blind to 
history and that they were unaware that the Resident Koreans were going to North 
Korea because they, the Japanese, made their lives absolutely miserable in Japan.
574
 
This glorification of an ahistorical repatriation movement underscores how 
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Japanese directors of this period seemed to be more concerned with their own 
ideologies than the well being of Resident Koreans. For example, Mochizuki Yūko’s 
Friendship Across the Sea and Urayama Kirio’s Foundry Town both seem to praise 
North Korea as a place where Resident Koreans can escape poverty and even domestic 
disputes, but their not so subtle underlying purposes seem to be to elevate the status of 
North Korea in the eyes of Japanese viewers. A more ham-handed approach can be seen 
in Yamada Tengo’s 山田典吾 (1916-1998) Nihonkai no uta (日本海の歌 Song of the 
Sea of Japan) which uses the formation and the implementation of the repatriation 
movement to North Korea as a base to show the struggle between the North Korean and 
Japanese masses against the Japanese and American ruling classes.
575
 Yamada also 
“glorifies” the construction of North Korean socialism as well as Kim Il-sung’s 
anti-Japanese partisan battles within this film.
576
 Historical works were also not spared 
in their support of the directors’ political ideologies which can be seen in the veteran 
director Toyoda Shirō’s 豊田四郎 (1906-1977) 1969 filmic adaptation of Akutagawa 
Ryūnosuke’s 芥川龍之介 (1892-1927) story Jigokuhen (地獄変 “Hell Screen,” 1918). 
The filmic version of this work features a group of Korean artisans led by Yoshihide, 
who had fled to Japan when the Korean kingdom of Koryö 高麗 (918-1392) was in 
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dire straits. However, much to the group’s consternation, the Japanese emperor does not 
allow them to return home when things settle down back home.
577
 This aspect was not 
present in the original work by Akutagawa and, although the film is set in Korea’s 
Koryö period, which was synonymous with Japan’s Heian period (794-1185), North 
Korea, the locale for the Koryö kingdom, is still viewed as an “earthly paradise.”578 
Because of this leftist Japanese view of North Korea as an “earthly paradise,” this film, 
according to Yomota, seems to be very “selfish” and “lacking recognition” of the true 
situation in North Korea and the lives of those who repatriated there.
579
 
Although these films might be considered off-putting because of their directors’ 
fawning look at North Korea, their ideologies were not the directors’ alone. In fact, 
many of their beliefs reflect those of the General Association of Korean Residents in 
Japan (在日本朝鮮人総連合会 Zai nihon chōsenjin sōren gōkai), abbreviated in 
Japanese as Sōren and Korean as Chongryon.580 Sōren, which formed in 1955 and 
distanced itself from Japanese affairs, originally created newsreels that were produced 
by Sōren jihō (総連時報 Sōren News) and concerned with patriotic observances, the 
national convention of Sōren, and celebratory events of the founding of the nation in 
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Pyongyang. Yomota states that, outside of the “glorification of the republic and the 
“personality cult of the leader,” these films are quite hollow.581 Although rather empty 
at first, Sōren News eventually became more active. Of course, one issue that it took 
particular interest in was the first repatriation movement. Newsreels of this movement 
show the jubilant faces of Resident Koreans as they board a train at Shinagawa Station 
which will take them to Niigata where they will depart on a Soviet ship to Chongjin. 
Much of the “action” in this newsreel revolves around South Korea supporting Resident 
Koreans who sit on the rails in protest of the repatriation movement. As the narrator 
states, “Syngman Rhee and his henchmen tried to cause a disruption, but it failed.”582 
Indeed, their protest did fail and thousands of smiling Resident Koreans were shipped 
off to a land that wasn’t even their true home.     
However, although Sōren News was in many ways found to be lacking, more 
substance was given to Resident Koreans by Japanese News (日本のニュース Nihon 
no Nyūsu) which was produced by Nippon Eiga Shinsha Co. Ltd. (日本映画新社 
Nihon eiga shinsha). This group created newsreels that depicted such things as 
displaced Resident Koreans who were forced to live in tents before their reparation to 
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North Korea.
583
 More importantly, the newsreels also showed what happened after the 
Resident Koreans arrived in North Korea. As Yomota states, the viewer is able to 
witness the applause of North Koreans when the repatriation ships arrive in Chongjin, a 
totally mechanized farm, the modern wonders of Pyongyang, and a high-rise apartment 
building that had been especially built for the repatriates. Such wonderful scenes make 
the narrator state, “Their days of hope start from this place for a peaceful life.”584 
The positivism found in these newsreels encouraged many other Resident 
Koreans to follow suit and return to North Korea. However, because of the information 
that we now know of North Korea, these films in hindsight show the great damage 
caused to Resident Koreans by Sōren and other organizations and peoples who blindly 
supported the repatriation movement to North Korea.
585
    
This view of North Korea as an “earthly paradise” remained a strong theme in 
films involving Resident Koreans through the late 1950s until the mid 1960s. However, 
in a similar way that films that focused on poverty as solidarity between the Japanese 
and Koreans died out, films that took up this issue, as well as the repatriation movement 
in general, faded away with Japan’s rapid economic growth period. Therefore, North 
Korea was no longer needed as an “earthly paradise” when Japan was becoming more 
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and more comfortable for the Japanese.
586
 
 
2.10: Alternative Views 
Although most films created during the late 1950s and early 1960s that 
centered on or contained Resident Korean characters displayed their “purity, beauty, and 
honesty” or fawned over the “earthly paradise” of North Korea, there were exceptions to 
this rule. Are ga minato no tomoshibi da (あれが港の灯だ There are the Harbor 
Lights, 1961) is a major example within the realm of mainstream narrative cinema.
587
 
Penned by Mizuki Yōko 水木洋子 (1912-2002) and directed by the social-realist 
filmmaker Imai Tadashi 今井正 (1912-1991), the movie is rare because it centers not 
only on the general sense of distrust shared between Japan and the recently created 
nation of South Korea, but also a real historical issue: the Syngman Rhee Line (Ri 
Shōban Rain 李承晩ライン) which was established by the first president of South 
Korea on January 18, 1952.
588
 This line, which extended beyond territorial lines 
established by international law, caused a serious issue when South Korean fishermen 
began shooting rifles at Japanese fishing boats when they traveled across the line 
established by Rhee. South Korean patrol boats also hijacked the Japanese fishing boats 
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and the Japanese fishermen were even imprisoned for crossing over the line.
589
 
However, fishermen from Kyushu were undeterred and continued to cross over to fish 
the rich waters. The Japanese government, which supported their plight, assisted them 
by sending out the Japanese Coast Guard to protect the Japanese fishing vessels. 
However, unlike the South Korean patrol boats, the Japanese went unarmed and could 
only intervene between the fishing boats of the two countries.
590
 
This situation, of course, aggravated the already tense situation between South 
Korea and Japan and antipathy towards Koreans grew in Japan. However, it was 
difficult for the Japanese to openly accuse South Korea of its actions because of Japan’s 
violent past in the peninsula. This caution can even be seen in this film when the patrol 
boats firing on the Japanese vessels are referred to as “mysterious boats” instead of 
“South Korean patrol boats.” Thus, the Japanese fishermen were forced to stew in their 
own vitriol while waiting for an outlet which, for this film at least, is embodied in the 
figure of the Resident Korean Pak Shunmei 朴春明 who passes as Japanese under the 
name Kimura Hideo 木村秀雄.591 
Because he is a Resident Korean, Pak feels torn between his country by blood 
and his country by soil. His situation is exacerbated, as we shall see, by the fact that he 
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is treated as an “other” by both South Korea and Japan. Although the feeling of being 
split between Japan and Korea would become a common theme touched upon by both 
Japanese and Resident Korean directors in the coming decades, this film is considered 
to be a “heraldic” work because it was the first to touch upon such an issue.592 
Pak’s battle between his Japanese and Korean halves comes to the fore when a 
fisherman named Nishioka is killed by the gunfire from one of the South Korean Patrol 
boats after the Japanese fishermen cross the Syngman Rhee Line. Angered by the 
shooting, the wife of the manager viciously criticizes the South Korean fishermen. Pak, 
unable to keep listening to the abuse, speaks out. Angered further, the wife, Chizuko, 
states that she dislikes how the Koreans keep falling back on the thirty-five years of 
colonialism to justify drawing the Syngman Rhee Line. The Japanese have now been 
wronged by the shootings, so they will be unable to forget that injustice as well. Pak is 
unable to accept such a simple deduction because he feels that the Japanese should 
apologize for the colonial rule and that the South Korean fishermen should be forgiven 
because they are only trying to survive. The wife, incensed, asks Pak if they should 
think it moral that they kidnapped and imprisoned Japanese fishermen and kept the men 
in prison over term. She then asks Pak the ultimate question: “If you are killed like 
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Nishioka-san, will you still say that it’s moral?” Pak is unable to answer this and thus 
his conflicting Japanese and Korean selves continue to be at odds with one another.
593
 
As I stated above, although Pak’s close Japanese friends know of his Korean 
heritage, he passes under the name Kimura Hideo in order to avoid discrimination and 
from drawing undue attention to himself. However, one day the chief fisherman informs 
Pak’s shipmates of his heritage before shipping out. Although the chief fisherman adds 
“Please get along with each other!” and the crew members seem undeterred having a 
Korean amongst them, the chief fisherman’s actions are inexcusable because they took 
away his ability to pass as Japanese which is oftentimes essential for Resident Koreans 
to live peacefully in Japan. Things worsen for Pak when a South Korean patrol boat 
spots him and the other fishermen. The Japanese fishermen believe that Pak informed 
the South Koreans of their presence. In the end, Pak’s boat is the only one caught by the 
South Koreans who quickly label him “pan choppari” or half-Japanese. Because of his, 
and only his, capture, the Japanese fisherman think that Pak is a traitor and one of them 
states, “He betrayed us and now he is welcome as a hero in Korea.”594  
Unlike other films which display discrimination towards Resident Koreans 
such as Foundry Town and Omoni and the Boy, There are the Harbor Lights does not 
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allow the situation to be tidied up so a happy ending can occur. Instead, Pak is still 
firmly stuck between the Korea and Japan and he is abandoned and misunderstood by 
both. Thus, Japanese audiences might be able to better understand the difficult position 
of Koreans in Japan because this film does not allow discrimination to be neatly tucked 
away.
595
   
Another important example is the scene in which Pak and the manager’s wife 
argue whether the Japanese or the South Koreans should be the first to apologize. 
Although Pak is sympathetic to the Japanese and the murder of Nishioka causes him a 
great deal of personal turmoil, he is unable to simply write off the South Koreans as evil 
because he sees the Japanese as the original source of trouble between the two countries. 
So, with the history of Japanese colonialism in mind, Pak states, “In a fight, the one 
who punched first should apologize…”596 Thus, this is one of the first films to show the 
South Korean side of an issue. As Pak states, the South Korean fishermen are fighting 
off the Japanese in order to survive and that the Japanese should not be satisfied if they 
are able just to run off the fishermen from the peninsula because they will suffer further 
because of Japanese actions.
597
 
Although this scene is revolutionary in the world of Japanese film, it is not 
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without its problems. Significantly, although Pak does mention that the root causes of 
the problems suffered by Koreans can be found in Japanese colonialism, they are not 
extrapolated on further and it seems that their main purpose is to show that Japan also 
suffers from a number of problems, which are in fact more severe than those suffered by 
the South Koreans.
598
 Furthermore, the film is not as concerned with Resident Koreans 
as it is with the Korean peninsula, both North and South, a general tendency in film of 
this period as well as of later years.
599
 Mizuki’s and Imai’s film, although not 
particularly well received by Japanese audiences, was given approval by film critics 
who thought that the film presented a “fair position on such a difficult theme that can 
easily end up just inflaming antipathy toward Korea.”600  
Now, having a chapter concerning the history of how Resident Koreans were 
represented in early postwar film to act as a companion to the previous history of 
Resident Korean chapter, I will now take this thesis in a different direction to describe in 
detail Matsuda Masao’s and Adachi Masao’s conceptualization of the theory of 
landscape. This theory, as I will show in chapter four, is a useful tool in understanding 
the place of Resident Koreans in an increasingly homogeneous Japan and will aid my 
analysis of Ōshima Nagisa’s films concerning this minority as well. 
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Chapter 3: Landscape Theory 
3.1: The Discovery of Homogeneous Landscapes 
In order to examine the representation of Resident Korean identity in Japanese 
film, I will look at the narrative and visual strategies deployed in Oshima Nagisa’s 
Death by Hanging through the lens of a theory of film developed in the 1960s by 
avant-garde Japanese film directors and critics, namely fûkeiron (風景論) or Landscape 
Theory. The theory was first developed in connection to a documentary on the life of 
serial killer Nagayama Norio 永山則夫 (1949-1997) that drew connection between his 
crimes and his childhood and adolescence in suburban Hokkaido and urban Tokyo. 
Starting out as a hermeneutic tool to address the specific experience of Nagayama, 
Landscape Theory developed an interpretive framework to examine the effect of the 
changing modern Japanese social landscape on individual identity that has significant 
bearing on Oshima’s fictional treatment of Resident Korean identity, as we will see.601 
In order to probe into the development of Landscape Theory, I will first briefly describe 
its evolution in relation to the case of Nagayama, and then proceed to explicate its 
applicability to my main case study, Oshima’s documentary films. 
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The seventh child and the fourth son of the desperately poor family, Nagayama 
Norio’s itinerant life began at the age of two when his family moved to Abashiri City. 
Shortly after arriving, Nagayama’s oldest sister was sexually assaulted and had to be put 
in a hospital, while his eldest brother impregnated a classmate at his part time high 
school, left his family, and became a petty criminal.
602
 After three years, the family 
moved to the city of Itayanagi in Aomori prefecture, where they fell into abject poverty 
when the father abandoned them as well.
603
 After graduating from middle school, 
Nagayama went to Tokyo to find employment at a fruit parlor that also supplied him 
with room and board. On October 6, 1968 the nineteen-year-old man snuck into the 
naval base at Yokosuka and stole a “West German manufactured .22 caliber Rohm 
RG-10, nicknamed the ‘Rosco’” along with fifty rounds of live ammunition and 
proceeded to kill four individuals. The first shooting occurred at the Tokyo Prince Hotel 
on October 11
th
, the second occurred on October 14
th
 at the Yasaka Shrine in Kyoto, the 
third occurred in a suburb of Hakodate on October 26
th
, and the final shooting took 
place on November 5
th
 in Nagoya.
604
 Nagayama’s victims consisted of two taxi drivers 
and two security guards. For these murders, Nagayama was sentenced to death and his 
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execution was carried out in 1997.
605
  
Slightly before and during the time that he lived as a vagrant drifting from city 
to city and from job to job, Nagayama committed a number of petty crimes such as 
stealing items from a clothing store, a butcher shop, and even from the U.S. military 
base in Yokosuka.
606
 However, despite these crimes, there was no hint that Nagayama 
was capable of committing such violent acts as murder. The filmmaker Adachi Masao 
states that the disaffected youth of 1960s Japan normally rebelled against society by 
joining student movements, becoming yakuza, or delving into narcotics. Nagayama, 
however, never joined a student organization or union and never got involved with 
underworld crime.
607
  
This led to much media speculation on the reasons for his crime.
608
 One 
prominent individual who tried to cast light on the situation was the Avant-Garde 
playwright, filmmaker, and poet Terayama Shūji 寺山修司 (1937-1985) who, while 
referring to the nineteen-year-old man as a “metropolitan gypsy wandering the Tokyo 
desert,” stated that Nagayama was likely driven to his murderous ways because of the 
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effects of the “desolate sky of the north.”609 Tahara Sōichirō 田原総一朗 (1934- ) was 
quick to disagree with Terayama because, during his time visiting Itayanagi where 
Nagayama’s mother still lived, “the sky…was surprisingly bright and Mt. Iwaki was 
sparkling with silver under the smog-less deep blue sky.”610 Matsuda Masao states that 
Tahara here would likely be called an “irresponsible tourist” by Terayama, who was 
from Aomori and who shared a similar background with Nagayama, for such a 
statement, because the journalist had traveled to Itayanagi during the late spring instead 
of midwinter.
611
 As interesting as this argument may be, is the “dark climate of the 
north” an adequate answer to why Nagayama killed four individuals?612 For Matsuda 
Masao, Adachi Masao, and their comrades it was not, so in 1969 they began planning 
their own investigation into why Nagayama Norio became a serial killer. 
The seed of the idea that would eventually become the “landscape” film 
Ryakushō: renzoku shasatsu ma (略称・連続射殺魔, A.K.A. Serial Killer, 1969) began 
to develop when Adachi, Matsuda, and the others were in preparation for the revival of 
the journal Eiga hihyō (映画批評 Film Critique). Although this magazine was a 
milestone in and of itself because it was a theory-heavy journal released at a time when 
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most filmgoers were primarily interested in popular cinema, Adachi and his comrades 
did not feel that the magazine was enough to create a true “movement” in Japan.613 
Thus, they decided to produce an experimental film. It was at the time that Adachi and 
Matsuda were organizing the publication of Eiga hihyō that Nagayama Norio shot his 
victims, was arrested, and awaiting his trial to begin.
614
 Like the general public and 
intellectuals such as Terayama and Tahara, Adachi, Matsuda, and company were 
interested in Nagayama’s case, but did not understand why the young man committed 
such a violent crime. Thus they decided to make a film concerning the reasons why 
Nagayama killed four people.
615
  
The group travelled to Yobito, the city where Nagayama was born, and 
Abashiri City where Nagayama had spent part of his early childhood and desired to 
return to after his family moved to Itayanagi.
616
 The group then continued following 
Nagayama’s path and travelled to Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Kobe. What they 
observed on the trip convinced them that although Nagayama had grown up extremely 
poor and hungry, these were not the reasons why the young man shot four individuals, 
and thus they saw a more compelling trigger in the landscape that had surrounded 
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him.
617
 Matsuda Masao, reflecting on the group’s trips to Yobito, Abashiri City, and 
Itayanagi, came to recognize that he had déjà vu like feeling when he visited Itayanagi 
because the landscape was identical to that of Abashiri City.  
What’s more, the landscapes of both Itayanagi and Abashiri City were exact 
reflections of Tokyo and their “uniqueness of local areas was considerably worn out.”618 
Similarly, although he did not understand exactly why at first, Adachi states that he had 
a feeling of “suffocation” when he and the group traveled from city to city as they 
followed the steps of Nagayama. However, instead of encountering a concrete force that 
was causing this feeling of “suffocation,” Adachi only encountered landscape that was 
“just as beautiful as a postcard.”619 Keenly aware that the cities and small towns of 
Japan were “turning into small urban zones modeled on Tokyo,” the group thought that 
Nagayama’s violent outburst was the result of a nearly unbearable feeling of 
“suffocation” caused by the homogeneity of the Japanese landscape.620 The group came 
to believe that the reason why Nagayama had not engaged in unions or student 
movements or become a yakuza was that he had acutely “experienced the feeling of 
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suffocation in these towns” and shot at it out of desperation.621 
 
3.2: The Decay of the First Village 
Satisfied that they had found the supposed cause of Nagayama’s murderous 
ways, the group of filmmakers decided to depict how the young man was made into a 
serial killer by the suffocating presence of Japan’s homogeneous landscape and how the 
same creators of this landscape condemned him for his actions.
622
 Thus, the filmmakers 
attempted to make the perspective of the film match how Nagayama himself “face[d] 
the landscape” and thereby show the viewers how the Japanese landscape was becoming 
homogeneous.
623
 Nagayama’s status as a “member of the masses who grew up in the 
lower-class strata of society” was crucial to the filmmakers because they believed that 
he possessed “visionary eyes” that could aid the Japanese in seeing “another Japanese 
archipelago” that they normally would be unaware of.624 With their interest in 
Nagayama’s landscape firmly established, the group of filmmakers decided that it was 
unnecessary to create a concrete story for the film. Thereby, they focused solely on how 
state power was represented in urban landscapes and carefully trimmed away all excess 
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material.
625
 In all, the group would travel to and film the common urban landscapes of 
thirty-three cities and create what Matsuda would refer to as a jikkei eiga 実景映画 or 
an “actual landscape film.” 626 
The filmmaking group discovered that the landscape of Japan was becoming 
uniform relatively early in their search to discover the reason why Nagayama Norio 
committed his crimes. While in Abashiri City, the first city Nagayama’s family moved 
to after his birth, the filmmakers witnessed a festival which contained a “daimyo march” 
which consisted of a number of locals dressed like court nobles. Besides the court 
nobles, the filmmaking group also witnessed other common festival sights that most 
Japanese would be quite familiar with from films, photos, and their daily lives such as 
“Shintō priests purifying at street corners, portable shrines, floats, flutes, and drums.”627  
Despite its being a common scene that one could witness throughout the 
Japanese archipelago, the group of filmmakers could not help but laugh with 
amusement when they encountered the festival. Although there was nothing particularly 
funny about the scene itself, Matsuda, Adachi, and company found the festival with its 
“daimyo march” to be ludicrous because Abashiri, a city that faces the Sea of Okhotsk, 
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is one of the historical homes of the Ainu, Japan’s indigenous people628 As Matsuda 
writes, although Abashiri had been economically ruled by the Matsumae Han 松前藩 
and governed by the bakufu during the last years of the Tokugawa Era for military needs, 
mainland Japanese did not begin to come to the area until the year 1880 when the 
village office was established. This means that there was no historical precedence for 
the festival to take place in Abashiri.
629
  
The turning of Abashiri into a small model of Tokyo and its inhabitants acting 
out the traditions of the capital presents striking similarities with the “internal 
colonization” that took place in Hokkaido and Okinawa during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in order to try to homogenize the populace of Japan. As is well 
known, one of the longest lasting results of this colonization was the creation of “empty 
culture” at home. As can be seen in this brief account of Abashiri, the culture of Tokyo 
replaced many aspects of Abashiri’s native culture. However, instead of becoming 
completely internalized and adopted as the natives’ own culture, the culture of Tokyo 
became empty after the original colonists and their early descendants died off. This 
vapid culture created by outside forces left the inhabitants of Abashiri feeling empty and 
thus they turned to Tokyo as the source of true culture and as their real home. Yet, as we 
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will soon see, Tokyo offered no solace for those outside looking in. 
 While the above account depicts how an outside society physically replaces 
another society’s culture with its own, a culture can also die from internal decay. In his 
essay “Fukashi no mura no iriguchi de” (不可視のムラの入口で At the Entrance to the 
Invisible Village, 1971), Matsuda describes how a traditional family dissolves from 
within due to a little prodding from an outside force: television. 
Like many of his fellows within the Japanese avant-garde film movement, 
Matsuda Masao states that he tended to avoid television documentaries because of their 
vapid, maudlin subjects that oftentimes focused on how “traditional” Japan was rapidly 
becoming modern and thereby losing its native spirit. Thus, when a documentary 
concerning a family living deep in Iwate prefecture came on the television, Matsuda 
thought that the documentary film was going to be nothing more than overly 
sentimental schlock.
630
 However, Matsuda’s interest was sparked by this particular 
documentary because it dealt with the family of one of the few individuals who still 
earned his living as a charcoal burner.
631
 Matsuda was initially interested in the 
documentary because it was a reminder that Japan had been undergoing an “energy 
revolution” for the previous two decades and that coal and charcoal were rapidly being 
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replaced by electricity and petroleum which led to very poor conditions for laid off 
workers, however, there was more to this particular program than what the film critic 
originally thought.
632
 Originally he thought that the film would contain the familiar 
trappings of themes that aimed to make the viewers admire the “effort of those people 
acting as the base of Japan” and make them feel a sense of loss because traditional 
lifestyles and trades were being destroyed by Japan’s ongoing modernization.633 
However, instead of being an “elegy to natural order of no return,” the documentary 
depicted how such traditional industries dissolved from within and thereby captured 
“subtle reversed relations between cause and result” compared to what is normally 
depicted in mainstream documentary film.
634
 
As stated above, the documentary revolves around the lives of a charcoal 
burner’s family. Many of the children had already left home to work and settle in more 
urban areas, but the eldest brother and one daughter, the protagonist of the film, 
remained at home and were destined to take over the failing family business. Because 
the family home has no electricity due to its location deep in the wilderness, the eldest 
brother, whose hobby is to take apart and reassemble machines, decides to buy an old 
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motorcycle in order to use its parts to make an electric dynamo for his family’s use.635 
However, despite his efforts, the machine is only able to create enough electricity to 
light a small bulb. The father, who continues to busy himself by making increasingly 
unsellable charcoal, is unable to just do nothing so he buys an electric dynamo and adds 
to the family’s ever increasing debts.636  
After having the dynamo set up inside the family home, the first electrical 
appliance the family purchased is a television.
637
 The television does not affect the 
older members of the family; the father continues to make charcoal and the eldest 
brother continues to try to make his own electric dynamo, but the younger children 
quickly lose interest in the games that they created on their own. More significantly, the 
daughter, who was supposed to stay and keep the failing charcoal business alive, left 
home to work at a dressmaking shop in Morioka, the capital of Iwate prefecture.
638
 The 
film strongly hints that it was the presence of the television that made the daughter leave 
home because it presented to her a stronger sense of “reality” than the life she lived. In 
the next section, I will show how the homogenization of the Japanese archipelago, 
although it presents itself as appealing, is hostile to those who do not fit a particular 
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mold, such as Nagayama and the coal burner’s daughter.   
At a glance, one might think that Matsuda’s essays concerning the festival in 
Abashiri and the demise of a traditional family in Iwate prefecture are too different in 
both historical background and contemporary context to have any true significance with 
each other. However, Matsuda writes that both of these scenes, as well as others that the 
filmmaking group encountered as they travelled throughout thirty-three cities, had one 
“common factor which could be called nothing but [uniform] landscape.”639 Indeed, 
according to Matsuda, if one paid close attention to Abashiri with its empty festivals and 
the scenes of Tokyo being broadcasted into a home in Iwate, one could understand that 
all of Japan had become “standardized as a chain of big cities” and that once one 
became aware of this situation, one could not help but see “Tokyo” in even the most 
rural of areas.
640
 Thus, the apple farms of the Tsugaru Plain no longer reminded 
Matsuda, Adachi, and company of “a green forest, but as something just reminding us of 
our gray capital with its white leaves dusted by agricultural chemicals” and Terayama’s 
“desolate sky” of the north was reduced to the “smog” of the capital.641 Therefore, 
because of the uniformity of landscape that Matsuda encountered, he writes that neither 
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in Abashiri nor in Itayanagi could he and his fellows find any trace of Nagayama 
Norio’s true “hometown;” instead, they only discovered miniature versions of Tokyo.642 
Thus for example the view from Nagayama Norio’s last apartment, with its “roofs of 
houses, TV antennas standing close together, and a few green clusters of trees for a 
residential area,” was identical to what everyone can see from their windows throughout 
the Japanese archipelago.
643
 This experience chilled Matsuda to the core, because it 
gave him concrete evidence of the homogenizing force of state power.
644
 
In order to explain this phenomenon Matsuda refers to the work of political 
scientist Kamishima Jirō 上島次郎 (1918-1998). Kamishima states that the “natural 
village” or “first village” was firmly placed on the five pillars of the Japanese “order 
consciousness” that consisted of “a view of religious life, economic life, social life, 
political life and outcastes.”645 These five pillars of “order consciousness” would 
become engrained within the lives of the villagers of the “first village” from birth, so it 
was natural that individuals would use these same pillars, as can be seen in Abashiri, 
when they established the “second village.”646  
Kamishima also states that the second village’s “sense of solidarity” with the 
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first village is based on “past memory” and because the lifestyles of those in the second 
village have to be recreated instead of being lived naturally, they become “remarkably 
ideated.”647 Thus, the unity of the second villagers is “integrated under a kind of 
romanticism” in which the “detached from reality [first village] is beautified, recalls 
strong attachment, and is vividly regenerated on the people’s sympathy because of its 
distantiation.”648  
By the late 1960s, Japanese attitudes toward the first village were changing. As 
Matsuda states, Tokyo has long acted as the preferred destination for migrant workers, 
but their travels to the capital were always in “centripetal tension to the homeland.”649 
By the end of the 1960s, the collective gaze of Japan’s population was drawn away from 
the “first village” and turned towards Tokyo or cities modeled after Tokyo.650 In part, 
the change of the collective gaze’s orientation can be blamed on provincial intellectuals 
who believed that Tokyo was “fertile” while their own provincial areas were “desolate.” 
However, as mentioned above in connection with the coal burner’s family in Iwate, 
television not only helped turn the collective populace’s gaze toward Tokyo but greatly 
accelerated the rate in which it was done so as well.
651
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Concerning the coal burner’s family in Iwate, Matsuda states that the television 
acted as a “window” that “connected to the outside world to this household isolated in 
the mountains” and, because big cities were the focus of the programs instead of 
villages, the daughter was drawn away from her life deep in the mountains to something 
that she thought was more authentic.
652
 Tokyo was more important to the daughter than 
her life in the mountains because of the “fresh originality” that she thought she would 
encounter there.
653
 As a result, the second village/big city came to be seen as authentic 
while the first village came to be seen as a copy. In simple terms, this means that the 
first village was undermined by the big city and it was quickly becoming a miniaturized 
copy of the big city. As a result, Japan’s landscape increasingly became homogenized 
until there was little difference between Tokyo and the provinces.
654
 
Nagayama Norio’s family was too poor to own a television. However, Matsuda 
speculates that the continuing modernization process during the 1950s and 1960s 
affected the poor boy as well. Rather poetically Matsuda writes that “Nagayama Norio 
and his brothers spent their childhood being ignored like stones by the trains passing by 
them.” These trains hinted that there was another “hometown” for Nagayama, and they 
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helped inspire his life of vagrancy.
655
  
 
3. 3: High Economic Growth and the Homogenous Landscape 
Although it is still a relevant theory today, fūkeiron is a concept that is firmly 
tied to the economic and political fabric of late 1960s and early 1970s Japan. As Adachi 
Masao states in an interview with the historian Harry Harootunian, Japan was entering a 
time in which politicians were “casting off the postwar” and “policies for high 
economic growth were reaching a peak.”656 That landscape would be connected to 
economic growth is nothing unusual. Yuriko Furuhata, drawing on the work of Denis 
Cosgrove, states that landscape is “inseparable from the economic and social 
expansions of the urban property owners” and thus landscape becomes “a way of seeing 
the external world” and a method for the “practical appropriation of space.”657 In the 
context of late 1960s Japan, the uniformity of both rural and urban landscape was the 
physical evidence of the “concentric migrations of labour and correlative circulation of 
standardized commodities” throughout the Japanese archipelago that was created by the 
conservative Japanese government.
658
 As a result of this increasingly homogeneous 
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landscape, individuals like Nagayama, i.e. “unskilled manual labourers,” were created 
and destined to roam a Japan that had become one “massive city.”659 
Although I have not cast Tokyo with its ever-spreading homogeneous 
landscape in a positive light, it must be remembered that Tokyo drew individuals who 
believed that the capital offered “something original” and something energetic that they 
could not find in their hometowns.
660
 As Matsuda writes, the journey to the capital 
represented a trek to the “original world” that they had come to know through Japanese 
media outlets. Thus, these individuals, whose numbers were primarily made up of 
lumpenproletariat, moved in an opposite direction “of the folklorists who leave for 
today’s remote areas and solitary islands pursuing our past archetypes.”661  
However, once they arrived in Tokyo, they only found the same landscape that 
existed within their hometowns. Also, to their disappointment, the “original enthusiasm” 
that they had hoped to find in the capital’s expressions of culture was nowhere to be 
found. During a return trip to Tokyo after spending time in Hokkaido and northeastern 
Honshu, the filmmaking group witnessed a festival in Shinjuku and the parade was the 
same as one on television.
662
 Indeed, Matsuda states that the festival was nothing more 
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than the “shade of the media which it had created itself.”663 The scene, which was just 
as depressing as the daimyo march that the filmmaking group had witnessed in Abashiri 
was a “funeral procession of scenery” that bespoke of the death of originality and the 
omnipresence of homogeneity.
664
  
Of course, Nagayama and his fellows wanted to discover something more than 
just homogeneous landscape. According to Matsuda, these individuals were searching 
for a “third village” between the first village, the one that used to be original but has 
become a reflection of the second village, and the second village, which is a copy of the 
first village and has become culturally sterile.
665
 Supposedly existing “at the end of the 
centripetal flow to the second village from the first village, the third village is in fact an 
“invisible village” because it exists as a “daydream” without true substance.666 
Condemned to become “eternal rebels,” these lumpenproletariat were completely locked 
in a never-ending struggle to find the third village; no matter where they traveled to in 
Japan, they were confronted by the same landscape.
667
 However, they continued their 
search for “reality:” returning to the “first village” was not possible because they knew 
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that it is nothing more than a “fictional” copy of Tokyo.668 Thus, in some ways, the 
vagrant lifestyle lived by Nagayama was a “choice” not to give in to Japan’s 
increasingly homogeneous landscape and to continue a quest to find something real 
within the Japanese archipelago.
669
  
Although it is difficult to think of Nagayama Norio as a victim since he took 
the lives of four individuals, Matsuda and Adachi write convincingly that Nagayama, 
and those who shared his class, were indeed victims of those behind Japan’s 
ever-expanding homogeneous landscape. Individuals like Nagayama were created by 
the “homogenization of scenery” and they “are the truth” of how the Japanese state 
oppressed the poorest of its citizens.
670
 This homogeneous landscape, which “involved 
the overflowing will of the government and the power of the time,” did not just harm 
individuals in lowly positions like Nagayama Norio; it “incorporated all the people who 
lived in these transformed places.” The filmmakers’ argument that by “shooting at the 
landscape” Nagayama had tried to generate a “collision of natural things and artificial 
things” to separate the real from the copy thus has greater applicability to the case of 
similarly disenfranchised individuals, including Resident Koreans, as we will see.
671
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For his actions, Nagayama came under the heated scrutiny of some of Japan’s 
most prominent intelligentsia, including the aforementioned Terayama Shūji who 
criticized the young man’s lack of “power of thought,” “power of imagination,” and 
“power of theatrical imagination.”672 Matsuda felt that Terayama and those who shared 
similar thoughts were being overly pedantic and seemed to ignore the fact that the 
young man was one of the nameless masses in the lowest echelon of society, whose only 
choice to strike back at an increasingly homogeneous Japanese society was through 
“geographical vagrancy” and “power of action.”673 Matsuda, Adachi, and the other 
members of the filmmaking collective, after experiencing the “feeling of suffocation” 
caused by the “beauty that was only like that of a postcard,” decided to film “the 
arbitrary power that appeared in the landscape,” that had “alienated and threatened” 
Nagayama’s being to the point that he shot the very landscape itself.674  
One problem that emerged in the filming process was the choice of camera 
techniques. Like many of the other avant-garde film directors from this time period, 
Adachi gave his cameramen relatively free reign with how they wanted to make the 
movie. However, he did ask them “neither to film beautiful things beautifully nor to try 
to film dirty things intentionally,” since he wanted to simply capture the homogeneous 
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landscape of the Japanese archipelago which was like a “beautiful postcard.”675 Simply 
filming the Japanese landscape proved to be difficult for the two cameramen because 
they were too skilled at their professional craft. For example, Yamazaki created a vivid 
scene of the spot at Yasaka shrine in Kyoto where Nagayama had shot and killed a 
policeman who was working the night patrol.
676
 Thinking that the camerawork was too 
good, Adachi asked Yamazaki and his assistant “to take everything apart and make it 
jerky because it was too smooth and beautiful.”677  
The collective hoped that they could create a film that would show how the 
feeling of suffocation caused by this identical landscape could lead Nagayama Norio, a 
poor man with no history of violent crime, to steal a gun and kill four people.
678
 By 
establishing the “common denominator” of Japan’s homogenized landscape that had 
spread “from center to periphery and country to capital,” the collective’s film asked its 
audience to “approach every urban corner, literally as if it were a crime scene, or at least 
a place of lurking danger.”679 
 
3.4: Discovering State Power Within Homogeneous Landscape 
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As a film that contained nothing more than ordinary scenery, Matsuda states 
that the purpose behind filming A.K.A. Serial Killer could be considered the opposite of 
why the French photographer Eugène Atget (1857-1927) had taken photos of the 
“empty streets of Paris.”680 As Walter Benjamin writes, Atget photographed “scenery 
just like a crime scene” due to the fact that “there was not a human form in the crime 
scene.” By taking these photos, Atget helped create “evidence of the historical 
process.
681
 However, unlike Atget, Adachi, Matsuda, and the rest of the collective 
filmed the “crime scene as scenery.” Matsuda’s beliefs behind this statement are 
difficult to extricate because his writing is overly complex, but, in simple terms, he 
seems to be stating that the group filmed everything as simple landscape because the 
fabric of the whole was a much more powerful force than simply the area where a 
particular action had occurred. Certain spots, because of their history, should not be 
considered the only spaces that contain “lurking danger,” but everywhere on a given 
landscape, both rural and urban, should be approached with great caution.
682
 
As I stated earlier, fūkeiron, or the theory of landscape, is deeply linked to the 
changes in the politics and society during the transition period from late 1960s to early 
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1970s Japan. Indeed, Matsuda states that it would not have been possible for the theory 
of landscape to develop during the 1960s alone.
683
 Yuriko Furuhata, in her attempt to 
answer why the theory of landscape was able to develop in Japan during the transition 
from the 1960s to the 1970s, writes that this period of Japanese history was different 
than the 1950s and early 1960s because traditional “macropolitical representations of 
large-scale demonstrations” such as “the masses confronting the state apparatus 
embodied in the form of riot police” were no longer a proper way to present the political 
turmoil of the time.
684
 Furuhata writes that the decline of this image was threefold: the 
centrality of the classic mode of resistance, the masses versus the state was rapidly 
declining; leftist activists, intelligentsia, and artists were becoming disillusioned with 
the revolutionary subject; and Japan’s economy was undergoing a dramatic shift from 
industry to post industry.
685
 In general, these changes simply represent the shift from 
the highly politicized 1960s to the highly capitalist/consumerist 1970s during which 
resistance and subversive groups were defanged by the almighty yen.
686
 
However, despite the rise of these three issues, the methods in which 
documentary films were created in Japan were slow to change. For the most part, leftist 
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documentary filmmaking in Japan during the late 1960s and the early 1970s reflected 
many of the ideals visualized in the Argentinian directors Fernando Solanas’ (1936- ) 
and Octavio Getino’s (1935-2012) film La hora de los hornos (The Hour of the 
Furnaces, 1968). “With a rapid montage of fashion models, Batman, cowboys and 
bleeding Vietnamese children” accompanied by a soundtrack consisting of the rapid 
blasts of a machine gun, Furuhata states that this long documentary film perfectly 
encapsulated “the political avant-garde notion of ‘film as a weapon.”687 Embracing 
Solanas’ and Getino’s beliefs that “the camera is the inexhaustible expropriator of 
image-weapons” and that “the projector” was “a gun that can shoot 24 frames per 
second,” Japanese, as well as other countries’, leftist filmmakers who believed it was of 
the utmost necessity to immediately cover “events from a left perspective” created a 
great number of action-oriented documentary films.
688
 
During this time period, Japanese documentary filmmakers primarily focused 
on creating images that focused on “eventfulness and human action” such as “police 
brutality, picketing workers, [and] marching students.”689 Also, it is important to note 
that the filmmakers were often part of the action itself. For example, the renowned 
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documentary director Ogawa Shinsuke 小川紳介 (1935-1992), when he was filming a 
student struggle at Meiji University, “felt a strong urge to do something about the reality 
presented there from my own [professional] position” and put his camera aside to jump 
into the foray in order to protect masked students from being unmasked and brutalized 
by riot policemen.
690
 Ogawa, supposedly, was fighting a feeling of indifference towards 
politics before this event took place. However, because he was willing to receive bodily 
harm in order to protect the student protestors, Matsuda Masao writes that the 
action-filled documentary “turned into a masterpiece in front of our eyes.”691 
Of course, Ogawa, as well as well as other directors such as his longtime 
filmmaking partner Tsuchimoto Noriaki 土本典昭 (1928-2008), had other reasons to 
get directly involved in the student struggle than simply creating masterpieces of 
documentary filmmaking. As Abé Markus Nornes notes, Ogawa’s and Tsuchimoto’s 
direct actions were implemented in order to spit in the face of “the rhetoric of objective 
reportage used by the television news documentary to veil its alliance with the 
government and big business.”692 Thus, as a byproduct, the actions presented in these 
films energized the student movement and these directors quickly became “cultural 
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heroes of the left.”693 
However, despite the leftist filmmakers’ efforts to help fuel change in Japan, 
the Japanese populace came to feel as if it was “bound in all-powerful systems that can 
seldom be affected from within.”694 The collective wanted to steer their audience’s 
focus away from the “human figure” and turn it towards mundane landscapes because 
that was where they felt power manifests itself.
695
 Adachi agrees that the power of the 
Japanese state can be seen in human figures such as members of the military or the 
police, but they were only a small “piece of the system” whereas landscape represented 
the omnipresence of state power.
696
 Adler, drawing on the work of the photographer 
and critic Yamagishi Shōji 山岸章二 (1930-1979) states that everything in Japan is 
controlled by a “system” or a “mechanism.”697  
In order to explain how the source of power had changed from the human 
figure to the system of mechanism, the literary critic Katō Shūichi 加藤周一 
(1919-2008), states that while “Napoleon, seated on his horse viewing the burning of 
Moscow, made a very picturesque figure,” the former American Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara, “guiding the Vietnam war from an office in the Pentagon” was not 
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of the same cloth.
698
 This is because “the focus of the Vietnam War did not lie in the 
character of the man, McNamara; it lay in the non-human mechanism that he 
represented.” This “mechanism” was what kept the war going, but, because it did not 
possess a physical form like Napoleon, it could not “be depicted in painting, nor can it 
be shown in photographs.”699 
Although Adachi, Matsuda, and the rest of the collective would agree that 
power was no longer represented within the human figure, they might have disagreed 
with Katō that power during the late 1960s and early 1970s was not photographable. 
While he was viewing a collection of photos taken by the photographer Kurihara Tatsuo 
栗原達男 (1937- ), Matsuda was primarily attracted to a “plain picture with a common 
structure” that contained the image of an “empty space” that separates “a huge manhole 
cover…and the lines of warriors (student protestors) passing far away”700 Matsuda, 
after paying particularly close attention to “the weird scenery where all the warriors are 
gone and only the manhole cover… exists,” felt an “unexpected inclination to scenery” 
within himself that he had not noticed before.
701
  
Matsuda was intrigued by the scenery in the photo because, although the 
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student protestors were almost out of the frame and although there was no sign of 
opposition from a human figure, he felt that state power still radiated in it.
702
 Again, 
this desire to carefully contemplate was drawn from a rather new “mode of thinking 
about resistance” in which “the revolutionary acts of human agents” were losing support 
in favor of individuals “investigating the immanent relations of power that are found 
within a historically specific social formation.”703 Matsuda believed that leftists must 
“stare at ordinary, casual, touching, ubiquitous, and filthy ‘landscapes existing 
everywhere’” like the lumpenproletariat were supposedly doing because “[l]andscape is 
the casual window which underlies to the abysm of the end of a century.”704 In other 
words, not only did the homogeneous landscape show individuals how Japan was being 
completely dominated by the state, but it also showed how leftists needed to alter their 
tactics in order to effectively confront the Japanese State and keep the idea of “eternal 
revolution” alive.705 
The historian Harry Harootunian, after viewing A.K.A Serial Killer, states in 
his interview with Adachi that landscape “determines who we are.”706 Thereby, 
Matsuda believed that the average Japanese citizen needed to create a new map of the 
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archipelago to truly understand how the state’s power runs through it. Reflecting on 
how cartographers create different images of the world depending on what country and 
continent they are from, Matsuda asks his readers to place two maps beside each other 
on a wall and compare them to each other.
707
 When he did so himself, Matsuda 
experienced a wave of nausea because certain countries and continents were placed in 
different locations from what he was accustomed to. However, despite his feeling of 
sickness, the placement of Africa and South America on one map, which resembled 
“Siamese twins being forcefully separated” made Matsuda feel like he was witnessing 
“the birth of ‘the third world.’”708 This “third world” of Matsuda’s does not pertain to 
economic status or development, but is “another world as the existence” that depends on 
how the individuals who create a map position themselves and others. They 
“crystallized” their positions as the “people who made the map,” i.e. those in power, and 
“crystallized” those “who were made by the map,” i.e. those who are controlled.709 
Because this crystallization was controlled only by those who wielded some measure of 
power, Matsuda writes that he “could not help but think that we can find another Japan 
for us, which is expressible as a concrete and materialistic map” created by those who 
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held no power, like the lumpenproletariat Nagayama Norio.
710
 
 
3.5. Discovering Actuality 
Although the directors of these were attempting to simply inspire their 
audiences to spring to action and fight the increasingly conservative Japanese 
government, Matsuda, Adachi and the other members of the filmmaking collective were 
concerned with the way action-filled sequences were presented to Japanese audiences. 
Primarily, the collective wanted the audience to be aware that documentary films, like 
narrative films, create “meaning through internal sequenciation.”711 This simply means 
that documentary films are shot and edited in a manner that the director thinks will get 
his or her point across in the most effective manner.
712
 A.K.A Serial Killer, besides 
being a film that attempted to show the Japanese audience the power that existed under 
the seemingly harmless camouflage of homogeneous landscapes, was also a critique of 
mediated images from both the right and left. 
Although the filming of landscapes instead of “revolutionary events” might 
seem like a waste of film, the collective’s decision to do so can be read as a critique of 
the “mediatized ‘actuality’” that was being shown in theaters and on television. Indeed, 
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as Furuhata points out, two of the most effective methods in which to protest 
“mediatized ‘actuality’” was to either film the same material “with difference” or to 
completely avoid filming “spectacular events themselves.”713 Therefore, in A.K.A 
Serial Killer and the handful of other films that were influenced by the theory of 
landscape, “no indictment of cultural imperialism and neocolonial capitalism is 
explicitly articulated” and no “epoch-making events” are included.714 This means that 
the ubiquitous images of protesting students and workers that were so common in both 
leftist documentary films and on the news were completely absent from the collective’s 
work.
715
 Concerning the collective’s refusal to film “epoch-making events,” Furuhata 
states that Matsuda, Adachi, and their fellows desired to disrupt “the revolutionary 
temporality that structures political documentary films of the 1960s.” Normally, leftist 
directors would focus their cameras on “dramatic moments of rupture and change” 
because these events both seemed to inspire their viewers and because they were viewed 
as hopeful shifts in power.
716
 However, by shifting the focus of their film to the prosaic 
landscape of the Japanese archipelago, the collective effectively challenged the 
importance of such events in the Japan of the late 1960s and, especially, the early 1970s 
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when old forms of political resistance—the physical masses versus the physical state as 
represented by the riot police—as well as a firm belief in the revolutionary subject were 
declining.
717
 The collective’s rejection of “dramatic moments of rupture and change” 
can clearly be “seen” in A.K.A Serial Killer in the fact that the group avoided 
dramatizing Nagayama Norio’s crime, in contrast with the dominant trend in leftist 
documentary films that put great emphasis on such things as dates and locations.
718
 
Another method that the collective used to challenge ordinary leftist 
documentary films and the documentaries produced by news companies was to 
implement an early and outdated type of filmmaking: the actuality film.
719
 Drawing on 
the work of Tom Gunning, Furuhata notes that the actuality films lacked the “dramatic 
articulation of a story” because they “contain neither elaborate narratives nor dramatic 
events.”720 According to Furuhata, the collective’s implementation of this older form of 
filmmaking, which was without narrative, was done in order to keep the audience 
members from being drawn completely into the film.
721
 Drawing on Noël Burch, 
Furuhata writes that the transition from the “‘primitive mode of representation’ of early 
cinema to the ‘institutional mode of representation’ of mainstream narrative cinema” 
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occurred when the audience members, who were firmly positioned outside of the film 
during the early days of cinema, became more and more a part of a film as filming 
techniques and theories advanced.
722
 Indeed, the audience members became “the point 
of reference” for films and thereby became too involved with filmic works to truly be 
critical of their contents.
723
 Thus, the landscape film A.K.A Serial Killer possesses a 
power to make individuals pay attention to its banal content because it does not contain 
narrative or formal devices such as “the axial match, the eyeline match, the shot/reverse 
shot, and narrative closure” which would normally draw an individual deep into a film’s 
world.
724
 
With the goal of keeping the audience from fully being pulled into a film’s 
world, the filmmaking collective was able to create a work that separated landscape 
completely from narrative and brought it to the fore so that the audience’s attention was 
completely drawn to it. This, as I have already stated, was different from most narrative 
films in which “exterior space [landscape] frames the action and is subordinate to it.”725 
Although the audience might not develop an “obsessive propensity towards landscape” 
like Matsuda, Adachi, and the other members of the filmmaking collective had during 
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their travels following the path of Nagayama Norio, hopefully, by watching a strange 
“landscape film” like A.K.A Serial Killer, they would develop an interest in the 
landscape itself and actually think of the reason why the landscape was being presented 
in such a way instead of having the answer spoon-fed to them.
726
 
One of the main purposes for the collective’s conceptualization of the theory of 
landscape was to make city dwellers, and those whose rural homes had been urbanized, 
become aware of how Japan’s homogenized landscape represented the oppressiveness 
of the Japanese state.
727
 However, along with showing the oppression of homogenized 
landscapes, Matsuda, Adachi, and company also wanted to show how “protective” the 
Japanese state was of its population. Thus, as Adler writes, the Japanese state used equal 
parts oppression and protection to rear and create “obedient citizens” that would 
continue to homogenize the Japanese landscape.
728
 Because their society was based on 
a protective oppression, the Japanese in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the novelist 
and translator Shibusawa Tatsuhiko 澁澤龍彦 (1928-1987) stipulates, “live[d] right in 
the midst of phantom of an ominous and tricky pseudo-utopia created by techno-society 
and regulated society.”729  
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According to Shibusawa, the Japanese state created these “pseudo-utopias” to 
make the Japanese people forget the “agonies and contradictions of history” and, 
eventually, the “adhesive capacity of the world melting out of shape like Dali’s 
paintings becomes too strong and young people are immobilized like insects captured 
by the sundew.”730 Thereby, the Japanese state effectively imprisoned its populace in a 
state of historical amnesia and the people were destined to remain in what Régis Debray 
refers to as a “purgatory that is comfortable to live in.”731 Debray continues by stating 
that even a person who is against the oppressive state, if he or she “lives in a city 
unconsciously becomes bourgeois compared to guerrilla warriors” because the former 
“cannot understand what physical travails required to eat, sleep, and move” are 
involved.
732
 Thus, the city dweller “lives [only] as a consumer” whose life becomes 
“underdeveloped and bourgeois” as he or she continues to support the power that 
homogenizes Japan.
733
 
However, despite the power the Japanese state uses to control its citizens and 
despite the comfort of the pseudo-utopia that is offered as well, many knew that Tokyo 
and its homogenizing power was the “source of our suffocation.” Yet, because of the 
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simple difficulty in living, homogeneous landscape “keeps spreading everyday while 
people walk through the city in order to survive.”734 Matsuda, through Debray, urges 
the Japanese to cease living their lives under the cumbersome power of homogenized 
landscapes and rise up against it, because the urban landscape, despite its power to 
dominate, is the “life-space of the Masses” where oppression must be fought.735  
As Matsuda eloquently puts it, The Japanese no longer had “‘mountains’ (first 
villages) to return to anymore” because they were “living in a transition period where 
the whole Japanese islands were transfiguring into a massive city.” However, instead of 
giving into the power that pulverized their “mountains” into dust, the Japanese people, 
through the example of the lumpenproletariat like Nagayama Norio, had to build their 
own “mountain” within the “purgatory that is comfortable to live in” in order to fight it, 
occupy it, and dismantle it.
736
 Matsuda believes that it would be proper for Tokyo and 
the rest of urban and rural Japan to meet this fate because of its past evils and that the 
revolutionaries should recreate Japan into a “purgatory in its true meaning as a purifier 
of soul.”737 
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3.6. Landscape in The Man Who Left His Will on Film 
Although the theory of landscape is an effective medium for the critique of film, 
landscape films that were created in the same vein as A.K.A. Serial Killer would remain 
a rare item.
738
 However, the theory would gain a powerful supporter when the 
prominent independent film director Ōshima Nagisa created his film Tōkyō sensō sengo 
hiwa: eiga de isho o nokoshite shinda otoko no monogatari (東京战争戦後秘話映画で
遺書を残して死んだ男の物語 The Secret Story of the Post-Tokyo War: The Man 
Who Left His Will on Film, 1970).
739
 With a screenplay written by Hara Masataka 原
正孝 (1950- ) and Sasaki Mamoru, two major supporters of the theory of landscape, 
Will on Film differs from A.K.A Serial Killer in the fact that it possesses a narrative and 
a plot, albeit a sometimes infuriatingly confusing one. Centering around the thinly 
mustached protagonist Motoki 元木, Will on Film depicts the young man’s quest to find 
both the creator of a mysterious filmic will and the locations where the film was shot. 
The topics of landscape and the filming of landscape greet the viewer from the 
very first scene of the film. This scene, at first, depicts the eye-level perspective of the 
creator of the filmic will as he films a stretch of highway. He is soon accosted by an 
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angry Motoki, whose rage is seemingly set aflame by the fact that the filmmaker is 
filming only landscape where there are no human figures. This situation angers Motoki 
because the leftist filmmaking group he belongs to has “something more important to 
film” than mundane landscape which could be filmed at any time. Thus, in this early 
scene, one can already see the confusion caused by filming something as simple as 
landscape, when one’s filmic ideals are formed by the necessity of filming 
action-oriented sequences.  
After being confronted by the protagonist, the filmmaker breaks into a run. 
Motoki pursues him, but, because of the filmmaker’s quickness and because of heavy 
traffic, loses him and does not spot him again until the man leaps to his death from the 
roof of a building. After a policeman picks up the camera, which will seemingly be used 
as evidence, Motoki runs and snatches it away. Motoki then flees from the scene, but is 
pursued by the police into a dark tunnel where, although it is not depicted in the actual 
film, Motoki is supposedly assaulted by the police and beaten unconscious. 
When Motoki revives, he finds himself within the confines of his leftist 
filmmaking group’s headquarters. The group, which had been waiting for him to wake 
up, inquires about what happened to him after he had become separated from them, the 
fate of the Bolex camera he had possessed, and what was on the Bolex’s film. Motoki, 
206 
 
as well, is concerned about the camera, which was supposedly lost when one of the 
group’s members, Endo, sprained his ankle, and wants to start a campaign in order to 
get the camera back, makes the mistake of stating that “We’ve got to get my camera.” 
This simple statement sets off a vitriolic member named Yazawa who turns Motoki’s 
desire to get back the camera and film into a critique of the young man’s political 
soundness.  
After stating “You’ve still got the idea of personal property” to Motoki, Yazawa 
continues sinking his barbs into Motoki by questioning his true purpose for running 
after the camera: “Did Motoki go after the cops because he wanted to resist oppression 
or was he trying to protect his property?” At this point, other members of the group 
jump into the discussion supporting either Yazawa or Motoki. The argument at this point 
devolves into nothing more than name-calling with Yazawa making such statements as 
“materialistic bourgeois consciousness” and “ownership is betrayal of the proletariat.”  
Endo, who sympathizes with Motoki, challenges Yazawa and demands to know 
what he would have done if he had found himself in Motoki’s position. Yazawa, 
however, is quick to deflect the question and the name calling continues with Yazawa 
accusing Endo of being a “mindless activist” while Endo calls Yazawa a “dogmatist.” 
This scene is similar to one that can be found in Ōshima’s earlier film Nihon no yoru to 
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kiri (日本の夜と霧 Night and Fog in Japan, 1960) in which the dogmatic Nakayama 
spews rhetoric while the unity of his comrades is in shambles. In Motoki’s case, the 
group seems to forget that he wanted to organize a protest in order to retrieve the 
camera and decide to ponder on the best “strategy” to get back the film instead. Thus, 
infighting over rhetoric and planning quickly take the place of direct action and little is 
actually accomplished by the group.   
After deciding that they need to work out a strategy to get the film and camera 
back, most of the group’s members depart while leaving a member named Yasuko 
behind to look after the injured Motoki. Soon after the group departs, Motoki again 
becomes restless and leaves the compound in order to retrieve the camera and its film. 
Accompanied by Yasuko, Motoki inquires about what activities occurred on the day that 
he lost the camera. 
Yasuko reports that the camera and film were lost on April 28, the anniversary 
of when mainland Japan regained its sovereignty from the United States while Okinawa 
remained in America’s military grasp. On that day, the film collective met in front of 
Sendagaya station in order to film the protest that was taking place there. At this point in 
the film, the line between fiction and reality becomes blurred because the scenes 
depicted on the screen are from actual documentary footage. For the viewer who is 
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unfamiliar with the theory of landscape, the documentary segments depicted here are 
relatively stereotypical images of protests in 1960s Japan, but, for the viewer who is 
familiar with the theory, one can see much of what Matsuda’s and Adachi’s filmmaking 
collective critiqued about action-oriented documentary films. Indeed, as I stated earlier 
in this chapter, Japanese documentary makers who believed it was of the utmost 
necessity to immediately cover “events from a left perspective,” and created a great 
number of action-oriented documentary films that reflected Solanas’ and Getino’s ideal 
that the “camera is the inexhaustible expropriator of image-weapons.”740 Thus, these 
directors tended to focus on “dramatic moments of rupture and change” such as “police 
brutality, picketing workers, [and] marching students.”741 
Yasuko’s narration of the events that took place on April 28th fits almost 
perfectly into these “dramatic moments of rupture and change”: “the shields of the riot 
police were lined up;” “the loud commands coming from the armored car echoed across 
the broad avenue;” “Then the riot police attacked without warning. They were out to get 
us no matter what. We used all the film we brought taking that scene.” To make this 
event even more dramatic, Yasuko goes on to say that a plainclothesman police officer 
accosted the group that led to Endo spraining his ankle and Motoki losing the Bolex 
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camera and its film.  
However, despite the fact that the scene is filled with action sequences, this 
segment of the film also reveals some of the realities of protests that normally go 
unrevealed within a documentary film. For example, Yasuko, after stating that “the 
shields of the riot police were lined up” goes on to state that the beginnings of the 
protest failed to meet the collective’s expectations because many of the protestors 
“cooperated so nicely [with the police that] it drove us crazy” and that some of the 
police, because of their large number and because the crowd was behaving itself, had 
enough time “to play with the children” at a local park. These scenes would have 
normally been excised from a conventional leftist documentary film because they did 
not show “dramatic moments of rupture and change” involving “eventfulness and 
human action.”742 Instead, as the promulgators of the theory of landscape wanted to 
show, these scenes demonstrate how documentary films, like narrative films, are 
constructs and that the directors of documentary films are attempting to imbue the 
viewers with their beliefs. Thus, the use of mundane, boring scenes show that Solanas’ 
and Getino’s conceptualization of “film as a weapon” only shows images that the 
directors want to show and does not give the viewer a full understanding of any given 
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situation. 
As Yasuko continues her account, the young man becomes agitated because her 
story does not match the events that Motoki experienced himself. Still convinced that 
Endo had died earlier, Motoki demands Yasuko to tell him what she was doing when he 
and Endo lost the camera. Yasuko explains that she was busy taking scenes of the 
Okinawa Day demonstrations. This answer enrages Motoki who, possibly acting as the 
mouthpiece for the film’s creators and the supporters of the theory of landscape, states 
“How long are you going to keep up this nonsense? Making film into a weapon.” Rather 
surprisingly, Yasuko agrees with Motoki that the collective truly “can’t participate in the 
struggle by making films” and that making films is only a “rationalization,” and avoids 
truly facing the obstacles that must be overcome for true revolution to occur. However, 
Motoki thinks that her words come too late because she had continued to film the 
scenes. 
 Besides offering a critique of action-oriented films, Ōshima later in the film 
also reflects on the power of imagination, an idea that played a major role in the theories 
of avant-garde intellectuals of the late 1960s. While editing some film footage, Motoki 
engages in a conversation with Yazawa and a female member of the collective named 
Akiko about the power of film. Yazawa states that “all mankind is being oppressed” and 
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that the only way for mankind “to break through that oppression is imagination.” It is 
for this reason that Motoki and the rest of the collective create films.  
At this point, Motoki states that “the recovery struggle is more than just getting 
the film back:” it is a method in which he, and the rest of the collective, can fight back 
against the “oppression of creativity,” or resisting the authorities’ attempts to suppress 
creative media. Indeed, as can derived from Motoki and Yazawa’s rather artificial 
conversation and, as I mentioned above, Terayama Shūji’s frowning upon Nagayama 
Norio’s lack of “power of thought,” “power of imagination,” and “power of theatrical 
imagination,” artistic forms of resistance were, in many ways, preferred over direct 
action.
743
 However, as with the case of Nagayama, such methods were simply not 
available for the members of the lowest classes because they were too busy with mere 
survival. Thus, those who were concerned primarily with resisting the oppression of 
imagination were so wrapped in their own worlds that they became rather oblivious to 
the suffering of those at the bottom of society. 
Documentary film also represents a way for Motoki to fully engage with 
history. Before joining the filmmaking collective, Motoki’s experience with protests was 
that of an ordinary protestor, an experience, possibly because it did not measure up to 
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the protests that he thought he was going to be part of, that had left him feeling empty 
since he thought the protests were doing nothing more than “moving side by side with 
history.” However, roughly around the same time Motoki saw a documentary made by 
an independent group concerning the protests that “illustrated history” and thus made 
the protests “seem familiar, personal.” Motoki’s statement is important here because it 
shows the impact the mediated image has on the viewer. Instead of coming to 
understand that protests include a lot of down time and disappointment, Motoki clings 
to an artificial representation of protesting that the media feeds viewers. For the 
promulgators of the theory of landscape, this is problematic because, while the heads of 
viewers are filled with the mediated images of protest, real power still lurks in the very 
landscape of Japan. 
Motoki’s belief that his “street demonstrations were bankrupt” is supported by 
Yazawa who states that Motoki “joined our group in order to use film as a means to 
launch a new struggle.” Motoki confirms Yazawa’s statement and adds that “film 
creates a new relationship between reality and the creative self” in which they mutually 
criticize each other. These beliefs are sound, but, as I will show in the next section, the 
films created by Motoki and his collective have a number of problems which can be 
revealed through the theory of landscape. 
213 
 
To this point, I have primarily focused on how the authors of the theory of 
landscape would have likely critiqued the filmmaking methods of Motoki’s collective; 
now, I will turn my attention to the filmic will that is screened within Will on Film. In 
some ways, as Matsuda Masao argues, the entirety of Will on Film could be called a 
“landscape film,” but the filmic will acts as a “landscape film” in the purest sense of the 
term.
744
 
In an odd scene that takes place after Motoki rapes Yasuko, the collective 
watches the filmic will of the deceased member that was supposedly returned after the 
filmmaker’s death was ruled a suicide. The film itself is very short, but, because it 
consists of nothing but still shots of a residential area, a busy street with shops and 
pedestrians, a stretch of road, a tobacco shop with a public phone, a postbox, and power 
lines, the film seems to drag on for an exceptional amount of time. Due to this mundane 
landscape, one of the collective’s members states that the filmic will “is an awfully slow 
testament” that the filmmaker left behind. While the group watches the film, they 
attempt to find some meaning behind the scenes. For example, as the collective watches 
the scene that contains a still shot of the busy shop-lined street with pedestrians milling 
about, one of the members notices a sake shop and simply states “Maybe he bought his 
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liquor there,” however, one of the other members is quick to note that the filmmaker 
“really wasn’t much of a drinker.”  
This befuddled search for understanding continues with the speculation that the 
director was “after the shopgirl.” This empty speculation continues throughout most of 
the short landscape film with no higher understanding being reached by the collective. 
However, a hint about the true purpose of the film is made when one member asks 
another: “Isn’t that the bookshop you use a lot?” to which the other answers, “Maybe, I 
can’t really tell.” This is a simple statement, but it hints at what the creators of Will on 
Film wanted the filmic will to be: nothing more than semi-static scenes of “ordinary 
landscape.”745  
I went into great detail here to show that, although the contents of landscape 
films can be boring almost to an infuriating level, their contents do make the audience 
think about the films that they were watching. If the creators of A.K.A Serial Killer had 
created a film that had built upon the theory of landscape instead of being a film that 
was the theory of landscape, some of the directors’ original intentions might have been 
lost because the audience would have been too involved with the film to notice the 
landscape which would have likely faded into the background. 
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After the film reaches its conclusion, Motoki and Yasuko are the only members 
of the film collective who have interest in the filmic will and the landscapes that are 
depicted in it. The two screen the film again and Motoki demands for Yasuko to tell him 
where the film was taken; it is nearly impossible for him to locate it because “it’s a 
place like a million others.” Motoki wants to know what possessed the director to create 
such a “filthy film” that included nothing more than images of things like “ a street of 
broken down signs,” “bent and twisted guardrails,” and “a mailbox, weathered and 
peeling.” He contends that “it’s just junk and more junk” and was filmed only because 
of the director’s limited ability. However, Yasuko, countering Motoki’s escalating anger, 
simply states “No, there must be something better there. You just can’t see it.” 
As with Adachi and Matsuda’s A.K.A Serial Killer, the filmic will is steeped in 
the “anti-theatrical” and the “anti-spectacular,” and thereby eschews the “dramatization 
of narrative events and emotion,” which are the common elements found in 
action-oriented documentary films.
746
 Instead, again in a similar fashion to Adachi and 
Matsuda’s film, the mundane landscapes filmed by the deceased filmmaker are similar 
to the images of actuality films which “contain neither elaborate narratives nor dramatic 
events.”747 The purpose of these mundane images was to keep the audience members 
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from being drawn completely into the film so that they would be forced to pay attention 
to the images on the screen rather than simply being wrapped up in “the revolutionary 
temporality that structures political documentary films of the 1960s.”748  
Although mundane, the scenes within the filmic will are somewhat picturesque 
and reflect the “beauty that was only like that of a postcard” that Adachi and Matsuda 
encountered when they followed Nagayama Norio’s circuitous path.749 At the same 
time, through their ordinariness and hushed nature, these scenes can also make the 
viewer uneasy, especially if he or she is like Motoki and is aware that something is 
hidden beneath the façade of mundane landscape. Indeed, some of the members of the 
film collective become concerned while they view the filmic will. One member states 
that the filmic will contain “landscapes which can make you cry” while Akiko, in a 
more direct way states that the work “is beginning to scare me.”750 Like Adachi and 
Matsuda, the members of the collective can detect the “feeling of suffocation” caused 
by the “beauty that was only like that of a postcard.”751 
The reason why the landscape radiated a “feeling of suffocation” was because 
it represented the “arbitrary power of the state.” The filmmaking collective in Will of 
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Film, like most left-leaning Japanese directors of the time, focused on action-oriented 
scenes and epoch-making human activity; Adachi and Matsuda, as well as the deceased 
filmmaker, were different because they were not interested in including scenes of action 
outside of the daily lives of individuals who happened to come within reach of the 
camera’s eye.752 The absence of action-oriented scenes in the filmic will recreated the 
“reverse Atget” plan that Adachi and Matsuda implemented in A.K.A Serial Killer in 
which they filmed “crime scene[s] as scenery.”753 As I mentioned above, filming 
“crime scene[s] as scenery” means that Adachi and Matsuda refused to simply film 
locations where “action” had occurred, such as the spots where Nagayama Norio 
murdered his four victims. Instead, they followed his path and carefully filmed the 
mundane landscapes that the young man had witnessed during his wandering 
throughout the Japanese archipelago. Thus, Adachi and Matsuda were more interested 
in depicting the arbitrary power of the state that could be found in mundane landscapes 
rather than focusing on spots where “action” occurred because they only made up a 
small fraction of the complete picture.
754
 The deceased director of the filmic will also 
focuses on mundane pieces of landscape, such a street lined with shops, a highway, a 
red postbox, and electrical wires to show that, while the riot police that the film 
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collective filmed are indeed a representation of state power, they are only one aspect of 
it. Capitalism as represented by the shops, transportation as represented by the highway, 
communication as represented by the postbox, and power as represented by the 
electrical lines are a quieter but more prevalent and powerful form of state authority.
755
 
Similar to Adachi and Matsuda, the deceased filmmaker also shows how the 
homogenization of Japan has reached residential areas. In Will on Film, there are two 
scenes in which the viewer receives a long view of the “snug scenery of an ordinary 
residential area”756 The first occurs in the filmic will and the second occurs when 
Motoki visits his family home. The creators of the film are strongly hinting that these 
views from the window take place from the same spot. However, after viewing the film 
several times, one realizes that scenes are actually different from each other, yet another 
sign of how the homogeneity of the Japanese archipelago has spread into Japanese rural 
and urban residential areas. For Matsuda, who wrote in an earlier article that 
“Nagayama Norio also saw the scenery which is everywhere, like the ones seen from 
my and your windows,” noted that scenery that can be seen from the windows in the 
“films” is similar to the one that could be viewed from Nagayama’s window.757 Thus, 
through these “films” Matsuda believes that the Japanese audience can witness the 
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homogenization of Japan.
758
 
As I stated earlier, the collective member Akiko became scared as she watched 
the deceased director’s film. I interpret her fright as a sign that she sensed there was 
something more to the landscapes than what was on the screen. These sentiments were 
shared by Matsuda, who was made to feel uneasy by some of the simplest presentations 
of landscape in the film. These scenes of landscape appeared when Motoki “simply 
started to shoot sceneries all around himself without looking through the finder.”759 
Although these landscapes were filmed rather haphazardly, they “were [the] scary ones 
which swallowed up the dead bodies of youth both in illusion and reality” while they 
continued to spread their homogeneity throughout Japan.
760
  
As with A.K.A Serial Killer, the supposed purpose of the director of the filmic 
will was to look beyond “macropolitical representations” of power and to find the 
“adhesives” that kept the juggernaut of the Japanese state running.761 Similar to Motoki 
when he physically engaged with demonstrations, many Japanese “bound in 
all-powerful systems that can seldom be affected from within,” felt as if Japanese 
society was impossible to change.
762
 For Adachi and Matsuda and the deceased 
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filmmaker, the reason why these demonstrators felt like they were unable to defeat these 
“all-powerful systems” was due to the fact that they were attacking them at the wrong 
spots: attacking riot police instead of critiquing the “ordinary, casual, touching, 
ubiquitous, and filthy ‘landscapes existing everywhere’” that held the true power of the 
state.
763
 This call to change focus from the “human figure” of state power to ordinary 
landscape was a method that the directors used to try to further the “eternal revolution” 
which they thought was in danger of petering out.
764
 
Interestingly, although these landscapes were ordinary and supposedly present 
throughout the Japanese archipelago, the assistant directors of Will on Film actually had 
difficulty finding such landscape when they went location hunting.
765
 Matsuda 
originally found the assistant directors’ situation to be humorous, but it hinted at 
something more sinister. In this respect, the assistant directors’ difficulty in finding 
ordinary landscapes resembles the same difficulty the photographer Nakahira Takuma 
experienced when he attempted to “physically intrude in[to] the landscape.”766 
Nakahira had been able to see the landscape when he was “just watching [it] from afar,” 
but it disappeared when he was inside of it.
767
 After Motoki watches the filmic will the 
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first time, he becomes obsessed with locating landscapes that appeared in the film. 
However, due to the fact that the landscapes are so ordinary, he has a very difficult time 
locating them and, at first, is only able to find landscapes that are similar to the ones that 
were displayed in the filmic will.  
When Motoki and Yasuko search for the landscapes again after viewing the 
filmic will for a second time, the landscapes themselves seem to form an avatar in the 
shape of man. Although Motoki runs after the man at full speed, he is unable to get a 
clear view of the “man.” Thus, the man is similar to the landscape encountered by 
Nakahira because it is visible at a distance but invisible close up. As he grows frustrated 
in his pursuit of the “man,” something, unlike the feeling of “suffocation” that Adachi 
and Matsuda experienced, actually strikes back and harms Yasuko several times. When 
Motoki asks Yasuko who attacked her, she points and Motoki only sees the same “man” 
running away. Although an individual can only see the landscape at a distance, the 
landscape itself can harm individuals who oppose it. 
Mundane landscape is not openly malicious and it can offer its denizens a 
number of comforts. However, as Matsuda writes, this mundane landscape, “which 
ought to exist everywhere but nowhere, but then exist everywhere,” questions the 
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subjectivity of the individuals within it.
768
 If it goes unopposed, the “reality of 
landscape” simply “swallows up” the “subjectivity of each individual” and thereby the 
human population becomes the “effects” of landscape.769 According to Matsuda, the 
best defense against this landscape is “whether we can be aware of our being-in-itself 
stared at by the thing (あいつ, the “man” in the landscape) existing in landscape.”770 
Thus, A.K.A Serial Killer and The Man Who Left His Will on Film are warning signals 
for individuals to become “sensitive enough to notice that you are seen by the landscape 
spread out over the window.”771 
The filmic will within Will on Film and A.K.A Serial Killer are examples of 
how some leftist documentary filmmakers were moving from footage “anchored in the 
revolutionary acts of the human agents – to a de-centralized analytic mode of 
investigating the immanent relations of power that are found within a historically 
specific social formation.”772 When one considers the early documentary films by 
Ōshima that concerned the lives of Resident Koreans in Japan and destitute Koreans in 
South Korea, one can see a huge shift from the physical struggles of these individuals 
and their bodily wounds caused by war and the Japanese and South Korean 
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governments to the “‘diagram’ of the microphysics of power’” within the “shaking, 
melting and warped capital” of Tokyo.773 For Matsuda, this shift represented Ōshima’s 
“transposition from jōkyōron (情況論, theory of situation) to fūkeiron (風景論, theory 
of scenery) which also mirrored the same shift from 1960s to 1970s Japan.”774 Let’s 
now take a close look at Ōshima’s documentary films through the lens of fūkeiron. 
 
3.7 Resident Koreans and Koreans through the Documentary Lens 
Before delving into a deeper analysis of Death by Hanging, I will now present 
a fūkeiron influenced analysis of two documentaries that Ōshima Nagisa directed from 
1963 until 1965 that concern Resident Koreans and peninsular Koreans, namely 
Wasurerareta kōgun (忘れられた皇軍 The Forgotten Soldiers, 1963) and Yunbogi no 
nikki (ユンボギの日記 Yunbogi’s Diary, 1965). 
Ōshima’s The Forgotten Soldiers debuted on Nippon Television’s program 
Nonfikushon gekiba (ノンフィクション劇場 Nonfiction Theater) on August 16, 1963. 
Despite clocking in at less than thirty minutes and being broadcasted in a 10:54 timeslot, 
the documentary created a clamor within its audience who sent in their opinions of the 
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film to Japan’s major newspapers.775 Indeed, Satō Tadao, who ranks the film as one of 
Ōshima’s great works, recognized that The Forgotten Soldiers rose above the multitude 
of left-leaning 1960s documentary films not only because of its skillful camerawork and 
editing, but because of the director’s willingness to film scenes that other directors 
would have likely avoided and through his ability to share the anger of the wounded 
veterans.
776
 
The Forgotten Soldiers is a landmark work within the history of Resident 
Korean films because it was the first to break the stereotypes of Resident Koreans being 
optimistic and possessing high morals despite their poverty, and to replace them with 
real men who had been abandoned by both Japan and Korea.
777
 In this manner, Ōshima 
intended this film to act as a wake-up call to the Japanese who had willfully ignored the 
presence of wounded Resident Korean Veterans as a method to ignore Japan’s colonial 
and wartime legacy.
778
  
As Satō writes, during the first few years that followed the end of World War II, 
the streets of Japan’s big cities were filled by disabled war veterans garbed in army caps 
and white kimonos that had been issued to them by military hospitals.
779
 Normally in 
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pairs, one member of the duo would play an old military song on an accordion while the 
other member, who was normally missing a limb or two, would accept handouts from 
passersby.
780
 The Japanese populace felt sympathy for the injured veterans at first, but, 
as most of the veterans gained employment and reentered Japanese society, the 
sympathy turned to hatred for the remaining veterans because a rumor spread that the 
men were faking their disabilities.
781
 By believing this rumor, conscientious Japanese 
were able to dissolve their feelings of guilt when they saw the wounded veterans and 
thereby turn a blind eye to their suffering.
782
 However, it is important to remember that 
the Japanese government, with such things as the signing of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in 1952, had attempted to phase out Koreans/Resident Koreans from Japan and 
Japanese history because they did not fit in with the victimization mentality that had 
gripped the country. Thus, the ignorance of the Japanese populace concerning the 
national origins of the wounded soldiers can be seen as a result of victimization 
mentality.  
With this in mind, one can understand why the initial viewers of the 
documentary were shocked when they learned that the remaining white-clad veterans 
were Resident Koreans. One viewer, whose opinion was published in the August 21, 
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1963 edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun states that “(e)very time we saw their awful 
appearance, we used to wonder why they had to do such things when they had already 
received compensations.”783 However, his attitude towards the wounded veterans 
changed when he understood that the men had been refused help by both the Japanese 
and the South Korean governments.
784
 Similarly, the TV listings of the Asahi Shinbun, 
at first, echoed the disgust of the Japanese public with the Resident Korean veterans 
with the statement, “What a sorry state they are still in after eighteen years have 
passed.”785 However, the tone of the piece changes when it is revealed that “we never 
knew that there were such people (Resident Koreans) among them!”786 It is somewhat 
refreshing to see that the Japanese populace was disturbed by how its government and 
the South Korean government treated their countrymen, but, again, it shows the true 
power that a government wields in erasing the known presence of unwanted minorities. 
Although the number of Resident Koreans in Japanese film went from 
nonexistent to occasionally present nearly a decade after the culmination of the war, 
their appearances in film began to fade by the end of the 1950s or early 1960s. This was 
due to combined reasons. On one hand, leftist-humanist directors struggled to find 
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methods to use poverty to connect the Japanese with peninsular Koreans as Japan 
entered into the high economic growth period; on the other, the lure of North Korea as 
an “earthly paradise” receded.787 While these changes would eventually lead to the 
disappearance of Resident Korean images within Japanese film, initially the Resident 
Koreans who appeared within the leftist-humanist directors’ films were highly idealized 
as paragons of virtue and purity. Thus, Ōshima’s desire to film the wounded veterans 
represented an opportunity to bring true images of Resident Koreans to Japanese 
television screens. 
As I showed in chapter one, thousands of peninsular Koreans were forced into 
the Japanese military through the implementation of “forced conscription” during the 
twilight years of Japan’s colonial period. Of course, while serving as soldiers or laborers 
for the Japanese, many Koreans were killed or maimed during attacks.
788
 These men, 
although most of them were forced to do so, were stigmatized by both the North and 
South Korean governments because they had actively “supported” the Japanese. Thus, 
after the war came to a close, many remained in Japan because returning home was both 
shameful and possibly perilous. 
Although far from enviable, the Resident Korean veterans were able to survive 
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because their “Japanese” nationality, which remained intact at the end of the war, 
allowed them to receive governmental pensions for the war disabled.
789
 However, this 
small amount of security was snatched away from them with the implementation of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952. Although the enactment of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty ended the U.S. occupation and gave the Japanese people the right to 
self-government, it was a black mark for Resident Koreans because it stripped them of 
their status as “Japanese nationals with Japanese nationality” and turned them into 
“foreigners” without giving them the opportunity to choose their own nationality.790 
Resident Koreans were thus rendered “dual exiles” and “completely stateless” in Japan 
because they had been labeled as a people who had “renounced Japanese nationality,” 
and because Japan did not recognize North Korea or South Korea as a sovereign 
nation.
791
 At the same time Resident Korean veterans had their benefits stripped from 
them because they were no longer Japanese citizens.
792
 Having their means of survival 
snatched away from them, the wounded veterans turned to begging as a means of 
survival.
793
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The Japanese government turned a blind eye to them because, after officially 
freeing them from colonialism, it was released “from any responsibility for postcolonial 
settlement for the peoples of the former colonies that stayed on in Japan.”794 Thus, as 
Sonia Ryang states, Resident Koreans lost their human rights along with their national 
rights.
795
 Resident Koreans, at least those who sided with South Korea, would not gain 
basic human rights until the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations, which marked 
Japan’s official recognition of South Korea.796 
As individuals who were not “human[s] in terms of rights and entitlements,” 
Resident Koreans, of course, “did not have a direct access to political life equal to that 
of national citizens.”797 This situation left them in a state of silence because, no matter 
how vindicated their opinions and criticisms of their status in Japan were, “their voices 
do not reach the political realm as legitimate voices” because they were invisible within 
Japan.
798
 Thereby, the concerns of the Resident Korean soldiers would likely never rise 
above “private concerns” because it was ordinarily the concerns of Japanese nationals 
that were able to break through the private and become “public debate.”799 Because of 
this situation, the Resident Korean soldiers, and Resident Koreans in general, felt they 
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were not involved with national tasks that aimed to improve the “common social good” 
and therefore only had each other to rely on.
800
  
The Forgotten Soldiers opens simply with Ōshima and his staff filming the 
Resident Korean veterans going to a Japanese governmental office in order to demand 
that they receive pensions similar to those that wounded Japanese veterans received. 
The Japanese officials, of course, rejected the requests of the veterans.
801
 Afterward, 
the soldiers met with a representative of the South Korean government and again 
demanded that they receive some manner of aid for the wartime injuries. Unsurprisingly, 
the veterans were rejected again, and the representative stated that it was an issue that 
the Japanese government should deal with because the men had served in the Japanese 
military.
802
 After having been rejected by the Japanese government, the men took to the 
streets and gave speeches about their difficult situation.
803
 However, because of the bad 
feelings that had developed towards the men due to the rumors that they were faking 
their injuries, the Japanese populace remained indifferent to their suffering. 
After their efforts to gain recognition from both the Japanese and the South 
Korean governments ended in failure, the group of veterans engaged in a drinking party 
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at a bar on the second floor of a noodle shop.
804
 The festivities begin merrily enough 
with the veterans singing Japanese army songs, but, for unknown reasons, the group 
bursts out into a fight.
805
 Although contemporary Japanese films concerning the 
Resident Korean community, such as Yukisada Isao’ Go and Sai Yōichi’s 崔洋一 
(1949- ) Chi to hone (血と骨 Blood and Bones, 2004) are full of bodily violence, the 
violence depicted within The Forgotten Soldiers was new to Japanese audiences 
because it was performed by a minority group whose filmic images tended to stereotype 
them as being paragons of purity and virtue.
806
  
Although a fight amongst disabled veterans would always be difficult to watch, 
this scene becomes even more unbearable when Ōshima focuses his camera on the 
blinded veteran Seo Nak Won 徐洛源 who, after becoming agitated with the fighting 
amongst his comrades, removes his dark glasses to show tears flowing from his eyeless 
sockets.
807
 Satō writes that this scene is what makes Ōshima’s film different than other 
left-leaning documentaries being released during the 1960s because it eclipsed the 
standard material that most directors were willing to film. As he notes, the early scenes 
of the documentary in which the wounded veterans sought aid from the Japanese and 
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South Korean governments and protested in the streets were no different than what any 
director interested in the Resident Korean veterans would have filmed.
808
 However, 
Satō believes that other directors would have ceased filming at the fight scene because 
of its unpleasant and almost exploitive material.
809
 Ōshima seems to have been of a 
different mind because this fight scene resonated as a “crucial moment” and he thereby 
kept filming it until he “shot the moment that one poor wounded soldier, in his anger, 
took off his glasses and cried.”810 
Besides its graphic depiction of the scarred bodies of the Resident Korean 
soldiers, the fight scene would have likely been edited out—if it had been filmed in the 
first place—by other directors because the reason why the fight occurred is obscure.811 
Although the unknown cause of the fight could be seen as a hindrance in 
comprehending the documentary, Ōshima, in his article “Wasurerareta kōgun no 
hitotachi” (忘れられた皇軍の人たち The People of The Forgotten Soldiers), states 
that “the facts I saw and heard during the shooting were much more darkish” than the 
actual material that was filmed and released to Japanese television audiences.
812
 Satō 
speculates that the words used by the soldiers could have been “attacking someone” 
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directly and, if Ōshima and his staff had filmed these sequences or if they had simply 
mentioned them, the making and broadcasting of the film would have been 
impossible.
813
 Thus, this experience shows how the “factuality” of documentary films 
must be questioned because, not only are the films created in such a manner in order to 
match the desires of the directors, outside forces also control what contents can be 
placed within documentary films. 
Ōshima hones his camera in on the Resident Korean veterans’ scars and 
missing limbs while they engage both in their merriment, as one of the members keeps 
the rhythm of the singing by “tapping only half the length of an arm,” and in the fight, 
showing the soldiers’ “entangled deformed arms.”814 As these scarred men continue 
their fight, the narrator reflects on “this sad fight” and states that it is the result of 
“pent-up anger that can only be vent on their fellows” instead of the ones who directly 
caused their suffering.
815
 After this fight comes to a close, the veterans prepare to leave 
with only the blind Seo Nak-wan hesitating. It is a at this point that Seo takes off his 
dark glasses and points toward his empty socket with its tears pouring down his 
cheek.
816
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Highly corporal, Ōshima’s close-ups of Seo’s empty eye are what give The 
Forgotten Soldiers “definitive significance” and thereby mark it as a changing point for 
Japanese documentary and narrative films concerning Resident Koreans.
817
 Ōshima’s 
simple goal for creating this film was that he “wanted all Japanese to see brutal scars 
and miserable lives” of the Resident Korean veterans.818 However, even more 
importantly for the director, The Forgotten Soldiers acted as a method to make the 
Japanese audience realize that the “wounds on their (the Resident Korean Soldiers’) 
hearts were more brutal and more miserable than their bodily scars.”819 For this purpose, 
Ōshima believed the most effective method was to film “their fight at the party after the 
demonstration parade and the tears flowing from the empty eye.”820 It seems this 
strategy implemented by Ōshima was effective because it unnerved the Japanese 
audience and made them truly pay attention to the documentary appearing on their 
televisions one late summer night.
821
 Thus, the film was successful as a small protest 
against the Japanese who had only shown indifference to the wounded soldiers. 
Documentary films created during the mid and late 1960s by leftist directors 
tended to be highly energetic works centering upon “dramatic action” created by 
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individuals such as “student protesters and workers engaged in political resistance.”822 
This was a sign that the “avant-garde notion of “film as a weapon” had become deeply 
entrenched within the works of leftist filmmakers and they used their cameras as 
“inexhaustible expropriator(s) of image-weapons”823 Ōshima supported this notion 
while it was in its early stage of development with The Forgotten Soldiers. “Film as a 
weapon” was a serious issue for the directors who leaned towards it because they hoped 
that their works could provoke a “‘war,” which was then “not something we should 
object to but something we should start” in order to change Japan.824  
Besides the skilled and finely honed manner in which Ōshima directed and 
edited The Forgotten Soldiers, Satō believes that the success of the documentary can 
also be linked to the willingness of the wounded veterans to release their pent-up “anger 
without paying any regard to appearances” and by letting Ōshima take it in with his 
camera.”825 Of course, part of this willingness simply developed from coincidence, but 
a good portion of it likely developed from Ōshima’s personal attitude as he filmed the 
wounded veterans as well.
826
 Satō states, a “feeling of shared anger was formed” at the 
filming locations because Ōshima did not hesitate to display his own opinions and 
                                                   
822
 Furuhata, “Returning to Actuality,” p.346. 
823
 Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino as quoted in Furuhata, “Returning to Actuality,” p.345. 
824
 Matsuda, “Fūkei’ to ‘jōkyō,” pp.138-39. 
825
 Satō, Ōshima Nagisa no sekai, p.130. 
826
 Ibid, pp.130-31. 
236 
 
emotions within a work.
827
 If Ōshima had acted differently and simply asked questions 
and absorbed the answers in order to mull them over later, The Forgotten Soldiers could 
have been a very different type of film.
828
 
Although The Forgotten Soldiers lacks images of “police brutality, picketing 
workers, [or] marching students,” it does “convey a sense of eventfulness and human 
action” that was commonplace for leftist documentary films during the 1960s.829 
Ōshima’s anger in this film, as well as its presence in his other documentaries 
concerning Resident Koreans, hints at how many directors would become directly 
involved with the actions in their works. For example, as we saw in the discussion of 
the theory of landscape, the prominent director Ogawa Shinsuke, who had become 
“apathetic towards politics while making PR films,” felt the “urge to do something 
about the reality presented” while filming student protestors engaged in an altercation 
with riot policemen at Meiji University.
830
 Matsuda Masao, who would later critique 
action-oriented documentary films, admired how Ogawa puts aside his camera and 
attempts to “guard the masked fighters – those student troopers – with his own body” 
from being brutalized by the police.
831
 Matsuda wrote that Ogawa’s bodily actions were 
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what made the documentary “turn into a masterpiece in front of our eyes.”832 
Although the directors’ bodily engagement within their films reflects their need 
to be actively involved with political movements, it also has the effect of making the 
viewers crave “the thrill of independence” and the experience “of crossing barricade 
lines and taking sides.”833 Thus, being captivated by the “fiction” of the documentaries 
and seeing the directors as “cultural heroes of the left,” the viewers are led to consume 
the filmmakers’ desired ideals.834 
 
3.8 Narration in Ōshima’s Documentaries 
The year after he completed The Forgotten Soldiers, Ōshima would travel to 
South Korea in order to film Seishun no ishibumi (青春の碑, The Tomb of Youth, 1964) 
also for the television program Nonfiction Theatre.
835
 While collecting information for 
filming, Ōshima took many photos of Seoul’s poorest areas and their denizens while 
paying particular interest to the street children.
836
 After completing The Tomb of Youth, 
Ōshima would use these photos to create a short film that consisted of nothing but these 
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photographs, recitations of excerpts from a young Korean boy named Yi Yun-bok’s李潤
福 diary, which had been translated by Tsukamoto Isao 塚本勲 and proved to be quite 
popular in Japan, and narration by the actor Komastu Hōsei 小松方正 (1926-2003).837 
The film was completely produced by Ōshima independent production company 
Sōzōsha and it was commonly screened through “four-walling.”838 
Although Ōshima would name the short film Yunbogi’s Diary after the 
Japanese translation Yi Yun-bok’s diary, the film is not a direct representation of the 
diary because the photographs were taken before the idea of the film began to 
germinate.
839
 Thus, at first glance, the film seems to be little more than an assemblage 
of photographs of desperately poor children selling various goods, shining shoes, and 
simply playing in the streets.
840
 As these images flash across the screen, a voiceover 
quotes from the diary and the audience learns about the difficulties Yi Yun-bok faced 
when he peddled gum or shined shoes, such as being stalked by reform officers and 
harassed by the owners of local businesses who did not want the young boy near their 
premises.
841
 
If the short film’s content had limited itself to the format of presenting 
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photographs with voiceovers reading from Yi Yun-bok’s translated diary, it would have 
likely not gone beyond a work that tugged at the Japanese audience’s heartstrings when 
they viewed the poverty and wretched conditions the South Korean people lived in and 
heard the harsh life experiences Yi Yun-bok had already gone through at such a young 
age. However, Ōshima created a deeper work by inserting images of the 1960 April 
Revolution (Shigatsu kakumei 四月革命), in which laborers and students rose up in 
revolt and were able to oust the autocratic first president of South Korea, Syngman 
Rhee, from power.
842
 
As we saw in my discussion of the theory of landscape, leftist documentary 
directors tended to focus on images of the “revolutionary view of history, which 
privileges dramatic moments of rupture and change” in their films.843 Ōshima, 
cinematically embodying Matsuda Masao’s statement that “‘War’ is now not something 
we should object to but something we should start,” continually states that “the boys 
were there” in reference to the April Revolution and “among the victims killed by an 
assassin’s bullets.”844 Ōshima, through Komatsu’s voice, embraces his own hatred 
against the conservative American lapdog tyrant Syngman Rhee and states how the boys 
were “asking for an ideal, hating reality,” “hating tyranny,” and “hating people who hurt 
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national pride.”845 Filled with hatred, “the boys throw stones;” “full of pride, they 
throw stones.”846 Having wedged these images of the young Korean men who had 
tossed stones at their oppressors in the minds of the Japanese audience, the narrator 
directly asks the boy, “Yunbogi, will you too throw stones someday?” and answers his 
own question by stating “Yunbogi, will you too throw stones someday!”847 
Albeit heavy-handed, this is a poignant scene because Ōshima, through the 
narrator, is emphasizing the revolutionary potential that can be found in South Koreans, 
which is lacking in the Japanese because of their concerns about their own paychecks 
and consumer goods.
848
 When the narrator emphasizes Yunbogi’s power to become a 
revolutionary who throws stones at the establishment, this can be interpreted by the 
audience as “something that you want to be” or want someone else to be.849 Thus, the 
“person idealized in your thoughts” is not who he or she really is. As a result, this makes 
Ōshima guilty of stereotyping Koreans in a manner similar, albeit for different purposes, 
to that of the leftist humanist directors during the late 1950s and early 1960s.
850
 
Although Ōshima’s documentary films were already breaking new ground 
through their subject matter, Satō notes that the director also had a unique manner in 
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which he, or his narrators, narrated his works.
851
 Beginning with his early documentary 
Kōri no naka no seishun (氷の中の青春 Youth on Ice, 1962), Ōshima adopted a 
narration style that resembled a monologue.
852
 Far from being an authoritative voice, 
Ōshima gazed “at people’s actions he could never understand” and attempted to 
determine why the individuals within his documentary did things in a particular way or 
why they did them in only one way.
853
 Understanding that he would never fully 
understand the actions of those he filmed, Ōshima made no attempt to interpret or 
represent the feelings of the young fishermen in Youth on Ice.
854
 Having this feeling for 
his own countrymen, albeit ones of a vastly different background, Ōshima was more 
hesitant in attempting to dissect the feelings of the wounded veterans in The Forgotten 
Soldiers.
855
 Instead, he developed a narration method that displayed his surprise and the 
shame of coming to understand the wounded veterans’ situation in Japan.856 Highly 
emotional and apologetic towards the Resident Korean veterans, Ōshima seems to be 
asking himself “What on the earth was I doing?” when it came time to dissect his own 
past history with the soldiers. Ōshima hoped that his audience members would also 
question their own histories of ignoring the wounded veterans as the narrator continued 
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one-sided dialogue with the wounded men.
857
 Thus, the authoritative narration within 
The Forgotten Soldiers could be considered to follow a slightly skewed version of the 
“voice of God” model. As Stella Bruzzi writes, the purpose of the “voice of God” 
narration style is “to offer an omniscient and detached judgment” and “to guide the 
spectator through events” while telling them how they should be interpreted.858 
Because Ōshima’s narration style shies away from interpretation and instead offers 
loose monologues with the filmed individuals, it might be better to call it the “voice of 
Ōshima” instead of the “voice of God.” Also, despite the fact that the “voice of Ōshima” 
refrains from interpretation and spoon-feeding the audience information, it does work 
its way into the consciousness of the viewer and makes him or her reflect on their own 
history of interacting with the wounded veterans. This type of narration could lead to 
the viewer expressing emotions similar to those of the narrator, which acts as a call to 
action. 
Besides using narration styles to make the audience members experience 
certain emotions, narration is also an effective method to add creative qualities to a 
documentary film. In The Tomb of Youth, which was filmed in South Korea and whose 
subjects were real individuals, Japanese narration overlaps with Korean dialogue as the 
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narrator reads the dialogues of the characters in the film. Because of this and Ōshima’s 
deliberate directing of the subjects of the documentary, Tomb of Youth is a documentary 
that has the “dramatic storytelling” of a narrative film.859 As a result, one has to 
question the translated dialogues of the filmed South Koreans because one does not 
know how influenced they are “by the creator’s thoughts or ideas and how much it is by 
his empathy.”860 With this in mind, it is possible to think of the characters’ “translated 
words” as the tools of the director. In a similar fashion, Ōshima’s impassioned narration 
in Yunbogi’s Diary is the expression of the creator’s thoughts, not of facts.861 Having 
established Ōshima’s use of Resident Koreans in his earlier documentary films, I will 
now turn my attention to the documentary aspects found within his film Death by 
Hanging. 
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Chapter 4: Death by Hanging: the Creation and Destruction of Ri Chin’ U 
 
4.1: A Korean Rapist and Murderer 
Ōshima Nagisa’s film Death by Hanging is the highly fictionalized 
cinematization of the aftermath of the Komatsugawa jiken (小松川事件 Komatsugawa 
Incident) in which the Resident Korean factory worker Ri Chin’ U 李珍宇 
(1940-1962) was arrested and later executed for the rape and murder of the student Ōta 
Yoshie 太田芳江.862 The strangled body of the coed Ōta Yoshie was discovered on the 
roof of Komatsugawa High School where she was enrolled as a student in August of 
1958. Ri Chin’ U, who was a part-time student at the same school, anonymously called 
the police informing them of the murder; he was eventually arrested in September of the 
same year; he was given the death sentence by the court in 1959, his final appeal was 
rejected in 1961, and he was finally hanged at Sendai Prison in 1962.
863
 
The death of Ōta cut deep into the psyche of the Japanese populace because of 
the manner in which Ri handled himself after the murder took place. For one, Ri called 
the offices of the Yomiuri Shinbun in order to inform the police of the location of Ōta’s 
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body and, secondly, he went as far as to mail the schoolgirl’s belongings that he had 
pilfered from her dead body to her family and the detective in charge of the case to 
prove that he was the true killer.
864
 As Ri seemingly reveled in the difficulty that he was 
causing the investigation authorities, he was dubbed the koedake no hannin (声だけの
犯人 criminal with only a voice) and the jokōseigoroshi ( 女高生殺し high school 
coed murderer) by the media as his voice was broadcasted on the radio in hopes that 
someone would recognize it.
865
 Eventually, Ri was arrested because the flowery seat 
cover on his bicycle matched one spotted outside of a phone booth in Komatsugawa at 
the time the call was made to the Yomiuri Shinbun.
866
 At the time of his arrest, Ri 
confessed that he had also murdered a female cook four months earlier.
867
 
The media quickly labeled Ri Chin’ U as an “abnormal personality,”868 an 
impression exacerbated by the fact that he, as a “literary enthusiast” who wrote his own 
short fiction, had written a short work titled “Warui yatsu” (悪い奴 The Bad Guy), 
published within his high school’s literature journal, whose contents supposedly hinted 
of “his criminal tendencies” and thereby gave “evidence of his heartless personality.”869 
Ri’s image was further blackened, in a similar fashion as Meursault’s in Albert Camus’ 
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L’Étranger (The Stranger, 1942), when, after being apprehended, he displayed no 
repentance and remained calm as if the murders had nothing to do with him.
870
 
Without overlooking the horrendous nature of the crimes committed by Ri, it is 
important to examine the manner in which the Japanese populace consumed the 
mediated images of the young Resident Korean rapist and murderer. As Christopher 
Donal Scott writes, Japanese newspapers, besides the Asahi Shinbun, which simply 
referred to Ri as kōin (工員 factory worker), readily published Ri’s age, occupation, 
and address.
871
 This was “highly unusual and unethical” because, having been born on 
February 28, 1940, Ri was a minor at the time of the crimes and, under Japan’s Juvenile 
Law, it was illegal to publish personal information of an underage individual whose trial 
had been brought to Family Court.
872
  
The newspapers readily referred to the young criminal as Ri-shōnen (李少年 
Juvenile Ri) instead of implementing the common practice of refereeing to juveniles and 
their family members by their initials.
873
 More importantly, the surname Ri (李) openly 
revealed and drew attention to the young man’s Koreanness.874 By doing this, the 
Japanese media supported the “criminalization of zainichi Koreans” and, according to 
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the Resident Korean writer Suh Kyung-sik 徐京植 (1951- ) the media implemented 
“outright discrimination” in their handling of Ri’s case by highlighting the information 
that Ri lived in a Chōsen buraku (朝鮮部落 a Korean slum) and that his permanent 
residence was in Keijō (京城), the colonial name for Seoul.875 Besides singling out his 
Koreanness, the establishment of Ri’s place of residence and place of “permanent 
residence” acted as a strong method to denote that he originated from “deviant or 
pathological place(s)” that firmly placed him outside of Japanese society and confirmed 
his “dubious morality” as well.876 Similar to the manner in which Japanese society 
thought about its native outcaste peoples the Burakumin 部落民, it was believed that 
Resident Koreans were enmeshed within “a culture of pathology” that was given 
concrete form within the “crime-bound surroundings” in which they were raised.877 As 
a result, the Japanese populace came to embrace a type of “geographic profiling” which 
employed the “place of residence as the key determinant of ethnicity and likelihood of 
committing a crime.”878  
Although the belief that Ri was “predisposed to criminality based on his 
geographical origin” freed the Japanese of the responsibility of being the cause of 
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Resident Korean misery in Japan, his presence, and the possibility that there were more 
Resident Koreans like him who were predisposed to violent crime, “set off a kind of 
racial panic about the visibility and invisibility of zainichi Koreans.”879 The mediated 
image of the Resident Korean rapist and murderer was thus brimming with Japanese 
prejudices towards Koreans and Resident Koreans.  
 
4.2 Passing, identity, and imagination 
The third of nine children, Ri was born in a Koreatown located in Kameido to a 
day laborer father who had spent time in prison and a deaf-mute mother.
880
 As can be 
expected from these circumstances, Ri’s family lived in extreme poverty and in an 
exceedingly underprivileged environment.
881
 As was common for someone who lived 
in such dire circumstances, Ri became a habitual thief; however, instead of stealing 
money, the young man focused on stealing library books, which helped fuel his love for 
the works of Dostoyevsky and his desire to write short fiction.
882
 Ri performed well at 
school and participated in the student government during his elementary and middle 
school years.
883
 The unrelenting weight of his crushing poverty prevented Ri from 
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being able to attend a normal high school, so he attended Komatsugawa High School 
part-time as he worked at a factory.
884
  
Until the time he was arrested, most of Ri’s classmates were unaware that the 
young man was a Resident Korean. Like a good portion of other Resident Koreans, 
especially those belonging to the younger generations, the young man used a Japanese 
tsūmei (通名 common name), which, in combination with the respect he garnered from 
his fellow students and teachers through his good academic record, kept him from being 
discriminated against during his elementary and middle school years. The sense of 
betrayal and unease that Kaneko Shizuo’s 金子鎮宇, Ri Chin’ U’s Japanese name, 
caused his classmates when they learned that he was Resident Korean shows how 
thoroughly effective the Japanese government’s efforts to erase the presence of Resident 
Koreans had been.
885
 
Ri Chin’ U, although he was a habitual thief, attempted to overcome his poor 
background by excelling in both elementary and middle school, but, as Satō Tadao 
suggests, the extreme poverty that he experienced during his early years likely distorted 
his personality.
886
 Although ordinary sensory perceptions would easily allow Ri to 
understand that he was much poorer and from a “much more miserable home 
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environment” than his Japanese classmates, his sense of inferiority was likely magnified 
tenfold by the fact that he was forced to pass as Japanese each day.
887
 As Terayama 
Shūji writes, each day an individual “take(s) on the burden of a particular way of 
being.”888 Although we tend to think that an individual “‘puts on’” or “takes on the self” 
he or she is in fact putting on a largely prefabricated self that was “mediated through 
culture, language, [and] history” that has dashes of individuality due to “reiteration.”889 
Thus, what one considers to be the self has already been constructed before sparks of 
individuality are added. Although it is disconcerting, this prefabricated self can be 
considered part of the “luxury” of being included within a nation’s “all inclusive 
structure(s)” that generally strictly divides a population into natives and outsiders.890 
On the other hand, Ri Chin’ U was forced by Japanese society to create a fabricated self 
that was actively hostile to his true self. It is due to this, to paraphrase W. E. B. Du Bois, 
that Ri was forced to look at himself through the eyes of the other and thereby consume 
his Korean origins in a similar fashion to that of the Japanese. 
Having to put on a Japanese mask that represented all that was against his 
Korean origins was not unusual for a Resident Korean. However, Satō believes that Ri 
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was particularly hurt by the process due to his keen intelligence, which had allowed him 
not only to gain the praise of the Japanese, but also to further wedge himself into 
Japanese society.
891
 Thus, when his poverty, which in many ways could be seen as a 
direct result of his being Resident Korean, kept him from entering into a normal high 
school, and his lack of education and Korean origins kept him from entering a 
prosperous company, this wounded Ri. He felt that he had fully embraced the idea of 
Japanese assimilation in order to get ahead in life only to be struck down by old, deeply 
rooted Japanese prejudices toward Resident Koreans.
892
 
In order to escape his situation in life, Ri at first turned to books, especially his 
beloved Dostoyevsky and Goethe, as an escape.
893
 However, these books only allowed 
for a superficial release from his troubles, so Ri embroiled himself deeper into his 
Japanese persona “while he avoided looking at himself as a discriminated person.”894 
Supposedly, this deep contemplation of his “Japaneseness” led to Ri’s imagination 
becoming overly “fanciful” and he progressively lost the ability to distinguish between 
imagination and reality.
895
 Because he was “always mentally hungry in his real life,” 
yet his Koreanness limited him in Japanese society, he began to spend more time within 
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his mind in which he imagined himself committing crimes in minute detail. Seemingly 
content within his imaginary world of crime, Ri became entrapped within his 
imagination and showed little care for individuals in the real world.
896
 
Although content in his world of imagination at first, the burden of not being 
able to distinguish between imagination and reality became a “suffocating” experience 
for Ri. Therefore, he intently waited for a moment when “imagination and reality 
corresponded” with each other in order to finally understand again what was real and 
what was fantasy. Being a young man who was rendered impotent by both his poverty 
and Korean origins, it is not surprising that Ri tended to focus on masturbatory fantasies 
in order to find some satisfaction in life. However, due to his near total enmeshment 
within his fantasy world, his imagination simultaneously became more “realistic” and 
more warped.
897
 As Ri himself explained in a letter to his confidant, the North Korea 
supporting journalist (and later filmmaker) Pak Sunam 朴壽南 (1935- ), in order to 
establish a “realistic stage” within the imagination he began with simple “assumptions,” 
such as an imaginary “girlfriend” who could be used for masturbatory fantasies, but, as 
he was pulled deeper into the imagination, things became more detailed and realistic.
898
 
With his imaginary world leaking into reality, Ri began to contemplate how to make his 
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imaginary world perfectly overlap with the real world by assaulting women.
899
 
Having replayed his desired scene of violence countless times in his head, Ri was 
unable to simply attack an unsuspecting individual. Instead, he had to come across a 
situation like the one he had created in his head to act upon it.
900
 The importance for the 
real situation to exactly match the one in his mind was so strong that a planned attack 
would cease if his intended victim walked on the wrong side of the road.
901
 The 
appearance of the intended victim was supposedly of no importance, but she needed to 
behave in the manner that Ri had envisioned within his mind.
902
 Thus, when Ri was 
finally able to encounter the situation that he had dreamed of for so long, he felt that he 
had finally found the spot where fantasy and reality met.
903
 
 
4.3: Backing the Invisible Monster: Leftist Support for Ri Chin’ U 
Due to the fact that he was an incredibly intelligent Resident Korean minority 
who had committed a vicious crime, Ri attracted the attention of a number of 
left-leaning Japanese and Resident Korean intellectuals who were willing to come to his 
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defense.
904
 As stated above, one of Ri’s strongest supporters was the pro-North Korea 
Resident Korean journalist Pak Su-nam who believed that the cause of Ri’s murderous 
ways was the fact that he had been denied his Korean heritage. As Pak writes, “for 18 
years, until the boy was led to his crime, he continued to flee from his real name “Ri 
Chin’ U” and deceive himself and others as Japanese.905 As a result of having denied 
his own Koreanness and having his Japaneseness denied by both Japanese society and 
the Japanese government, Ri became a young man who was neither Korean nor 
Japanese.
906
 This made him lose his own “sense of place,” as well as his “personal self,” 
drawing him deeper into his own world of imagination. Thus, although he understood 
that he had killed the two women, he could not truly think of the actions as his own 
because he had done everything as if “through a veil” that separated fantasy and 
reality.
907
 
Although many later generation Resident Koreans suffered from a similar 
identity crisis, Ri’s situation was made worse by the fact that his family was isolated 
within his own Korean ghetto.
908
 Although there is no definitive reason given for why 
Ri and his family were outcasts among outcasts, it is speculated that Ri’s mother’s being 
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a deaf-mute might have played some role.
909
 As I mentioned in chapter one, social 
networks among Resident Koreans were vital to their survival because they were, 
especially during the first couple of decades after the war, blocked from receiving many 
of the governmental benefits given to Japanese citizens. However, possibly because of 
the mother’s disabilities, Ri’s family was unable to establish itself into one of these 
networks so the family’s position was truly wretched even within the Korean ghetto. As 
a result, Chin’ U and his siblings did not socialize with other Resident Koreans in the 
community, limiting their interactions to only family members. Having a deaf-mute for 
a mother, of course, also played a role in the children’s inability to acquire even 
rudimental Korean language speaking skills.
910
 Ri, with his well-known thieving ways, 
likely harmed his family’s reputation as well because, whenever an object went missing 
in his area, fingers were pointed directly at him.
911
 
Ri’s defense team recognized that Ri had been “systematically denied his 
heritage as a Korean” while simultaneously being “denied access to economic and 
social advancement” because of this same Koreanness.912 Thereby, the defense 
attempted to prove to the court “that it seemed hypocritical, at least, to discriminate 
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someone of a different ethnic background while at the same time expecting him to act 
like a member of the dominant society.” The court, however, remained unconvinced that 
Ri’s split Japanese and Korean identity made him into a killer.913 Instead, the court 
believed that Ri’s crime had resulted “from the weakness of his own moral and ethical 
sense.”914 As a result, Ri was sentenced to death and was executed in 1962. 
After Pak Su-nam established correspondence with Ri in 1960, she made it her 
mission to instill a sense of Korean pride within Ri.
915
 Ri, who was a devout Christian, 
had originally turned to his inner faith to guide him through the trial and his time in 
prison, and was reluctant at first to embrace himself as Korean. However, he would 
come to embrace the relationship he had developed with Pak and analyze his own 
psychology and its relationship to the crimes he committed. This is documented in 
numerous letters, which would later be published in a collection titled Tsumi to shi to ai 
to (罪と死と愛と Crime, Death, and Love), issued from San-ichi shobō in 1963.916  
Eventually, Ri came to embrace himself as Korean, and stated in a letter to Pak 
that “the thing we young folks need is national consciousness. To find the Korean in 
each of ourselves, that is what we exactly need!”917 Because he had already been 
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sentenced to death, Ri accepted the fact that he was going to die and not have the 
opportunity to fully become Korean, however, he supposedly found some solace in the 
fact that “[a]t this very last moment, I finally recognize myself as Chin’ U” and that he 
was able to die as his Korean self “rather than surviving as Shizuo,” the name he used to 
pass as Japanese.
918
 
Although it is noble that Ri supposedly came to accept himself as Korean, I 
find it a bit suspect because, being a man who had a difficult time distinguishing from 
reality and fantasy, Ri might have been very susceptible to Pak’s demands that he 
“should repent [his] crimes and become a terrific Korean.”919 Also, and more 
importantly, Ri’s Japanese side was completely ignored besides the fact that it was 
considered to be the source of Ri’s misery. While most media supported this vision, 
Ōshima Nagisa’s film Death by Hanging, proposed a very different interpretation, 
focusing on how the state-implemented systems of being that Ri craved turned him into 
a murderer and ultimately destroyed him. 
 
4.4 Ri Chin’ U and Landscape 
As I discussed in chapter 3, promoters of the theory of landscape such as 
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Adachi Masao and Matsuda Masao put forth the view that the postcard-like 
homogeneous landscape that was spreading throughout Japan was the cause for the 
feeling of suffocation of disenfranchised members of Japanese society, and that it was 
this feeling that had led, for example, Nagayama Norio to become a serial killer.
920
  
Homogeneous landscape caused this sense of suffocation because it was the 
outward manifestation of the “antagonistic ‘power’” of the state and thereby represented 
the “economic and political relations of domination and subjection.”921 The directors 
argued that this phenomenon was not unique to Nagayama, and that “all people know 
this sense of suffocation.”922 The severity of this suffocation was numbed if individual 
citizens had their proper place within the homogeneous landscape’s social fabric. 
However, if they deviated from the norm and were thereby unwilling to be rendered 
invisible and powerless, the state would take every action to eliminate them in order to 
preserve the homogeneity of the Japanese archipelago.  
As I will demonstrate in this chapter, there is a clear parallel between 
Nagayama Norio’s experiences of vagrancy, murder, and execution and the Resident 
Korean Ri Chin’ U’s own experiences of murder and execution. Although Nagayama 
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was Japanese and Ri was Resident Korean, they were both outcasts, existing at the 
margins of Japanese society. If they had remained there they would have simply been 
ignored, but because they were searching for something more, the Japanese state 
blocked them from progressing and eventually eliminated them totally when they 
committed crimes after their frustrations became too much to bear. In this fashion, the 
Japanese state had effectively created a system that not only ostracized individuals, but 
also concretely eliminated them. 
 
4.5: Searching for the Third Village in the Realm of Imagination 
As Matsuda noted in his study of Nagayama’s case, an unfortunate 
consequence of the centripetal movement of migrant workers towards urban Tokyo was 
the fact that, although their original hometowns, or “first villages,” had contained a 
degree of originality, with the continued emphasis on Tokyo, a “second village” whose 
culture was recycled from the homogenized hometowns, even these remnants of 
originality gave way to homogeneity.
923
  
Similarly, for first generation Resident Koreans, the Korean peninsula, albeit a 
highly ideated one, was firmly entrenched as their “first village” which acted both as 
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their “spiritual foundation” and as protection against Japanese assimilation policies.924 
Thus first generation Resident Koreans were simply not interested in looking for 
something more “original” in Japan because their originality was firmly based in the 
Korean peninsula. However, later generation Resident Koreans were, for the most part, 
unable to think of Korea as anything more than an “‘abstract’ homeland” that was both 
“artificial and alienating.”925 In order to make Japan, which was their “cultural and 
practical home,” more authentically their homeland, many later generation Resident 
Koreans went on their own mental quests to establish themselves as Japanese as we saw 
in the case of Ri Chin’ U.926 
Unlike Nagayama, who as we saw had gained his knowledge of something 
original through its representation on television, Ri Chin’ U gained the knowledge that 
there was something more than his pitiful life by being a Resident Korean passing as 
Japanese. This was an extraordinarily difficult position, yet at the same time Ri’s being 
caught in a “fissure” between Japan and Korea granted him a privileged point of view 
which was neither Japanese nor Korean, and enabled him to see himself as both subject 
and as object. 
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This ability to think of “one’s self by way of seeing the other” allowed Ri to 
completely comprehend himself as being outside the social and intellectual structures 
which firmly placed individuals into the categories of natives and outsiders. This, as I 
stated earlier, damaged Ri mentally because, although he gained the praise of the 
Japanese because of his academic achievements and although he had been able to 
enmesh himself somewhat into Japanese society by passing as Japanese, the full 
benefits of being Japanese were not available to him. However, instead of turning to his 
Korean roots or attempting to make the best of his situation, Ri chased the elusive 
authentic Japaneseness and attempted to get through his troubles by increasing his 
assimilation efforts.
927
 
Similar to Ri Chin’ U’s pursuit of authentic Japaneseness, Nagayama Norio left 
his hometown in order to find the “original hometown’ in Tokyo. Although in the capital 
he only found the same worn-out landscape that existed in his former home of Itayanagi 
in Aomori prefecture, Nagayama took it upon himself to attempt to find the “third 
village which is supposed to come into existence at the end of the centripetal flow to the 
second village from the first village.”928 
Matsuda, drawing on the work of Kamishima Jirō, wrote that this is an 
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“invisible village” that exists solely in the “daydream(s)” of those searching for it. The 
search for the third village, however, was necessary for individuals like Nagayama 
because it gave them some hope that there was a way to escape the vicious circle 
between the first village and the second village. The search for a daydream, of course, 
was an impossible task so it effectively ensnared Nagayama into a life of vagrancy 
which, as I have already shown and will detail more later, would end in tragedy.
929
 
Ri Chin’ U did not physically leave his Korean ghetto in Kamishinozaki, but 
rather began his own search for a third village through his imagination. Indeed, as 
Danvers and Tatum state, the world of imagination appeared for Ri, and his filmic 
counterpart R, when the “restricting and oppressing frames of the nation” would not 
relent no matter how assimilated he became. Rendered desperate, R(i) fled to the third 
village inside his head to satisfy his material, mental, and sexual desires that remained 
unfulfilled in his day to day life with the second village of Tokyo.
930
 
Although Ri had experienced racial discrimination and lived in an extremely 
poor environment, not all of his thoughts were masturbatory rape and murder fantasies. 
One of the most important sequences within Death by Hanging involves Ri’s filmic self 
R revealing both his imaginary world and the contentedness that he is able to find there. 
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Occurring after a sequence in which his would-be executors display their deeply rooted 
racist beliefs toward Koreans/Resident Koreans, R is ordered by the Education Officer 
to engage in a role play with the Public Prosecutor’s Secretary, played by Matsuda 
Masao, and two of the prison officers in order to help the condemned man remember his 
crimes. With the officials acting as R’s younger sisters, the Education Officer orders the 
Public Prosecutor’s Secretary to ask R for some money for a school excursion. However, 
instead of “giving” the sister the money, refusing to do so, or stating that there was no 
money available, R asks his sisters to close their eyes and imagine that they are going 
on a trip. Holding their hands, R gives them a detailed account of their imaginary trip 
telling them of the locales they pass by on their way to the Ueno Zoo. R asks them to 
take a close look at the animals. However, since the “sisters” have their eyes closed, 
they, of course, are unable to see the animals. R then suggests that he and his sisters 
should go to “somewhere that is nowhere.”931  
This “somewhere that is nowhere” is not an overly fantastic locale. R explains 
that there are businesses such as a bookshop and a noodle shop. The sisters become 
involved with the fantasy and ask if the location has a supermarket as well. The Public 
Prosecutor’s Secretary, delving deeper into his role as R’s sister, voices his concern that 
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“we haven’t got any money.” R nullifies this worry by stating that “everything is free 
here” and that there were no shopkeepers to keep R and his sisters from taking these 
free items. Finished with the imaginary shopping district, R then takes his sisters to a 
street of “grand houses” that contain material comforts such as record players, 
televisions, and refrigerators. R describes the family’s own house as having a veranda 
and two stories. This fantasy is eventually broken up by the Education Officer because 
he feels as if the role-play has no role in reminding R of his crimes. However, this scene 
is crucial in gaining a better understanding of R(i)’s third village because it shows that 
his ideal life, besides the free shops, is not overly fantastic but one that is open to a good 
portion of the Japanese populace whose paths are relatively unblocked because they are 
Japanese. Thus because he was completely defeated by the social fabric that makes up 
homogeneous landscape in real life, Ri, initially turned to his imagination where he 
could have his fill of candy and nice clothes and simply be happy.
932
 
 
4.6: Homogeneous Landscape as the Enemy 
Living within a third village through imagination or searching for it tirelessly 
can be dangerous for the pursuant because, as the Japanese archipelago rapidly turned 
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into one massive second village based on Tokyo, the “real” third village became more 
difficult to locate and those pursuing it no longer knew where to stop. Thus, they 
become ensnared within an “endless journey” to find something that does not exist.933 
One could argue that Nagayama and Ri might have found some solace if they had 
simply given up on the idea of finding the third village through endless vagrancy or by 
delving deeply into the imagination. However, Matsuda writes that the very idea of 
being able to return to the first village is nothing more than a “helpless illusion.” As a 
result, individuals such as Nagayama and Ri became “eternal rebel(s)” in search of the 
evasive third village.
934
 
Another reason why individuals such as Ri and Nagayama became eternal 
rebels was that their normal lives back home were simply too much to bear. Like 
Nagayama, Ri Chin’ U was enmeshed within a terribly deprived life. With his alcoholic 
father, deaf-mute mother, and five siblings, Ri lived in a room that was the size of six 
tatami mats.
935
 Not having enough privacy to even masturbate, Ri fled to his favoured 
destination, “somewhere that is nowhere,” or the imaginary third village. As this 
imaginary place continued to grow within his head, Ri was pulled even further away 
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from reality.
936
 During adolescence, Ri began to create imaginary women to serve as 
masturbation fuel; at this point, his imaginary third village became a disturbing place 
that allowed him to fulfil rape and murder fantasies.
937
  
Ri attempted to excuse his rape and murder fantasies by stating that his heart 
was “distorted by the stimulation of imagination,” but, more importantly for this thesis, 
these fantasies coincided with the time in which Ri was becoming concerned that he 
was too deeply caught within his imagination.
938
 Satō states that, at this point, Ri was 
so entangled within his own imagination that he was no longer able to connect with 
others.
939
 However, Ri still wanted “to touch reality directly” in order to “shake off his 
too swollen world of imagination (the imaginary third village) at once.”940 
At this point, we can see that the powers that had homogenized Japan’s 
landscape had effectively prevented undesirable individuals like the poverty stricken 
lumpenproletariat Nagayama Norio and the Resident Korean Ri Chin’ U from being 
able to find their own spaces with Japan’s social fabric. As a result of this experience, 
Nagayama Norio, who “had acutely felt and realistically experienced the feeling of 
suffocation” caused by continuously encountering homogeneous landscape as he 
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desperately searched for his third village, would eventually steal a pistol and shoot the 
landscape.
941
 The purpose of these shots was to rend the fabric of homogeneous 
landscape in order to separate the fiction of the second villages and find the originality 
of the third village. However, the shooting of the homogeneous landscape would make 
the man into a serial killer.
942
 
In a similarly violent method, which I have detailed above, Ri Chin’ U hoped to 
escape the imaginary third village that he had created in his mind by raping and 
murdering a woman in the exact same fashion in reality as he had done countless times 
within his imagination. Thus, for Ri, murder and rape were not simply due to his 
“abnormal personality or just an outpouring of a rebellious spirit” but constituted a way 
to “escape from the pain of forced imagination.”943 
Thus, again without excusing the crimes that they committed, one could say 
that both Nagayama Norio and Ri Chin’ U were driven to their violent crimes because 
they were denied entry into Japanese society by the social fabric that created Japan’s 
homogenous landscape. In the next section I will detail what they actually wanted to 
find within Japan’s homogeneous landscape, and how their desires destroyed them. 
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4.7: Changing Power Sources: From Body to Landscape 
As I discussed earlier in this thesis, in his early documentary films concerning 
Koreans and Resident Koreans, The Forgotten Soldiers and The Tomb of Youth, Ōshima 
Nagisa incorporated a very corporal type of filmmaking in which the scarred bodies of 
his filmed subjects were readily put into focus in order to shock his viewers out of 
complacency. Also, in his short film Yunbogi’s Diary the director freely uses 
documentary footage of the 1960 student protests in South Korea to inspire the Japanese 
to rise in protest in a similar manner. Thus Ōshima often used physical bodies and 
bodily confrontation to show the struggles of Koreans and Resident Koreans.  
Although these depictions of physical confrontations were appropriate for early 
1960s documentary films, Adachi Masao states that, by the late 1960s, the culture of 
confrontation in Japan had changed. The bodily supporters of state power, as manifested 
in the figures of soldiers and police officers, still existed and they offered the state “a 
mechanism of violence” which could be used to preserve power when needed, but such 
displays represented “only a small portion of power” that the state possessed.944 Indeed, 
as Terayama Shūji displayed in his play Nuhikun (奴婢訓 Directions for Servants, 
1978), when most of the physical power of the “master” remains unseen, it can grip 
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those under its control more severely than in its corporal form.
945
 It is for this reason 
that filmmakers such as Adachi and Ōshima, as we saw in The Man Who Left His Will 
on Film, turned to homogenous landscape to find the locale where power manifests 
itself.
946
 
The process of finding the invisible powers behind homogeneous landscape 
was not an easy task because it involved looking away from easily noticeable 
manifestations of state power such as the military or riot police to find something 
deeper within Japan’s social fabric. In fact, these hidden sources of power were so finely 
engrained into the mundanity that many simply did not notice their presence or, if they 
were aware of their presence, they felt as if they had no power to change them.
947
 Thus, 
in order to locate these hidden mechanisms of the state, Matsuda implores his readers to 
carefully critique the “ordinary, casual, touching, ubiquitous, and filthy ‘landscapes 
existing everywhere.’”948  
By immersing themselves into homogenous landscape in order to find the 
power behind Japan’s social fabric, filmmakers such as Adachi and Ōshima, were able 
to detect what Gilles Deleuze referred to as the “diagram” of the “microphysics of 
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power,” which actualizes the invisible relations of power within a “historically specific 
social formation.”949 Described by Deleuze as a type of “cartography that is 
coextensive with the whole social field,” one should not think of the diagram as a 
singular underlying power source, but as a series of unseen and unheard sources of 
power that act as the controlling agents within, for example, the military, schools, and 
hospitals.
950
 
Similar to Michel Foucault’s theorization of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, 
Deleuzian diagrams observe and regulate the actions of the populaces that they control 
while the observed go unaware. As I noted earlier, the photographer Nakahira Takuma, 
in a similar fashion to The Man Who Left His Will on Film’s protagonist Motoki, states 
that he is unable “to physically intrude in the landscape that lays before my eyes,” but 
that the homogeneous landscape itself, embedded with the all-controlling diagrams, 
“brutally returned to” Nakahira his vision as it deeply noted his actions.951  
This is the true power of homogeneous landscape. As I noted in chapter 3, the 
film crew of The Man Who Left His Will on Film had an incredibly difficult time 
locating landscape that supposedly existed everywhere.
952
 Part of this difficulty was 
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spatial, meaning that their perspective was simply off when they entered a particular 
landscape.
953
 However, more importantly, the nature of homogeneous landscape 
allowed it to exist everywhere and nowhere simultaneously.
954
 This resulted in the 
individual being unable to “see” the landscape, but the landscape itself, or at least its 
embedded diagram, being able to see the individual completely.
955
 By possessing 
unobstructed sight while rendering those it observes blind through its evasiveness and 
homogeneity, landscape was able to swallow up the subjectivity of Japan’s populace.956 
Tangled within the power of landscape, a large portion of Japan’s population was under 
the subjection of the Japanese government’s ideological control as well.957  
 
4.8: Desiring to be Controlled 
The novelist and essayist Sakaguchi Ango 坂口安吾 (1906-1955) welcomed 
the absolute devastation of the early postwar period because it released the Japanese 
population from the ideologies that had led the country to devastation in the first place. 
However, because of the “constitutive inescapability” of state-enforced ideologies, or, in 
Ango’s opinion, “human weakness,” Japan’s populace was entrapped by the resurfacing 
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of prewar and wartime conservatism. Indeed, although daraku 堕落, the id-infused 
chaos of the early postwar years caused by the destruction of Japan’s state institutions, 
offered the Japanese a taste of freedom from their past, many were still drawn to the 
country’s “will of history,” which Sas defines as a “deterministic deus ex machina,” 
which acts as a type of “morality” for a population. This state-created morality is more 
powerful than armed soldiers or bloodthirsty riot policemen because it “exists as a 
something internalized in every subject’s consciousness” which can influence an 
individual no matter if they are obedient or disobedient to the state.
 958
  
In other words, homogeneous landscape does not simply observe the individual 
subject like an unseen guard within a panopticon, but through our own eyes because it is 
part of us. While the idea of being observed inside and out by the will of history or 
diagram embedded homogeneous landscape is rather unnerving, one must always keep 
in mind that these concepts are easily accepted by the majority of a populace.
959
 
Although complicity with the prewar and wartime ideologies led to the Japanese 
archipelago being devastated and the ideologies being thoroughly discredited, they were 
not “fully overturned.”960 One of the major reasons why the Japanese populace was 
reluctant to let go of its prewar ideologies was that the “terrifying free fall” of daraku, a 
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landscape where one’s animalistic desires for food and sex were of utmost importance, 
was too much to bear in such chaotic times. Thus, instead of giving away to bodily 
anarchy, the Japanese populace, egged on and prodded by both the Japanese government 
and the American occupying forces, reinstated the “bulwarks against the free-fall of the 
social,” such as the emperor system, which kept the will of history alive.961  
Again, although it was promoted by both the Japanese and American 
governments, the “banal human reality that constitutively underlies the workings of 
ideology and the state” was also supported by the general populace.962 As Terayama 
Shūji writes, “Even as humans are being liberated from an institution…they begin 
assigning roles to other people and transitioning into another institution.”963 For the 
Japanese populace, this was not even “another institution” because they were supporting 
the very institutions they were supposed to have been liberated from. Terayama 
considers this form of thinking to be a dangerous gaffe because the “deformation that 
results from that mistake is extending outward into every part of the world.”964 
However, according to Sas, the dangers associated with clinging to these conservative 
forms of ideological thought are not as important as preserving the social order 
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controlled by the powers that be. For example, in Terayama’s play Directions for 
Servants, the servants quickly restart a recording of their master’s voice so that he can 
regain his symbolic role even when his physical being is absent.
965
 Thus, the “chaotic 
fissure” of the master’s controlling presence, although it offers the servants a chance to 
gain freedom, is quickly reinstated in order for the servants to be engulfed in the control 
of a higher power.
966
 
The morality created by the state’s ideologies therefore forms within the 
individual subject’s self as a type of conscience. As Freud states, conscience (or anxiety) 
is the initial cause of “instinctual renunciations,” however, things eventually reverse 
themselves and these renunciations increase the power of the conscience.
967
 Thus, with 
each new renunciation, the conscience becomes more severe and intolerant and thereby 
develops “a dynamic source of conscience,” which fuels itself through the subject’s 
self-imposed denial of his or her desires.
968
 Although desired by the controlled subject, 
the “dynamic source of conscience,” is firmly enmeshed within the subject as well as in 
diagram-infused homogeneous landscape. Thus, although the power of homogeneous 
landscape might be invisible itself, its power is manifested in the actions and 
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prohibitions of the individual subject.
969
 The more embedded the dynamic force of 
conscience becomes within an individual, the more difficult it becomes to discern what 
is actually one’s individual choice (is there such a thing?) and what both external and 
internal powers have made one do. In some ways, because of the manner in which the 
state wants to control and the individual subject wants to be controlled, the state and the 
subject enter into a “contract-based system” because the subject gains the control he or 
she needs while the state gains its power over the subject.
970
 
As a result of this control created as a mutual agreement between the state and 
the subject, a large portion of the individual’s subjectivity, as we saw in the case of Ri 
Chin’ U, was created before one was even born. This was so, as Terayama states, 
because going out into any given society involves wearing that society’s cultural 
expectations.
971
 Molded by “a nature mediated through culture, language, history, and 
the very relationality of the subject in the exterior world,” the individual is oftentimes 
unaware that a large portion of their own being is controlled by something larger 
because they are able to make individual choices.
972
 However, these choices tend to be 
rather superficial, such as choice in consumer goods, in comparison to the controls the 
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state has over the individual.
973
 
At first glance, the Japanese populace’s willingness to submit to 
prewar/wartime ideologies and thereby allow itself to be swallowed up by homogeneous 
landscape seems rather deplorable. However, one must remember that the Japanese 
government through homogeneous landscape, albeit suffocating, is incredibly protective 
of its citizens and that it is able to command obedience because of the comfort it is able 
to offer its population.
974
 Thus, Japan, thanks to the homogenization of Japan’s 
landscape, had become a “purgatory that is comfortable to live in” and it is this same 
“purgatory” that Nagayama Norio and Ri Chin’U were searching for through vagrancy 
and imagination in their quests to find their own elusive third villages.
975
  
The third villages that Nagayama and Ri were searching for did exist 
throughout the entire Japanese archipelago, however, because of their disenfranchised 
position, these third villages were sealed off for these individuals. Even though 
Nagayama and Ri could have become obedient to the Japanese state as the average 
salaryman, they were blocked off from doing so because they were considered outsiders 
who did not deserve the Japanese state’s protection. Denied simple entry into Japanese 
society, Nagayama and Ri searched for a way to belong; when they were denied that, 
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they both committed horrendous crimes out of despair. Japan was not a “purgatory that 
is comfortable to live in” for them, it was a unadulterated hell that denied them the lives 
that it offered the majority of its citizens and, after these two men fought back against 
the state through violence, it eliminated them through strangling the life out of their 
bodies. 
Although homogeneous landscape is very protective of its desired populace, it 
wipes out things that interfere with its goals, and suffocates the individuals that do not 
conform. Those who fell into the parameters of desired citizenship were numbed to the 
oppressiveness of Japan’s homogeneous landscape because they were, supposedly, 
content and comfortable with the lives that they were offered through their obedience to 
the nation. However, poor and discriminate subjects like Ri Chin’ U were not given an 
opportunity to even become obedient citizens of the Japanese nation; rendered 
“homeless,” they committed violent crimes in order to find some crack in the 
landscape.
976
 Only at this point, the homogeneous landscape, with the Japanese 
diagrams of power fully embedded within it, did finally “notice” these people. Of 
course, it was not out of any sense of benevolence, but out of a desire to destroy the 
individuals that it had created by refusing them the same benefits it had given to its 
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desired citizens. This notion illuminates the deeper meaning of the pseudo-documentary 
that opens Ōshima Nagisa’s Death by Hanging. 
 
4.9: Uncovering State Power through Pseudo-documentary 
After a sequence of Godardian-styled title cards informs the viewers of the 
results of survey concerning the abolition of the death penalty given by Ministry of 
Justice in June 1967, Ōshima’s Death by Hanging begins with a pseudo-documentary 
mode, showing an aerial shot of the former Sugamo prison in Ikebukuro. If the viewer 
consumes Ōshima’s own “voice of God” styled narration without critique, one might 
think that it is simply overly detailed, however, through the lens of the theory of 
landscape, it becomes something much more critical in understanding the director’s 
purposes in opening the film in this manner.  
From the very beginning of his narration, Ōshima informs the audience of the 
landscape surrounding the execution chamber and the curious architecture of the 
execution chamber itself. Supporting the director’s famous statement that “the darkest 
part of state power is kept secret,” the narrator explains that the execution chamber 
“quietly exists in a corner of the vast prison site” where it is screened off from the rest 
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of the prison by a “board fence made of worn-out wood.”977 However, instead of being 
a utilitarian building that simply possessed the mode of execution, the execution 
chamber resembles a type of Japanese accommodation called a bunka jūtaku (文化住宅 
cultural accommodation), which was a common type of rental property for families and 
had helped transform the layout of Japanese urban landscapes during the postwar 
period.
978
 The homeliness of the execution chamber is further enhanced by the fact that 
it is nestled on top of a green hill with flowers such as cherries or azaleas and that it “is 
painted ivory and its roof, made of galvanized sheet iron, is shining in the sunlight.
979
 
The art director Toda Shigemasa 戸田重正 (1928-1987), who worked on all of 
Ōshima’s films from Hakuchū no Tōrima (白昼の通り魔 Violence at Noon, 1966) 
until Senjō no Merī Kurisumasu (戦場のメリー・クリスマス Merry Christmas, Mr. 
Lawrence, 1983) designed the execution chamber to look like an ordinary family home 
because the system of death penalty was “wrapped in a very peaceful and ordinary place” 
that could easily go undetected within ordinary landscape.
980
 As Satō writes, the 
ordinariness of the execution chamber helps hide it from average Japanese citizens 
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because they do not expect that such a brutal ritual would be carried out in a building 
that, “if you ignore the thick rope to hang him dangling from the ceiling,” looks like the 
home of a “poor newlywed couple.”981  
Toda, with his statement that the system of the death penalty was “wrapped in a 
very peaceful and ordinary place,” perfectly conceptualized why the concrete walls of 
Tokyo and the ones found within Tokyo-esque cities and rural communities made 
Nagayama Norio and Ri Chin’ U attack homogeneous landscape through violence. They, 
because of their marginalization, were able to detect that there was something more to 
the world than what was being presented to them, however, instead of locating 
something that was beneficial to their being, they found something that ultimately 
destroyed them. Examining Karatani Kōjin’s 柄谷行人 (1941- ) study of Sakaguchi 
Ango, Sas writes that there is a difference between what passes as truth or reality that is 
easily articulated and understood, such as the concrete walls of Tokyo and the bunka 
jūtaku within Death by Hanging’s pseudo-documentary, and a deeper actuality, such as 
the execution chamber within a building that looks like a simple home, that resides 
beneath the former.
982
 Obviously, the deeper set reality that reveals the brutality of the 
Japanese state is something that those in power do not want obedient citizens to be fully 
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aware of, so the state masks its own brutality through the construction of homogeneous 
landscape.
983
 However, those who display “behaviors that do not fit to the framework 
of hierarchical nation-state,” especially if they are part of a minority group, fully 
encounter the dark reality behind Japan’s homogenous landscape.984 
As mentioned above, the interior of the bunka jūtaku-like execution chamber is 
just as homey as its exterior. With its walls painted salmon pink, all the materials used 
for this mortar-coated ferroconcrete building are standardized goods which would not 
be uncommon for the construction of an average urban home in 1960s Japan.
985
 The 
mundanity of the execution chamber is enhanced by the fact that it contains a 
drawing-room-like room with a sofa, chair, and table on the left-hand side.
986
 After the 
domestic nature of the execution chamber has been established, the spectator is given a 
view of some not so average rooms, such as a holding cell for the condemned man. 
Ōshima’s unhesitant transition from describing the more mundane features of the 
execution chamber to some of its more lethal aspects shows how finely engrained into 
day-to-day life an execution can be as long as it is hidden away in homogenous 
landscape outside of the vision of obedient citizens. 
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Ōshima shows the ultimate power of the state when the prison officials begin to 
prepare the condemned man for his execution. While he trembles so violently from fear 
that it seems “as if all the joints of his body are dislocated,” the prison guards handcuff 
him and blindfold him with a piece of white cloth.
987
 After the condemned man is 
thoroughly restrained and blinded, a curtain is pulled back revealing the execution 
chamber and three waiting guards. The scene gives a clear example of how 
homogeneous landscape, or the Deleuzian diagram embedded within it, controls (or 
eliminates) those within its power.  
The condemned man’s case is, of course, the height of the power of the 
landscape/diagram, but the constant observation and powerlessness one feels when 
faced by landscape/diagram was the cause of the suffocation that Nagayama Norio and 
the filmmakers Adachi Masao and Matsuda Masao felt as they travelled through Japan. 
While the condemned man is being prepared for his execution, the prison officials ready 
themselves in a room where they can easily see him “through a viewing window of the 
execution room beyond the space above the stairs”.988 They can also easily see the 
space below the trapdoor where the condemned man will draw his final breath, having 
the privilege of seeing the condemned man both during his last moments alive and in his 
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first moments of death. They, the Public Prosecutor, the Chief of the Prison, the 
Education Officer, the Doctor, and the Chaplain represent law, capital punishment, 
education, medicine, and religion, i.e. the factors behind the homogeneous 
landscape/diagram of power’s demands that its people become obedient citizens; they 
are also the powers that can take away the lives of those who are not obedient to the 
state. Thus, after the condemned man’s execution comes to a close, the perfection of 
homogeneous landscape is again made whole. 
Besides being a means to eliminate those who rebel against the homogenous 
landscape/diagrams of power, the process of executing a criminal was a “mechanical 
movement” that acted as an “expression of Japan itself” in its most powerful form.989 
Indeed, with the code of criminal procedure acting as the application and the prison 
officials acting as the machine, Ōshima was able to show the Japanese state at the height 
of its own efficient brutality.  
One key aspect of this hidden state brutality is that it needs individuals like 
Nagayama Norio and Ri Chin U’ to empower it and to keep it running. As Terayama 
displayed in his play Kegawa no Marī (毛皮のマリー Marie in Furs, 1967), the 
sadomasochistic relationship between “mother” and “son” can only keep its (erotic) 
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power as long as the son is willing to resist the mother because “violation equals 
pleasure.”990 The mother, thus, needs “to confirm the violation” through punishment 
which allows both the sadistic power system to maintain its own power while it remains 
“a structure for maintaining order.”991 In a similar manner, the Japanese state eliminates 
individuals such as Nagayama Norio and Ri Chin’ U because it both ensures that 
homogenous landscape and the diagrams of power remain the controllers of the country 
while legitimizing that Japan and the Japanese people need its control.
992
 Indeed, 
locked in this system of cycle of “resistance, counterresistance, and restabilization,” 
homogenous landscape needs the Ris and the Nagayamas of the country to surround, 
exclude, and eliminate to establish the social norms of the common people, while 
keeping its power.
993
 Despite the brutality of this system, one must remember, that this, 
in many ways, is how the Japanese reformul[ed] institutions immediately after [their] 
liberation from them.
994
 Thus, the brutalization of outsiders plays its role in offering 
stability and comfort to obedient Japanese citizens. 
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4.10: R’s Failed Execution As Hermeneutic Tool 
It is within this context that the condemned man’s failed execution plays a 
major role at the end of the pseudo-documentary. Although the original audience 
members would have likely known the film that they were viewing was fictional, the 
documentary-like aspects of the opening could have lulled them into consuming the 
opening as fact without critique. Thus, when the condemned man does not die as 
expected within a “documentary” film, the resulting shock acts as an alienating, 
distancing device that knocks the viewer out of complacently consuming the film.
995
  
This failed execution represents the earliest idea that Ōshima had for what 
would later become the film Death by Hanging. As a law student at the University of 
Kyoto during the early 1950s, Ōshima and his law school friends wondered about and 
discussed what procedure the Japanese government would take if an execution failed 
and the question returned to him, along with the desire to film the question years later 
when he read the lawyer Mukae Teruyoshi’s 向江璋悦 (1910-1980) book Shikei 
haishi-ron no kenkyū (死刑廃止論の研究 Studies on the Anti-Death Penalty Debate, 
1960).
996
 Although the future director and his friends were unable to find a conclusive 
answer to the question, Ōshima partially held on to the idea that if an execution failed, 
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the condemned would be pardoned.
997
 However, after consulting with a jurist, Ōshima 
learned that this impression was completely false and that “the condemned convict will 
not be pardoned for such trifles. State power is merciless, so it will just do it (the 
execution) again.”998 The only condition in which the Japanese State would temporarily 
stop an execution is if the would be executed prisoner was rendered temporarily 
insane.
999
 However, even in such a condition, the condemned would not be spared, 
because the state would use any means necessary to revive the condemned in order to 
execute them.
1000
 
The Japanese Officials’ desire to eliminate R after the failure of his execution is 
primarily engrained in the fact that his very existence inhibits the Japanese state to begin 
“reinstitutionalization process” it normally initializes after the fabric of homogeneous 
landscape has been torn.
1001
 Indeed, preserving homogeneous landscape through 
execution can be seen as the state’s method for “reformulating institutions immediately 
after [an individual gained] liberation from them.”1002 Nagayama Norio and Ri Chin’ U 
were able to momentarily escape the prison of homogenous landscape through their 
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crimes which “undermine(d) the order of predominant power structures.”1003 After they 
were captured and later executed, the Japanese state was able to close the fissures within 
the homogeneous landscape that they opened. R, however, because he was a pole within 
the gears of the state’s execution machine, continued to “work on the system” of 
homogeneous landscape, thereby leaving open fissures, through his failed execution.
1004
  
If the matter was simply finishing the execution in order to suture the hole 
within homogeneous landscape, there is little stopping the prison officials from 
executing the unconscious man. However, as the Public Prosecutor’s Secretary states, 
“I’m sure that in section 479 of Regulations it is laid down, that one who has been 
unsuccessfully hanged shall be judged demented and the execution shall be stopped.” 
Unsure how to proceed, the Officials are relieved when R soon regains consciousness 
because they believe that they will be able to continue on with the execution. Yet, they 
soon learn that they are unable to carry out the execution again because the Resident 
Korean man has been rendered amnesic through his traumatic experience.
1005
  
Although this regulation, at first, seems to have a small hint of humanity to it 
because it seems concerned with not causing the condemned further trauma, this is 
simply not the case. As shown in Ōshima’s conversation with a jurist, the state would 
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use every effort in order to ensure that the condemned was revived and properly 
executed. However, more so than simply eliminating the condemned, the primary 
concern for the Japanese state is “making criminals accept their crimes.”1006 Thereby as 
the Public Prosecutor’s Secretary declares, the Japanese state’s purpose is to instill “a 
moral and ethical meaning to receiving punishment” within the condemned criminal’s 
mind so that they understand why they are to be eliminated.
1007
 In a nutshell, the 
primary thing that the Japanese Officials want R to admit is that he is under control of 
the “will of history,” which controls the homogeneous landscape that he had disrupted 
through the murder and rape of two women. By suffering the trauma of a failed 
execution, R lost the Freudian “dynamic source of conscience,” the moral core which 
makes one suppress instinctual desires, which had controlled most of his actions before 
his crimes. Thus, the Japanese Officials have taken it upon themselves to reestablish this 
“dynamic source of conscious” in order for R to be controlled again by the will of 
history or the internalized state.
1008
  
For Ōshima, the primary goal of the conservative Japanese government is to 
instill the will of history or internalized state within each individual who lives with in 
the Japanese archipelago. It is for this reason that the Japanese Officials will not budge 
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an inch as they attempt to reestablish R’s memory so that he will accept his crimes and, 
afterward, be eliminated for his admittance.
1009
 The Prison Officials are trying to instill 
“authentic Japaneseness” within him because he is supposed to feel the same guilt 
towards the state as obedient Japanese citizens. However, because this “authentic 
Japaneseness” was denied him by the state, he is being made to feel guilty towards 
something that refused to embrace him. Thus, in this way, one can see the genuine 
hostility that homogeneous landscape holds for outsiders. They are forced into 
submissive positions by the homogeneous landscape while never being under its full 
protection and they can be eliminated by the powers within this landscape even though 
they never benefited from it. 
Although R, understandably, is in a near vegetative state after his failed 
execution, he manages to put up a passive resistance against the Japanese Officials. 
Demanding that he embrace his lost “dynamic source of conscience” so that they can 
execute him, R’s resists their commands by simply ignoring them or by asking his own 
simple questions.
1010
 R’s failure to acknowledge the questions asked by the Prison 
Officials frees him from the function of either supporting or negating the questions 
asked. Thereby, he simply exists without establishing a relationship with guilt or 
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non-guilt with the questions.
1011
 The Japanese Officials, like the sadist mother in 
Terayama’s Marie in Furs, want R to become actively involved so that they can resist 
him, execute him, and reestablish the harmony of homogeneous landscape.
1012
 R, 
however, does not put up a fight and is able to preserve himself through “disinterested 
abandonment” in which he demonstrates his “independence from that which [he] 
relinquish(s) by ‘walking away.’”1013 The mechanism is analogous to Gayatri Spivak’s 
notion of the “strategic withholding,” in which the subaltern resists the oppressor by 
refusing to fit perfectly “within the framework of a dominant paradigm,” which, in R’s 
case, corresponds to the violent Resident Korean minority from a bad background who 
wreaks havoc on the Japanese.
1014
 
R’s “strategic withholding” is quite individualistic because, while not 
responding to the questions asked by the Japanese Officials, he asks simple questions 
which play no role in the matter at hand. Thus, R is wedged somewhere in between the 
“half-absent presence of a half-present absence” where he is simultaneously engaging 
with the Japanese Officials as he is slipping away from them.
1015
 In this way, R is able 
to create a “radically individualized and actualized ‘self’” that is free from both what 
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the Japanese Officials think he should be and the will of history that powers the 
Deleuzian diagrams within homogeneous Japanese landscape.
1016
 This is a difficult task 
because there is “no intersubjective, collective belief” created by the will of history to 
grasp on to, so R must recreate himself by himself without the comfortable purgatory of 
homogeneous landscape, which was not available to him in the first place.
1017
 This 
represents true freedom for R and acts as a method of escaping homogeneous landscape. 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
As I discussed throughout this thesis, one major problem with the 
representation of Resident Koreans in Japanese films is that often Resident Koreans are 
not really the subjects of the films, but rather they simply act as the “device” and “stage” 
for the directors to fight such things as Japanese national identity and state ideology.
1018
 
As can be expected from this situation, many Resident Korean characters created during 
this time period were rather one-dimensional. 
One manner in which avant-garde directors “reduced” their characters was 
through not giving them names.
1019
 In Death by Hanging the protagonist is simply 
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known as “R.” Although this single letter name obviously is a reference to his historical 
counterpart Ri Chin’ U, Yomota states that another purpose for using this alphabetized 
name is that R has been reduced to an existence that no longer has a specific name or 
personality.
1020
 As a result of reducing R down to this basic existence, the Resident 
Korean character simply becomes a statistic: another unknown minority viciously wiped 
out by the power of the Japanese state.
1021
 Boiled down to his basic essence, R, in 
Ōshima’s own words, becomes an “abstract existence.”1022 R is not a subject himself, 
but exists in the execution chamber as “the other” where the Japanese Officials can 
build up their own drama.
1023
 Thus, he acts as a sponge for the evils of the Japanese 
state both past and present while remaining, in Ogi Morihiko’s terms, a “blockhead.”1024 
Thus, in many ways, R is a rather unsatisfying character due to only being a mirror of 
the Japanese. 
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Conclusion 
As a result of Resident Korean characters acting as mirrors to the Japanese, the 
Japanese filmic world during the 1960s had yet to receive a fully realized Resident 
Korean character.”1025 The images of Japan’s largest minority were limited to 
“intellectual works” that did not truly reflect the Resident Korean community in Japan. 
However, as I demonstrated in my analysis of Oshima’s works, some directors built on 
this use of the Resident Koreans as mirrors in a more sophisticated, self-reflexive way, 
and used it as a basis for broader social critique. 
Discussing Ōshima Nagisa’s film Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence, Masao 
Miyoshi writes that the director was “determined to locate himself in the place of the 
Other and to look back at himself.”1026 Supporting this statement, Satō Tadao, writing 
on Ōshima’s early documentary work The Forgotten Soldiers, states that the short work 
is considered a masterpiece among countless television documentaries made during the 
1960s because of the manner in which the director filmed the disabled Resident Korean 
veterans.
1027
 Indeed, in this seminal work, the Resident Korean veterans broke the 
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stereotypes created by leftist-humanist directors of their being happy and content 
individuals who were not degraded by their abject poverty by bursting into a violent 
fight.
1028
 Part of Ōshima’s success in being able to film this scene was pure luck, but 
Satō believes that the Resident Korean soldiers allowed Ōshima to film their anger 
because he shared their sense of anger.
1029
  
Ōshima was supposedly able to “assimilate himself” to the manner in which 
Resident Koreans looked at the Japanese populace and then returned this gaze to his 
Japanese audiences so that they would better understand themselves through Resident 
Korean eyes.
1030
 Thus Ōshima was able, in some ways, to find the “fissure” that 
Resident Koreans like Ri Chin’ U stood in that gave him a “privileged point of view” 
which allowed him to understand Japan from both a Japanese and a Resident Korean 
perspective.
1031
 The director possessed a “parallax view” in which he was able to 
develop “two different but simultaneous interpretations” while viewing his filmed 
subjects through both Japanese and Resident Korean eyes.
1032
 
With his supposed ability to look through “multiple identities” while filming a 
subject, Ōshima’s desire to always add a “Korean point of view when we think about 
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Japanese problems” seems quite profound.1033 Indeed, he believed that since “Koreans 
are a mirror to the Japanese,” the Japanese populace could come to a better 
understanding of itself.
1034
 However, one needs to take special care with the manner in 
which Ōshima, as well as other leftist intellectuals, used a Korean/Resident Korean 
perspective in order “to look back at himself” and the rest of the Japanese population.  
For example, the playwright Kinoshita Junji, who wrote a play based on the 
Komatsugawa Incident titled Kuchibue ga fuyu no sora ni (口笛が冬の空に A Whistle 
in the Winter Sky, 1961), stated that “If something called the zainichi Korean problem 
exists, then it is a problem created by the Japanese.”1035 By believing that Resident 
Korean issues were totally “created by the Japanese,” many leftist Japanese used them 
as a mirror to reflect the aspects of being Japanese and living in Japan that they hated 
the most. Ōe Kenzaburō, writing about Ri Chin’ U and how the hardships of the young 
factory worker’s life led to his committing violent crimes, writes that “(w)e ourselves 
are the ones who committed rape and were hanged for it.” However, because they were 
the ones who simply led Ri to his crimes instead of actually committing them, they, the 
Japanese, also “belong to the side that placed the rope around his neck.”1036 Going 
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deeper than simply being concerned about the welfare of Resident Koreans, Kinoshita, 
Ōe, and, of course, Ōshima use Resident Koreans as “devices and stages to project the 
problem of the state called Japan”1037 Deeply concerned with the state of the wretched 
state of their own Japaneseness, many Japanese leftists, as the anarchist and critic 
Takenaka Rō 竹中労 (1930-1991) wrote, used Resident Koreans, as the “symbol of 
alienation,” which was incorporated to reveal such things as “discrimination, a sense of 
national greatness, and various other rotten parts [that still] linger[ed] in [the Japanese] 
subconscious.”1038 
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